Peach Tree Creek, July 22, and Ezra Church

Author(s):  
Earl J. Hess

When Hood replaced Johnston on July 18, the Army of Tennessee launched three tactical offensives in an attempt to prevent Sherman from snipping the rail lines feeding Atlanta. Temporary field fortifications played an important role in all three engagements. At Peach Tree Creek, on July 20, the Confederates took the Army of the Cumberland by surprise as it was crossing the stream but hasty breastworks shielded most Federal units as they repelled the attack. At the battle of Atlanta, on July 22, the Confederates very nearly crushed Sherman’s left flank but 17th Corps troops were able to hold on because they fought from both sides of their earthworks as needed to repel attacks from different directions. At Ezra Church on July 28, 15th Corps troops barely held on to their position on top of a low ridge with minimal breastworks to help them. In all three cases, hasty fieldworks added an important element in defensive capability that made a difference in the outcome of the battles.

Author(s):  
Earl J. Hess

On July 17, Sherman moved all of his troops to the south side of the Chattahoochee River and marched on Atlanta, with James B. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee moving the longest distance to reach Decatur east of Atlanta and tear up the Georgia Railroad as it advanced toward the city. This cut one of the three railroads Johnston relied on to feed his army in Atlanta. George H. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland had the shortest route to march, crossing the Chattahoochee near its junction with Peach Tree Creek, moving to Buck Head, and then marching south toward Atlanta. John M. Schofield's Army of the Ohio tried to fill in the distance between those two forces. As the Federals advanced with minor skirmishing against a screen of Confederate cavalry, Davis decided to relieve Johnston of command and elevate John Bell Hood to replace him. Hood, taken by surprise, tried to convince Davis to change his mind or at least postpone the change in commanders but the Confederate president refused to do so. Hood finally assumed his new command on July 18 and tried to prepare the Army of Tennessee to meet Sherman's advance.


Author(s):  
Earl J. Hess

The battle of Peach Tree Creek was the largest tactical offensive mounted by the Army of Tennessee since the battle of Chickamauga ten months before. Soldier morale was depressed by the loss of their beloved commander, Joseph E. Johnson. While most men had no real opinion of John Bell Hood, they knew that the army would now take the offensive. Many Confederates were reluctant to close with the enemy on July 20. Hardee's Corps failed to press home its advantage of manpower over John Newton's division. At least one third of Winfield S. Featherston's Brigade refused to accompany their comrades in pressing home the assault against William T. Ward's division. More or the less the same was true along the rest of the battle line. In contrast, most Federals fought with determination that day. Hood also developed an attack plan that was too complicated as he struggled to master the complexities of army level command. Efforts to preserve and mark the battlefield for posterity were mounted after the war, especially in the 1930s, but they mostly failed and the battlefield largely has been consumed by the explosive growth of Atlanta in the twentieth century.


Author(s):  
Earl J. Hess

Union and Confederate survivors evaluated the battle of Peach Tree Creek, commented on the performance of their enemy, and judged the conduct of their own officers. The Federals were jubilant over their victory and the Confederates admitted defeat. The battle increased the already high state of morale among Union soldiers and dimmed Confederate hopes. Hood also was frustrated by the failure of his first battle as army leader, believing a report that Hardee had warned his men before the battle to be wary of Union earthworks. There is no proof of this but Hood blamed Hardee for the defeat in his official report and his post-war memoirs. Hood also blamed Joseph E. Johnston for instilling a timid mood among the men through his constant retreats and refusal to take the offensive. Sherman continued to close up on Atlanta during July 21-22, advancing his men to follow up Hood's evacuation of the Peach Tree Creek Line and the Outer Line. Hood prepared to strike at Sherman's left flank, which resulted in the Battle of Atlanta on the afternoon of July 22. His men came much closer to tactical victory than they had two days before at Peach Tree Creek.


