Traditionalism and Universalism

This chapter begins with some remarks about what traditionalism, for all its difficulties, gets right, and why orthodox Christians are rightly reticent to abandon it. The author then moves on to universalism, first identifying what he takes to be its most plausible variety and then presenting select arguments on its behalf that are especially powerful and that pose the greatest challenge to anti-universalists. The most basic and fundamental argument in support of universalism is that the salvation of all persons seems to follow from two theological assumptions that are central to orthodox theism: that God is perfectly loving and that God is perfectly sovereign. Some further arguments from two of the foremost defenders of universalism, Marilyn Adams and Thomas Talbott, are given special consideration.

Conclusion

In some brief concluding remarks, the author considers the degree to which his proposed model is successful, according to the criteria established in the book’s introduction, in addressing the problem of hell as a “weak” theodicy. He contends that the model should be judged a success when evaluated on these terms, while recognizing that this is not enough to demonstrate that its claims actually are true. In closing, the author considers whether the divine presence model, or the broader theological framework in which it is most naturally situated, supports any reasonable conjectures as to what lies beyond the Day of Judgment.

The Doxastic Problem

Unlike the problem of justice and the problem of love, which aim to reveal some inner tension or implicit contradiction between the doctrine of hell and other parts of orthodox theism, there is a different kind of problem that stems from individual and collective belief in the doctrine: this the author terms the doxastic problem of hell. The general problem here is that thoroughgoing belief in hell seems prima facie incompatible with other beliefs, actions, and attitudes that are fundamental to the Christian faith. This chapter develops the problem in numerous forms, addressing various difficulties that arise concerning moral and religious motivation, love for God and neighbor, freedom, coercion, and despair. What these problems seem to demonstrate, individually and collectively, is that belief in hell is unedifying and perhaps even epistemically self-defeating. An adequate solution to the problem of hell, therefore, must somehow address these issues.

The Choice Model

According to the choice model, damnation is, in some important sense, chosen by the damned: God is simply respecting human free will in consigning some to hell. The choice model is subdivided into two general forms, corresponding to the way that damnation can be chosen either directly or indirectly. The first form, which sees damnation as the explicit and direct object of choice of those who are finally lost, faces the challenge of explaining motive: why would anyone freely choose eternal damnation? The second form, in which damnation is the natural consequence of certain free choices but not that which is chosen directly, faces the challenge of explaining why God does not annihilate the damned, mercifully putting them out of their misery. The author argues that Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death contains conceptual resources for addressing both of these challenges and thereby strengthening the choice model significantly; nevertheless, even this version faces difficulties that prevent it from being entirely satisfactory.

Addendum

There is currently a growing movement among some Christian philosophers to defend Reformed/Calvinist theological commitments with analytical precision and rigor. A number of the characteristic commitments of Reformed theology bear importantly on the problem of hell; the most important of these is theological determinism, which, when combined with a rejection of universalism, raises a host of serious problems. In addition to exacerbating concerns about divine justice and love, there are at least two doxastic problems that are unique to Calvinism. First is the problem of faith: a necessary condition of faith is trust, but a thorough understanding of the implications of Calvinist theology would seem to undermine one’s grounds for reasonably trusting God. Second is the problem of hope: Calvinism is incompatible with at least one of the deepest hopes of the Christian faith, while encouraging another hope that is thoroughly unedifying, and perhaps even despairing.

Introduction

There are many different criteria by which one might judge a particular solution to the problem of hell to be adequate or inadequate. The author discusses a number of such possibilities, noting that the problem of hell is more or less difficult to solve depending on one’s standards, and that each must judge for him- or herself what kind of solution will count as adequate. Following this, the author discusses the two broad types of solution that might be developed to address the problem of hell—namely, theodicy and defense—and sets out to construct a theodicy of hell in the “weak” sense—that is, a solution that demonstrates that all of the accepted constraints are reconcilable under a certain model which is itself plausible.

Objections, Replies, and Further Refinements

With the initial philosophical and theological case for the divine presence model in place, the author considers some objections, most of which the model can handle in the form introduced in the previous chapter, but one of which reveals the need for an additional component. First, the author considers the way that the divine presence model handles the biggest problems faced by its closest competitors, traditionalism and the choice model. He then turns to some challenges that are specific to the divine presence model’s way of understanding hell. In closing, he develops a variety of different hybrid views, which combine key elements of the divine presence model with other elements that are constitutive of one or more of the standard views. A number of such hybrid views are found in an inchoate form in the existing literature; the chapter briefly evaluates these, giving special attention to Talbott’s hybrid universalist model.

Developing an Alternative to the Standard Options

This chapter introduces the basic idea of the divine presence model, briefly tracing its roots in Eastern Orthodox theology, and then turning to the task of making the positive philosophical case for the view. The author argues that the problem of divine hiddenness is intertwined with the problem of hell, and reflection on the problem lends support to the divine presence model even as it reveals critical weaknesses in its competitors. The chapter then explores the way that the divine presence model receives further support from a classic treatment of the phenomenology of religious experience. In closing, the author considers the way that the model rejects the claim that the purpose of hell is retribution, yet still manages to accommodate the traditional idea that the punishment of hell is inflicted upon the damned, rather than being a simple function of the choices of those who are finally lost.

Annihilationism

In general, annihilationism is the view that there are some persons who will not be saved, but instead will cease to exist at some point. There are a number of different ways that annihilationism can be developed, however, including both retributive and non-retributive versions. The chapter argues that the retributive versions face the same basic problems as traditionalism. The non-retributive versions come in two main forms: those that focus on the natural consequences of sin, and those that focus on human free will. According to the first, annihilation is the natural, albeit unintended consequence of persistence in sin and/or self-exclusion from the presence of God. According to the second, annihilation is that which follows—either with or without divine assistance—a certain intention on the part of the one who is damned to bring about his or her own nonexistence. The author argues that each view turns out to have unacceptable consequences.

Providence, Freedom, and God’s Creation of the Damned

In the view of many anti-universalists, human free will is both a great good and that which poses the greatest obstacle to universalism. If created persons have free will, then it seems it is finally up to those persons, and not up to God, whether all will be saved. This is the most popular argument against universalism, but it turns out to be complicated by the fact that the metaphysical assumptions that drive it themselves generate problems for anti-universalists. For a variety of reasons, anti-universalism turns out to be ill-wed to each of the standard accounts of providence—viz., compatibilism, Molinism, and open theism—as none provides the anti-universalist with an adequate explanation of why God creates the damned. The chapter closes with a discussion of why the author is nevertheless unwilling to embrace universalism.