Taking Responsibility

This chapter introduces a third sort of blameworthiness, extended blameworthiness. The argument defends the idea that we can take responsibility. One kind of relevant case was discussed in Chapter 6: sometimes agents try hard, but because of their own bad motivations, do badly. This chapter returns to that case, and considers two other challenges: cases where an agent’s act or omission is bad but entirely inadvertent, and cases where an agent acts through implicit biases. In these cases, there is some pull to find the agent blameworthy. We can make sense of that by arguing that when certain sorts of relationship are at stake, agents should take responsibility for their failures and be willing to engage in the blame conversation. In taking responsibility they become properly blameworthy in the extended way.

Exemptions

This chapter explores the complexities of who is in and who is out of our moral community. First, it considers agents who are not impaired in any obvious way, but who are in the grip of a false moral view. Such agents are exempt from ordinary blame even if they could, in principle, be brought into our moral community. There are also agents who understand Morality, but have some sort of motivational incapacity. Proceeding through a discussion of Susan Wolf’s asymmetry thesis and Bernard Williams’s account of moral incapacity, the chapter argues that just as a psychological incapacity to do bad things does not undermine praiseworthiness, so a certain sort of incapacity to act well does not undermine blameworthiness. Last, the chapter argues that there is a way to understand psychopaths such that they do not have moral knowledge, and so are exempt from ordinary blame on that ground.

Introduction

There is surely a connection between our deontic concepts, rightness and wrongness, and our responsibility related concepts, praise- and blameworthiness. However, it is not clear what the relationship is. The book aims to shed light on our concepts of rightness and wrongness, praise- and blameworthiness, and praise and blame. This introductory chapter describes the methodology: a sort of reflective equilibrium. Our responsibility practices serve to regulate and rationalize our interpersonal relationships, and we should aim for our concepts to work well in that framework. This is a project in normative responsibility theory: the primary aim is not to give an account of the conditions of agency, but to give an account of what sort of wrong action makes blame fitting.

Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the main arguments of the book. The book defends pluralism about rightness and wrongness and about praise and blameworthiness. A central sort of blameworthiness, ordinary blameworthiness, is correlated with a sort of wrong action, subjectively wrong action. This account of ordinary blameworthiness focuses on a particular quality of will, and requires that the agent knows what she is doing, at least broadly. However, other sorts of wrong action may not be blameworthy at all (may be excused), or may be blameworthy only in a more detached way, where the focus is not on what the wrongdoer’s quality of will is, but on the point of view of the blamer. Finally, the book defends an extension of ordinary blameworthiness to cases where someone does something wrong inadvertently.

Subjective Obligation

This chapter offers an account of subjective obligation. Different accounts of rightness and wrongness meet different versions of a ‘responsibility constraint’. Subjective rightness meets a very strong version of the responsibility constraint, and correlates closely with praise- and blameworthiness. It also seems that subjective obligation must be accessible and action guiding. This chapter argues for some modifications to these starting points. First, subjective obligation should be action guiding, but not in the rich sense that people often intend when they say that subjective obligation should be action guiding. Second, it should be anchored in the true Morality, and so is accessible only to those in our moral community. Finally, we cannot formulate subjective obligation in terms of the agent’s beliefs about what ought to be done. Rather, we need to formulate subjective obligation in terms of trying: an agent is fulfilling her subjective obligation when she is trying to do well by Morality.

Praise and Blame

This chapter examines the idea of blame, as an activity distinct from judging blameworthy but not equivalent to punishing. There are different sorts of blame, that correspond to different sorts of wrongdoing. Ordinary blame is communicative, and applies to agents who have acted subjectively wrongly. Ordinary praise is, likewise, communicative, and also depends on the agent knowing what she is doing. These can be contrasted with detached praise and blame, which apply to agents outside our moral community. Detached blame is a mixed bag, and this chapter offers a general account of how such blame reactions work. They are not communicative, rather they function from a distance. That does not entail that they are mere appraisals: they are genuinely a species of blame, in that they are a response to wrongdoing that goes beyond a mere judgment. This leads to a discussion of detached blameworthiness, which corresponds to detached blame.

Excuses

This chapter looks at the sorts of excuse that might apply to the various sorts of wrongdoing. An agent who acts subjectively wrongly could not have a simple excuse of ignorance or lack of control, but it is possible that mitigating factors apply. Mitigating circumstances, like excuses, show that what is really going on is that the agent is not acting as badly as it appears she is. Next, the chapter examines cases of mixed motivations, where an agent is trying hard enough to be acting subjectively rightly, but something goes wrong with her act, not through external bad luck, but through the agent’s own flawed motivations. In such cases the agent is praiseworthy in the ordinary way for trying, but we are bound to react with a species of detached blame to her bad motives. Finally, the chapter considers the role that unfortunate formative circumstances play in reducing blameworthiness.

Ordinary Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness

This chapter defends the connection between subjective rightness and ordinary praiseworthiness. First, merely acting on conscience is not enough for praiseworthiness. On the other hand, merely being motivated towards what is actually good is not enough either. Praiseworthiness, like trying, is subject to a ‘reflexivity requirement’. Nomy Arpaly uses the example of Huck Finn to argue that an agent can be praiseworthy without having a good grasp of morality, and without acting as they believe they ought. On a competing view, the ‘Searchlight View’, full awareness of every relevant aspect of the act at the moment of action is necessary for praise- or blameworthiness. Both of these views fail: Arpaly’s view does not meet the reflexivity requirement, and the Searchlight View meets too strong a version. Some awareness, some background knowledge is required, but it need not be as bright as a searchlight.

Trying to Do Well by Morality

This chapter presents an account of trying. Trying involves knowledge of the aim and requires accepting the aim as an aim. In other words, there is a ‘reflexivity requirement’ on trying: roughly, the agent must know what she is doing to count as doing it, but her knowledge need not be full awareness in the moment. Additionally, we should understand trying in a strong sense, trying is not ‘merely’ trying. Trying means taking steps that the agent believes most likely to achieve her goal, which may be complex. The chapter closes with an account of failing to try. Failing to try, like trying, involves a conscious, though not necessarily conscious in the moment, grasp of the relevant aim as a required aim. Thus only those who have a grasp of Morality as an aim can count as failing to try to do well by Morality.