Author(s):  
Earl J. Hess

Most of the rest of Thomas' Army of the Cumberland crossed to the south side of Peach Tree Creek on the morning of July 20. While the Fourteenth Corps solidified a good position for defensive action only Geary's division of Joseph Hooker's Twentieth Corps advance to the best defensive ground to the left of the Fourteenth Corps. Hooker acted as if there was no need to hurry defensive arrangements and thus two of his divisions lounged in the bottomland on the south side of the creek rather than aligning themselves with Geary's exposed division. John Newton's division of the Fourth Corps also took up a strong defensive position to Hooker's left and was ready for action. Hood finalized his attack plan, hoping to catch Thomas after the Federals had crossed the creek but before they could fortify their positions—except for Hooker's two divisions, it already was too late to accomplish that goal. Hood had to further delay the attack from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m. due to McPherson's unexpectedly early arrival near the east side of Atlanta, forcing the Army of Tennessee to shift its line to the right to confront him.


2019 ◽  
pp. 78-103
Author(s):  
S.A. Romanenko

The article is devoted to the analysis of representations about AustriaHungary in Russia in political and publicists societies including Bolsheviks, Social Democrats, liberals (cadets), as well as MFA analysts from February to October. On the basis of the materials on foreign policy and the correlation of revolution and world war, from Russian daily press and journalists, which have not been studied before, the author comes to the conclusion that the representatives of the left flank of the political spectrum had neither information nor conceptually built ideas about the situation in AustriaHungary, about the perspectives for the development of revolutionary processes in the multinational state and its direction and aims. On the other hand, this was also largely characteristic of the moods of the AustroHungarian politicians, whether progovernment or opposition,Статья посвящена анализу представлений об АвстроВенгрии в России в политических и публицистических обществахв том числе большевиков, социалдемократов, либералов (кадетов), а также аналитиков МИД с февраля по октябрь. На основе материалов по внешней политике и соотношение революции и мировой войны, из российской ежедневной прессы и журналистов, которые до этого не изучались, автор приходит к выводу, что представители левого фланга политического спектра не имели ни информации, ни концептуально выстроенных представлений о ситуации в АвстроВенгрии, о перспективах развития революционных процессов в многонациональном государстве и его направленности, а также о том, что они не могли цели. С другой стороны, это было также в значительной степени характерно для настроений австровенгерских политиков, будь то проправительственные или оппозиционные, для которых цели национального движения уже в 1917 году играли гораздо большую роль, чем для русских. Для сравнительного анализа на основе архивных материалов приводятся позиции Министерства иностранных дел (Временного правительства) и Петроградского Совета.


2012 ◽  
pp. 483-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Tombesi ◽  
J. Marsal ◽  
B. Basile ◽  
A. Weibel ◽  
L. Solari ◽  
...  

Plants ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 514
Author(s):  
Chrysoula G. Orfanidou ◽  
Fei Xing ◽  
Jun Zhou ◽  
Shifang Li ◽  
Nikolaos I. Katis ◽  
...  

In the present study, we utilized high throughput and Sanger sequencing to determine the complete nucleotide sequence of a putative new ilarvirus species infecting sweet cherry, tentatively named prunus virus I (PrVI). The genome of PrVI is comprised of three RNA segments of 3474 nt (RNA1), 2911 nt (RNA2), and 2231 nt (RNA3) and features conserved motifs representative of the genus Ilarvirus. BlastN analysis revealed 68.1–71.9% nt identity of PrVI with strawberry necrotic shock virus (SNSV). In subsequent phylogenetic analysis, PrVI was grouped together with SNSV and blackberry chlorotic ringspot virus (BCRV), both members of subgroup 1 of ilarviruses. In addition, mini-scale surveys in stone fruit orchards revealed the presence of PrVI in a limited number of sweet cherries and in one peach tree. Overall, our data suggest that PrVI is a novel species of the genus Ilarvirus and it consists the fifth member of the genus that is currently known to infect Prunus spp.


1995 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 613
Author(s):  
Charles F. Bryan Jr. ◽  
Glenna R. Schroeder-Lein
Keyword(s):  

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