Annihilationism

Author(s):  
R. Zachary Manis

In general, annihilationism is the view that there are some persons who will not be saved, but instead will cease to exist at some point. There are a number of different ways that annihilationism can be developed, however, including both retributive and non-retributive versions. The chapter argues that the retributive versions face the same basic problems as traditionalism. The non-retributive versions come in two main forms: those that focus on the natural consequences of sin, and those that focus on human free will. According to the first, annihilation is the natural, albeit unintended consequence of persistence in sin and/or self-exclusion from the presence of God. According to the second, annihilation is that which follows—either with or without divine assistance—a certain intention on the part of the one who is damned to bring about his or her own nonexistence. The author argues that each view turns out to have unacceptable consequences.

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-150
Author(s):  
Eleonora Rai

AbstractThis article retraces the intra-Jesuit theological debates on the theology of salvation, including the relationship between the elements of predestination, God’s foreknowledge, Grace, and free will, in the delicate passage between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, and within the debates on Augustine’s theological legacy. Specifically, it explores the Flemish Jesuit Leonard Lessius’ theology and the discussions raised by it within the Society of Jesus, in order to show how soteriology has been central in the process of self-definition of the Jesuit identity in the Early Modern Age. This is particularly clear from the internal debates developed between Lessius, on the one hand, and General Claudio Acquaviva and curial theologian Roberto Bellarmino, on the other hand. Not only does the article investigate little known aspects of intra-Catholic theological debate in the post Tridentine period, but it also shows how deep pastoral and moral concerns strongly contributed to the rise of Lessius’ open-minded theology of salvation, which seemed to deprive God’s sovereign authority in favour of humankind’s free will, and human agency in the process of salvation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasil Dinev Penchev

If the concept of “free will” is reduced to that of “choice” all physical world share the latter quality. Anyway the “free will” can be distinguished from the “choice”: The “free will” involves implicitly a certain goal, and the choice is only the mean, by which the aim can be achieved or not by the one who determines the target. Thus, for example, an electron has always a choice but not free will unlike a human possessing both. Consequently, and paradoxically, the determinism of classical physics is more subjective and more anthropomorphic than the indeterminism of quantum mechanics for the former presupposes certain deterministic goal implicitly following the model of human freewill behavior. Quantum mechanics introduces the choice in the fundament of physical world involving a generalized case of choice, which can be called “subjectless”: There is certain choice, which originates from the transition of the future into the past. Thus that kind of choice is shared of all existing and does not need any subject: It can be considered as a low of nature. There are a few theorems in quantum mechanics directly relevant to the topic: two of them are called “free will theorems” by their authors (Conway and Kochen 2006; 2009). Any quantum system either a human or an electron or whatever else has always a choice: Its behavior is not predetermined by its past. This is a physical law. It implies that a form of information, the quantum information underlies all existing for the unit of the quantity of information is an elementary choice: either a bit or a quantum bit (qubit).


2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-78
Author(s):  
Nijay K. Gupta

Abstract The glory of Jesus is a leitmotif of the Fourth Gospel and probably reflects both the Shekinah “glory” of Israel’s God revealed in Jesus as well as honor attributed to Jesus by John. The Jewish wisdom teacher Ben Sira also employs glorification language frequently and carefully in Sirach. Bringing these two texts into conversation illuminates the peculiar and unique ways in which John portrayed the identity of Jesus. In Sirach 45:1-5, in particular, Ben Sira praised the glory of Moses—a man beloved of God, made equal to the angels, great before his enemies, powerful in word, intrepid before kings, sanctified in faithfulness, party to the holy presence of God, and privy to the secret things of God. Given that John also had much interest in Moses comparison and typology, setting these texts side-by-side brings to the forefront the double-nature of the Fourth Gospel’s glory-Christology. On the one hand, the Johannine Jesus offered great demonstrations of power and authoritative teaching. On the other hand, he fared quite the opposite as Ben Sira’s vision of the exalted Moses, especially in John’s passion narrative where Jesus appears frail, weak, shamed, and defeated. Comparing the Moses of Sirach to the Jesus of John’s Gospel especially reveals the Evangelist’s paradoxical theology of gloria in profundis—the humble glory of God demonstrated in Jesus.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 1993-1993
Author(s):  
G. Meynen

IntroductionMental disorders are often considered to be able to undermine a person's moral responsibility, at least in some respect. Yet, it is unclear exactly how mental disorders would be capable of compromising a person's responsibility. Sometimes, it is suggested that mental disorders undermine responsibility via some detrimental effect on free will.ObjectivesEstablishing to what extent the effect of mental disorder on moral responsibility might be due to an effect on free will, and to what extent other factors might play a role.AimsProviding an analysis of the concept of free will and assessing the relevance of the elements of this concept with respect to mental disorders. Second, establishing what other - not free will related - factors might be relevant to the intuition that mental disorders can undermine responsibility.MethodsConceptual analysis with respect to free will and moral responsibility on the one hand and specific features of mental disorders on the other.ResultsSome of the responsibility-undermining features of mental disorders could have to do primarily with free will related issues. However, for some other aspects it is less clear. In fact, they might be more epistemic in nature instead of having to do with free will.ConclusionsThe possible effects of mental disorders on moral responsibility are likely to involve also other than free will related factors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 739-749 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Roszak ◽  
Tomasz Huzarek

