Introduction
There are many different criteria by which one might judge a particular solution to the problem of hell to be adequate or inadequate. The author discusses a number of such possibilities, noting that the problem of hell is more or less difficult to solve depending on one’s standards, and that each must judge for him- or herself what kind of solution will count as adequate. Following this, the author discusses the two broad types of solution that might be developed to address the problem of hell—namely, theodicy and defense—and sets out to construct a theodicy of hell in the “weak” sense—that is, a solution that demonstrates that all of the accepted constraints are reconcilable under a certain model which is itself plausible.
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2004 ◽
Vol 19
(17)
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pp. 1291-1296
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2014 ◽
Vol 150
(10)
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pp. 1729-1741
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2013 ◽
Vol 2013
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pp. 1-5
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2014 ◽
Vol 28
(4)
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pp. 99-120
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2017 ◽
Vol 2017
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pp. 1-15
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1999 ◽
Vol 150
(1)
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pp. 239-267
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