Being

The chapter is divided into three main sections covering Kilwardby’s work on natural philosophy. The chapter starts with the basic issues of composition of corporeal substances and proceeds to consider the question of the nature of composition (versus simplicity) of the human soul. It also attempts to understand Kilwardby’s philosophical commitments underlying his involvement in the Oxford Prohibitions of 1277. Particular attention is paid to the notion of matter and simplicity that offers cues to the identification of the view(s) Kilwardby may be targeting in this event. In this chapter, I also show the nature of the events surrounding the 1277 Oxford Prohibitions in such a way that it makes clear that Kilwardby was not and could not be acting alone or even at his own initiative. Rather, the claim is that he was probably spearheading a philosophical and theological movement of opposition to certain interpretations of Aristotelian ideas, especially in natural philosophy. The final section of the chapter offers Kilwardby’s account of the nature of celestial change and the relation between celestial motion and time.

Incarnating

The chapter examines Kilwardby’s account of the doctrine of the Incarnation from the threefold perspective of its metaphysics, its epistemology, and its emotion theory. Adopting the medieval structure of analysis of the doctrine of the incarnation in Book III of the Sentences, the chapter considers in three different sections the core issues of the Christological debate: first, how do the two natures of Christ (divine and human) come together in constituting one person? Second, what kind of knowledge was available to Christ as both human and divine, namely does he acquire new knowledge and is thus changed? Third, was the incarnated Christ subject to suffering as other human beings, that is to say, was Christ’s soul affected by passions like fear?

Behaving

This chapter focuses on Kilwardby’s ethical theory, especially on the notions of happiness and virtue in the context of the Christian thought and also civil society. The key texts in which he discusses these topics—the Ethics and the Sentences commentaries—are examined in detail. Kilwardby’s commentary to the Ethics is limited to the first three books, as what is commonly known as the Ethica vetus et nova. Without access to the rest of the work, Kilwardby defends a particular understanding of what constitutes human happiness and how it can be achieved in this life. The analysis presented in this chapter brings new insight into how ethical and moral theory was discussed prior to the reception of the whole of the Aristotelian ethical treatises in the Latin West.

Being Logical

The chapter provides an overview of Kilwardby’s commentaries to Aristotle’s logical treatises of what was known as the Old Logic (Logica vetus), in what is commonly recognized as one of the earliest set of such commentaries. The chapter examines how Kilwardby conceives of the notions of being in the Categories and of signification (in the On Interpretation). In addition, it presents an analysis of the way thoughts are related to things and to language, in a way that is influential to later medieval authors. Among the ten categories of being identified by Aristotle and examined by Kilwardby, the category of relation has a particular significance, due to its theological and logical implications. The chapter presents Kilwardby’s thought on the nature of relation in the eponymous treatise (De natura relationis) dedicated to the topic, as well as in the Sentences commentary.

Believing

This chapter provides the first systematic study of Kilwardby’s theological thought, as found in his commentary to Peter Lombard’s Sentences. It starts by examining the nature of the Divine Trinity, namely how the three persons are related and differentiated in one divine nature. It continues by considering the concept of creation, namely how Kilwardby justifies the relation between creatures and the Creator in a way that explains ontological dependence in a non-transitive way: the creature is dependent of the Creator for its being while God creates without changes to its nature. The chapter also examines the nature of grace and its salvific outlook, as well as the nature of faith and of sin. Lastly, Kilwardby’s analysis of sacraments as signs and the relation between their salvific force and their performance is presented.

Knowing

The longest chapter of the book examines Kilwardby’s theory of knowledge, from sense perception to intellectual cognition. The key texts to understanding Kilwardby’s interpretation of Aristotelian and Augustinian epistemology are considered and the original solutions presented. Kilwardby combines an active theory of perception of Augustinian influence with a standard interpretation of the doctrine of abstraction. Also examined in this chapter is Kilwardby’s moderate realist interpretation of universals and how their discovery and application is found in scientific demonstrations. The conditions for and the nature of scientific demonstrations are examined in detail.

Living

This chapter presents the basic known facts of Kilwardby’s life and career, from his time as a student and then arts master in Paris during the 30’s and 40’s of the thirteenth century to his highly successful ecclesiastic career in Canterbury and finally his promotion to the cardinalate. The picture that emerges is that of an intellectual engaged with the main theological debates and the key philosophical traditions of his time. His transformation from devoted Aristotelian to fervent Augustinian is often used to obscure his contribution to later medieval thought. A quick glimpse to his life shows that this is a gross simplification, especially when considering the number of works on philosophical matters he wrote during his life. The chapter presents a list of all the works that he wrote or that have been attributed to him and further offers a categorization of the types of works for easy consultation.

Introduction

When I told a well-known scholar that I was writing a book on Robert Kilwardby for the series Great Medieval Thinkers, he commented with humor that “Robert Kilwardby” and “Great Medieval Thinker” didn’t quite fit together. Humor aside, I guess many would be tempted to agree with him. Kilwardby has often been considered a secondary figure, remaining in the shadow of other major thinkers of the thirteenth century—and there were many. However, it all depends on how one defines “greatness.” Is the basis for greatness influence or prestige, originality or relevance?...