Obligations of Conscience

In this paper, I outline and defend a commonly-held moral view which has received surprisingly little sustained philosophical attention. This view, which I call the ‘authority of conscience,’ states that believing ourselves to have moral obligations to act in a certain way does in fact create an obligation to act in that way. Although I do not provide a positive case for the principle of authoritative conscience, beyond its popularity and intuitive force, I defend it against several prima facie objections. I then go on to demonstrate that the principle does not entail any anti-realist metaethical commitments, and is therefore compatible in particular, and contrary to appearances, with plausible formulations of moral realism.

The Symposium on “Setting Health-Care Priorities” by Torbjörn Tännsjö

The present paper constitutes an introduction to a special issue of Diametros devoted to Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us by Torbjörn Tännsjö. The book in question states that there are three moral theories which have valid implications in the field of the distribution of medical resources in a healthcare system: utilitarianism (possibly conjoined with prioritarianism), the maximin/leximin view, and egalitarianism. A number of authors have contributed to this special issue with papers which challenge this thesis. Robert E. Goodin argues that, besides general moral theories, some local principles of justice might be valid. Quinn Hiroshi Gibson states that Tännsjö should have considered the Rawlsian view on justice in its contractualist reading. Jay A. Zameska argues that his “revised lexical sufficientarianism” constitutes a more reliable moral view than prioritarianism. Finally, Lasse Nielsen points out that there is more to say about distributive justice than consequentialist theories can grasp. Moreover, he puts forward an argument in defense of prioritarianism. The final article in this issue constitutes Tännsjö’s replies to his critics.

Climate change and religion: from ethics to sustainability action

This library research aims to: 1) explore the ethical aspects of the environment in climate change events, 2) map the moral values and philosophy of religion in climate change actions, 3) integrate the ethical, moral and philosophical aspects of religion by presenting new knowledge in sustainability actions. In this study, there are three concepts of environmental ethics, namely, the anthropocentric view, ecocentrism view, and religious, moral view. The anthropocentric view makes humans own and control natural resources exploitatively. The ecocentrism view places humans and the universe connected in a web of life. Moral religion sees problems born from human consciousness caused by sin and holiness. The way to solve the problems is to follow the “middle way,” which advocates simplicity in consumption and the fulfillment of basic human needs. This approach builds a new order by combining the application of technology, law, and global ethics from an anthropocentric perspective—the ecocentrism view with everything having an intrinsic value. For example, the practice of intelligence and meditation uses religious, moral values for sustainable actions. Such as with the experience of various Islamic religion-based organizations in Indonesia.

Loving some animals, eating others: Species categorisation in childhood, young adulthood and adulthood

Humans care for the wellbeing of some animals (e.g. dogs), yet tacitly endorse the maltreatment of others (e.g. pigs). What treatment we find morally appropriate for an animal depends on whether we characterise it as “pet” or “food”. Is this categorisation of animals and the resulting moral hierarchy of species present in childhood or instead taught through the lifespan? Comparing samples of children (9-11-years-old), young adults (18-21-years-old), and adults (29-59-years-old; total N=479), we find that children as compared to young adults and adults, a) show less speciesism, i.e. moral worth tied less to species-membership, b) are less likely to categorise farm animals as food than pets, c) think farm animals ought to be treated better, and d) deem eating meat and animal products less morally acceptable. These results are not due to children having a lower general acceptance of violence against living beings than adults. Our findings imply that our moral view of animal worth is not innate but instead develops over the lifespan in our specific societal context.

