Exemptions

2019 ◽  
pp. 152-178
Author(s):  
Elinor Mason

This chapter explores the complexities of who is in and who is out of our moral community. First, it considers agents who are not impaired in any obvious way, but who are in the grip of a false moral view. Such agents are exempt from ordinary blame even if they could, in principle, be brought into our moral community. There are also agents who understand Morality, but have some sort of motivational incapacity. Proceeding through a discussion of Susan Wolf’s asymmetry thesis and Bernard Williams’s account of moral incapacity, the chapter argues that just as a psychological incapacity to do bad things does not undermine praiseworthiness, so a certain sort of incapacity to act well does not undermine blameworthiness. Last, the chapter argues that there is a way to understand psychopaths such that they do not have moral knowledge, and so are exempt from ordinary blame on that ground.

2019 ◽  
pp. 106-150
Author(s):  
Sarah McGrath

This chapter explores how experience and observation contribute to moral knowledge. It defends the view that experience and observation can contribute to moral knowledge in any of the ways in which they contribute to our ordinary, non-moral knowledge of the world around us, including by empirically confirming and disconfirming moral claims. I argue that moral testimony has important implications for the possibility of confirming moral views by non-moral observations. I also argue that membership in a moral community, which puts one in a position to compare the moral opinions of others with one’s own, can contribute to moral knowledge not only by affording evidence for or against one’s opinions, but also by providing feedback that can serve to calibrate one’s capacity for judgment so that future exercises of that judgment are more likely to deliver knowledge. The chapter concludes with a discussion of a priori moral knowledge.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin F. Landy

Abstract May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.


2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick J. Dillon

Although the link between health and morality has been well established, few studies have examined how issues of morality emerge and are addressed in primary care medical encounters. This paper addresses the need to examine morality as it is (re)constructed in everyday health care interactions. A Membership Categorisation Analysis of 96 medical interviews reveals how patients orient to particular membership categories and distance themselves from others as a means of accounting (Buttny 1993; Scott and Lyman 1968) for morally questionable health behaviours. More specifically, this paper examines how patients use membership categorisations in order to achieve specific social identity(ies) (Schubert et al. 2009) through two primary strategies: defensive detailing and prioritizing alternative membership categories. Thus, this analysis tracks the emergence of cultural and moral knowledge about social life as it takes place in primary care medical encounters.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Kersting

Within the Kantian ethics consciousness of the moral principle is a fact of reason which cannot be grounded in any antecedent data, empirical or rational. Hegel however argues that the fact of reason is necessarily embedded in the fact of „Sittlichkeit“, that a pure reason is an empty and chimerical construction, that moral knowledge is unavoidably rootet in the contingent moral convictions of the given cultural and social environment. This essay defends Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral philosophy and – by generalizing Hegel’s hermeneutic approach – sketches the outlines of an explicatory concept of ethics which contradicts the scientistic understanding of moral philosophy characteristic for Kant, the utilitarianism and the supporters of discourse ethics likewise.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (16) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic R. Kellogg (George Washington University)

Using two examples of ethical choice, Philippa Foot’s snake and the traffic roundabout, this paper offers an account of normative induction that characterizes particularism and generalism as stages of normative inquiry, rather than rival accounts of moral knowledge and motivation. Ethical particularism holds that the evaluative cannot be “cashed out” in propositional form, and that it is descriptively “shapeless.” Drawing on examples from law, this paper claims that, while individual normative inquiry may be viewed as encountering a shapeless particularist context of seem-ingly unlimited nonmoral properties, normativity is driven by repe-tition of similar situations toward shared practices and descriptive predication. Rather than retention of epistemic status by defeated reasons, this illustrates retirement of relevant properties and ac-companying reasons, transformation of the reasons environment, and a pluralist normative ontology.


Is a global institutional order composed of sovereign states fit for cosmopolitan moral purpose? Cosmopolitan political theorists challenge claims that states, nations, and other collectives have ultimate moral significance. They focus instead on individuals: on what they share and on what each may owe to all others. They see principles of distributive justice—and increasingly political justice—applying with force in a global system in which billions continue to suffer from severe poverty and deprivation, political repression, interstate violence, and other ills. Cosmopolitans diverge, however, on the institutional implications of their shared moral view. Some argue that the current system of competing sovereign states tends to promote unjust outcomes and stands in need of deep structural reform. Others reject such claims and contend that justice can be pursued through transforming the orientations and conduct of individual and collective agents, especially states. This volume brings together prominent political theorists and international relations scholars—including some skeptics of cosmopolitanism—in a far-ranging dialogue about the institutional implications of the approach. The contributors offer penetrating analyses of both continuing and emerging issues around state sovereignty, democratic autonomy and accountability, and the promotion and protection of human rights. They also debate potential reforms of the current global system, from the transformation of cities and states to the creation of some encompassing world government capable of effectively promoting cosmopolitan aims.


Author(s):  
Sarah McGrath

Proponents of moral perception hold that some of our moral knowledge is perceptual knowledge. Discussions of whether moral perception is possible often seem to assume that there is some attractive alternative account of how we arrive at moral knowledge in those cases that are regarded as among the best candidates for cases of full-fledged moral perception. This chapter challenges that assumption by critically examining some alternative accounts of how we arrive at knowledge in the relevant class of cases, arguing that the more closely one examines these alternative accounts, the more implausible they seem as accounts of how we actually manage to arrive at moral knowledge. A modest version of moral perception is sketched, one that does not suffer from any similarly implausible commitments. There are some concluding reflections on why it matters whether some of our moral knowledge is perceptual.


2020 ◽  
pp. 209653112097395
Author(s):  
Zhengmei Peng ◽  
Dietrich Benner ◽  
Roumiana Nikolova ◽  
Stanislav Ivanov ◽  
Tao Peng

Purpose: This article presents the theoretical framework, research design, methodology, and main findings of the comparative measurement of ethical–moral competences of 15-year-old upper secondary students in Shanghai, under the ETiK-International-Shanghai project. Design/Approach/Methods: By dividing the ethical–moral competences into the categories of basic ethical–moral knowledge, ethical–moral judgment competence, and competence in developing ethical–moral action plans, a survey of 2,036 students was conducted, using a reliable and valid testing instrument. Findings: In general, 15-year-olds from homes with more educational resources perform higher in all three scales across all countries taken under consideration in our study. Furthermore, school practices, teaching, as well as quantity and quality of instruction play a very important role in the moral education process and especially in developing students’ proficiency levels of ethical–moral knowledge, reasoning competence, as well as students’ high abilities in developing moral action plans. When relevant educational background factors are held constant, Chinese students show lower average scores on basic ethical–moral knowledge and moral judgment competence. With exception of the tested Vienna students, all other European samples scored better than the Chinese students—also on the test for developing ethical–moral action plans. However, Chinese students are especially able to display outstanding empathy when dealing with suffering, misfortune, and sorrow, as well as in their willingness to help others. Originality/Value: The findings of this article can foster thinking about which topics should be further discussed to improve the ethical–moral knowledge and competences of Chinese students and highlight requirements for the further development of moral education in China at the levels of teaching, curriculum, teacher education, and research.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document