Abstract: How to recognize the presence of God in the world? Thomas Aquinas' proposition, based on the efficient, exemplary and intentional causality, including both the natural level and grace, avoids several simplifications, the consequence of which is transcendent blindness. On the one hand, it does not allow to fall into a panentheistic reductionism involving God into the game of His variability in relation to the changing world. The sensitivity of Thomas in interpreting a real existing world makes it impossible to close the subject in the ''house without windows'', from where God can only be presumed. On the other hand, the proposal of Aquinas avoids the radical transcendence of God, according to which He has nothing to do with the world.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuncheng Liu

Public health scholars classify gay men as “men who have sex with men (MSM)” in their studies and interventions. Debates have been raised about the MSM classification for decades. However, we know little about how people who are classified as MSM perceive and respond to this classification, particularly in the authoritarian context where the biopower interacts with the repressive state power. Drawing upon Ian Hacking's dynamic nominalism theory, this study tries to fill these gaps with interviews of 40 gay men in three Chinese cities about their interactions with public health education materials. I examined their perceptions of MSM knowledge and discourses associated with the classification, as well as their identifications to the MSM subject. I found that, on the one hand, many gay men had internalized the MSM subjectivity and considered themselves essentially at high risk of HIV infection. This compliance was constructed through various biopower techniques with the support of the state's repressive power, as the Chinese state censored almost all public representations of gay men except the HIV/AIDS subject MSM. On the other hand, some of my interviewees were resistant to be part of the MSM classification. I showed how this failure is an unintended consequence of the hegemonic MSM discourse and the authoritarian regime's institutional exclusion of the gay men's community's engagement in the expertise network that develops intervention materials and strategies. At last, I proposed to move beyond the debate around the name and representational character of the MSM by moving toward a more reflexive public health.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas H Costello ◽  
Shauna Marie Bowes ◽  
scott lilienfeld

Philosophers have long speculated that authoritarianism and belief in determinism are functionally related. To evaluate this hypothesis, we assessed whether authoritarianism and allied personality and political variables predict varieties of belief in determinism in three community samples (N1 = 566 to 20,010; N2 = 500; N3 = 419). Authoritarianism and allied variables manifested moderate to large positive correlations with both fatalistic and genetic determinism beliefs. Controlling for political conservatism did not meaningfully attenuate these relations. Further, openness was negatively related to fatalistic determinism beliefs and agreeableness was negatively related to genetic determinism beliefs. Taken together, our findings clarify the nature of relations between authoritarianism and general personality, on the one hand, and free will/determinism beliefs, on the other, and suggest intriguing intersections between worldviews and personality traits.


2021 ◽  
pp. 120-162
Author(s):  
Guy Elgat
Keyword(s):  

In this chapter, Paul Rée’s views on guilt, responsibility, free will, and punishment are considered. Three subsidiary aims of the discussion are to show that, first, Rée’s works are worth paying attention to in their own right and not merely as a foil for Nietzsche’s ideas; second, that Nietzsche’s criticisms of Rée’s views fall short of the mark; and third, that in contrast to the views of some interpreters, Rée’s thought does undergo development in the course of his career. The discussion presents a radically different approach to guilt from the one encountered in the chapters on Kant, Schelling, and Schopenhauer. This approach spurns all metaphysical speculation and attempts to consider guilt as a natural phenomenon, that is, a phenomenon that does not require for its explanation an appeal to some noumenal or intelligible realm where agents perform timeless deeds but is to be explained as a thoroughly this-worldly psychological phenomenon.


Numen ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Klawans

AbstractRecent scholarship on fate and free will in ancient Judaism is characterized by a lack of precision with regard to the nature of these disputes. There is also some disagreement concerning the degree to which the disparate positions can be constructively compared with either Hellenistic philosophical approaches or later rabbinic theological ones. It is argued here that Josephus's brief typology of ancient Jewish disputes on this topic finds confirmation in other ancient Jewish literature, especially the Wisdom of Ben Sira, the sectarian Dead Sea Scrolls, and later rabbinic literature. Yet it is imperative to nuance Josephus's typology so as to avoid imposing Hellenistic philosophical systems onto ancient Jewish theological ones. These observations hold true especially when it comes to understanding the balance between fate and free will — the “compatibilism” — that characterizes the Pharisaic approach. It is rarely noticed that Josephus's accounts attribute to this group two distinct ways of balancing fate and free will. On the one hand, each of these two approaches finds distinct analogues within rabbinic literature, a fact that further confirms both Josephus's reliability and the productivity of comparing his accounts with later rabbinic traditions. On the other hand, neither of the two types of compatibilism attributed by Josephus to the Pharisees can be identified with Stoic compatibilism. Nonetheless, the term “compatibilism” remains the most appropriate term for distinguishing the Pharisaic compromises from the more extreme (but by no means uncomplicated) positions that seem to have characterized the Sadducees and Essenes in Josephus's day.


MANUSYA ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-25
Author(s):  
Genevieve Migely

Although the heart of Berkeley’s philosophy is active substance, some argue that Berkeley’s notion of causation precludes human agency, an undesirable result for Berkeley. In the hope of securing the ontological status of finite substance in Berkeley’s metaphysics, this paper seeks to offer a rather different take on the Cartesian influence supporting Berkeley’s views on the causal efficacy of human spirits. After demonstrating the possibility of a Malebranchian occasionalism in light of Berkeley’s views on necessary connection, a close examination of Berkeley’s works reveals his real stance on what type of connection counts as causal. Employing Descartes’s divinely-established natural connection between a finite will and its effects, Berkeley is able to offer a coherent account of finite causation in the natural world that can accommodate free will. This naturalistic interpretation is able to situate Berkeley as one who is influenced by a Cartesian version of causation (though not the one scholars often attribute to him), but is able to legitimately resist the fall into Hume’s metaphysically empty position on causation as nothing but constant conjunction.


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