Conclusion

Field fortifications became an important feature of the Atlanta campaign, evolving from minimal beginnings to major proportions by the time the armies crossed the Etowah River. The impetus behind this development came not from the highest commanders but originated on the corps, division, and brigade levels, and sometimes from regimental officers and the privates. Sherman adapted his operational style to accommodate this development, consciously using fieldworks to aid his offensive needs without getting bogged down in a defensive-mindedness that fieldworks were capable of fostering. Johnston, in contrast, allowed himself to develop a consistent defensive operational style, relying too heavily on strong earthworks and not taking enough risks to slow or stymy Federal advances. Hood waffled from a disdain of enemy earthworks, launching vigorous but unsuccessful assaults, to reverting to Johnston’s defensive mode. The actual digging was overwhelmingly done by the rank and file, not by black laborers or by pioneer or engineer troops.

Peach Tree Creek, July 22, and Ezra Church

When Hood replaced Johnston on July 18, the Army of Tennessee launched three tactical offensives in an attempt to prevent Sherman from snipping the rail lines feeding Atlanta. Temporary field fortifications played an important role in all three engagements. At Peach Tree Creek, on July 20, the Confederates took the Army of the Cumberland by surprise as it was crossing the stream but hasty breastworks shielded most Federal units as they repelled the attack. At the battle of Atlanta, on July 22, the Confederates very nearly crushed Sherman’s left flank but 17th Corps troops were able to hold on because they fought from both sides of their earthworks as needed to repel attacks from different directions. At Ezra Church on July 28, 15th Corps troops barely held on to their position on top of a low ridge with minimal breastworks to help them. In all three cases, hasty fieldworks added an important element in defensive capability that made a difference in the outcome of the battles.

June 27

In the largest Federal tactical offensive of the campaign, Sherman launched frontal attacks at three locations along Johnston’s Kennesaw Mountain Line on the morning of June 27. Fifteenth Corps troops hit the area near Pigeon Hill and made no progress. Fourth Corps troops attacked north of Cheatham’s Hill with less to show for it. Fourteenth Corps troops attacked Cheatham’s Hill and failed to break through but lodged very close to the Confederate earthworks, protected by a slight rise of ground that allowed them to dig in and stay. After losing 3,000 men out of 15,000 engaged, the attacks demonstrated the utility of well-made earthworks planted on key ground. Sherman did not repeat the mistake for the rest of the campaign.

Crossing the Chattahoochee

Demonstrating increasing tenacity as he neared Atlanta, Johnston fell back from Kennesaw Mountain only a few miles to a prepared position at Smyrna Station. He held here a short while before falling back to his last position north of the last river protecting the city, constructing the Chattahoochee River Line. It possessed somewhat innovative features designed by artillery chief Francis Shoup and thus could be termed the Shoup Line. It was one of the few Confederate defences of the campaign constructed largely by slaves and impressed free blacks. Despite its strength, Johnston evacuated the Chattahoochee River Line on July 9 when Sherman crossed troops over the river miles upstream. Then Johnston concentrated on improving the Atlanta City Line, designed and constructed by Capt. Lemuel P. Grant for the past several months, as Sherman rested his troops for a full scale crossing of the Chattahoochee River.

The Kennesaw Line

On June 19, Johnston fell back to a new position anchored on the twin peaks of Kennesaw Mountain just northwest of Marietta. It was the strongest position he had yet taken in the campaign and it would hold the Federal for two weeks. Confederate earthworks became very deep and sophisticated along this line, although there were a few salient which protruded toward the Federals and offered some hope of a successful attack. At one of those salients, Cheatham’s Hill, Confederate engineers made a mistake in siting the line which left it vulnerable to a close approach by the Federals. Efforts to flank the Confederate left were stymied by timely movements of troops. Frustrated and worried that the delay might lead to the transfer of reinforcements from the Army of Tennessee to Lee’s army in Virginia, Sherman decided to mount a major frontal attack.

Dalton and Resaca

Confederate earthworks were located on high, dominating ridges during the first confrontation of the Atlanta campaign at Dalton. These positions were nearly impervious to direct attack even though they contained only light fieldworks. But the Federals could outflank them by using gaps located in those ridges well beyond the Confederate flanks. From the beginning of the campaign Sherman was able to use maneuver with judicious use of holding works to pry Johnston from strong positions with minimal loss. At Resaca, the next battle of the campaign, the Confederates had far less advantageous ground to defend and they failed to construct proper fortifications to compensate for that disadvantage. As a result they suffered heavy losses and were compelled to evacuate the position after only two days of fighting.

Flanking the Kennesaw Line

For nearly a week after the failed assault of June 27 the Federals continued to search for a way to break the Kennesaw Mountain Line. Fourteenth Corps troops lodged on Cheatham’s Hill sniped at the Confederate position only a few yards away and began digging a mine to blow up the angle in the opposing line. More promising was Sherman’s continued effort to flank the Confederate left wing. Meanwhile life in the trenches became stressful for soldiers in both armies. By July 2, Sherman was ready to break away temporarily from his railroad supply line and conduct a massive flanking march toward the Chattahoochee River. When Johnston got wind of this move, he evacuated the Kennesaw Mountain Line that night.

New Hope Church, Pickett’s Mill, and Dallas

When Sherman crossed the Etowah River on May 23 the character of the Atlanta campaign changed. He had used long and high ridges north of the river to conduct flanking movements. Now he entered a piedmont zone of generally level land choked by thick forests which offered many defensive advantages to Johnston. Union progress slowed as the Federals groped along ill-mapped roads while engaged in a wide flanking movement. Johnston effectively stymied their efforts by careful placement of his units to block Union advances. For the first time in the campaign, both sides dug deep and extensive fieldwork systems to hold their positions. One sees the onset of intense skirmishing, sniping, and close range artillery fire. Constant firing from static positions caused a great deal of damage to the environment. Soldier life in the trenches became more stressful and uncomfortable as the campaign bogged down in the wilds of Georgia. This two week phase of the campaign was punctuated by battles at New Hope Church on May 25, Pickett’s Mill on May 27, and Dallas on May 28, until Sherman moved to his left and regained contact with his railroad by the end of the first week in June.

Lovejoy’s Station, Palmetto Station, and the Federal Defenses of Atlanta

The fall of Atlanta did not end military operations. Hood retired several miles south of Jonesboro to Lovejoy’s Station where he dug in on good defensive ground. Sherman moved to oppose him for several days but could find no opportunity to attack. Unwilling to continue moving south of Atlanta while dependent on his slim rail line, Sherman retired to rest at Atlanta. Hood then moved the Army of Tennessee to Palmetto Station southwest of Atlanta to rest and plan his next move, digging a line of earthworks to protect his position. Sherman planned to turn Atlanta into an armed camp by evacuating Southern sympathizers from the civilian population and building a new line of earthworks to protect the heart of the city. These Federal defences of Atlanta were expertly planned and built and became a model of good field fortification.

Siege

By late July most Union and Confederate units settled into static, fortified positions just outside Atlanta and something like siege conditions became the norm. The lines were subject to almost constant artillery bombardment and skirmishing and sniping fire. The Federals especially were aggressive in their skirmishing, pushing Confederate skirmishers back to their main line in many places and dominating no-man’s land. Sherman organized a concentrated effort to bombard the city with heavy artillery, disrupting Confederate supply efforts, demoralizing soldiers and civilians alike, and destroying military and civilian structures in Atlanta. Living in trenches for weeks at a time, soldier life became more stressful, dirty, and wearisome. Lice became a problem along with the difficulty of finding adequate sources of water for cooking and cleanliness. .