Amoral realism or just war morality? Disentangling different conceptions of necessity

This paper addresses a misconception in the popular contrast between amoral realism and just war theory and clarifies the linguistic source of the misconception by disentangling the two interpretations of necessity. First, we can, and should, distinguish the Thucydidean “causal” conception of necessity, which is the basis for just war thinkers when they attack realist thought, from the Machiavellian “telic” conception. The paper, then, proceeds to reconsider the relationship between realism and morality through a textual analysis of representative contemporary realist theories and clarifies that their necessity judgments contain both causal and telic meanings. According to those supporting the moral view, the pursuit of national interest and security can be interpreted as emerging from their sense of moral duty. Realists are, even if partially, in line with just war theorists in evaluating the moral appropriateness of a war in itself and its methods. Finally, the paper explores the substantive disagreement between the two camps regarding the principle of discrimination, to demonstrate why they should still be assumed to have separate theories. In conclusion, their difference lies in not whether they place importance on the necessity judgment, among other considerations on the morality of war, but the extent to which they do so.

THEMORAL BASIS OF MODERN LEGAL NIHILISM

This article contains a philosophical study of the moral basis of modern legal nihilism. Usually legal nihilism is understood as a negative or indifferent attitude of individuals or social groups to law as a social institution. The universal and necessary nature of this phenomenon cannot be revealed by giving even the broadest list of active causes of its occurrence and spread. This nature of legal nihilism can be understood through systematic knowledge the idea of the moral spirit.Within the limits of this article, only the nearest spiritual and practical basis of the legal nihilism is revealed. Further consideration of the problem proves that this basis is the freedom of moral subject, the moral view in general, which is an effective principle of the form of the modern world. From a moral point of view only the autono- mous will is truly free and, therefore, really moral. For it is subordinate to a universal law, rooted in the «moral self» of the will itself. Thus the autonomy of the will is recognized as the true and only law of morality, which is identified with real moral order. Recognition of the autonomy of the moral will as the highest principle of the practical spirit made the moral view an indisputable criterion for evaluating any existing moral order. Thus the reflection of the practical experience of modern times laid the moral foundation of legal nihilism. For from this moment on, any external authority, every normative order has come under the initial suspicion of the moral subject, Every objective normative order came to be considered by him as something that has only a conditional significance. All this reality now requires legitimation by the subject of moral freedom, justification before person’s deep belief in what is rational and moral.

Exemptions

This chapter explores the complexities of who is in and who is out of our moral community. First, it considers agents who are not impaired in any obvious way, but who are in the grip of a false moral view. Such agents are exempt from ordinary blame even if they could, in principle, be brought into our moral community. There are also agents who understand Morality, but have some sort of motivational incapacity. Proceeding through a discussion of Susan Wolf’s asymmetry thesis and Bernard Williams’s account of moral incapacity, the chapter argues that just as a psychological incapacity to do bad things does not undermine praiseworthiness, so a certain sort of incapacity to act well does not undermine blameworthiness. Last, the chapter argues that there is a way to understand psychopaths such that they do not have moral knowledge, and so are exempt from ordinary blame on that ground.

Prioritarianism: A response to critics

Prioritarianism is a moral view that ranks outcomes according to the sum of a strictly increasing and strictly concave transformation of individual well-being. Prioritarianism is ‘welfarist’ (namely, it satisfies axioms of Pareto Indifference, Strong Pareto, and Anonymity) as well as satisfying three further axioms: Pigou–Dalton (formalizing the property of giving greater weight to those who are worse off), Separability, and Continuity. Philosophical discussion of prioritarianism was galvanized by Derek Parfit’s 1991 Lindley Lecture. Since then, and notwithstanding Parfit’s support, a variety of criticisms of prioritarianism have been advanced: by utilitarians (such as John Broome and Hilary Greaves), egalitarians (such as Lara Buchak; Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve; Ingmar Persson; and Larry Temkin), and sufficientists (Roger Crisp). In previous work, we have each endorsed prioritarianism. This article sets forth a renewed defense, in the light of the accumulated criticisms. We clarify the concept of a prioritarian moral view (here addressing work by David McCarthy), discuss the application of prioritarianism under uncertainty (herein of ‘ex post’ and ‘ex ante’ prioritarianism), distinguish between person-affecting and impersonal justifications, and provide a person-affecting case for prioritarianism. We then describe the various challenges mounted against prioritarianism – utilitarian, egalitarian, and sufficientist – and seek to counter each of them.