Mathematical Knowledge and the Origin of Phenomenology

The paper is divided into two parts. In the first one, I set forth a hypothesis to explain the failure of Husserl’s project presented in the Philosophie der Arithmetik based on the principle that the entire mathematical science is grounded in the concept of cardinal number. It is argued that Husserl’s analysis of the nature of the symbols used in the decadal system forces the rejection of this principle. In the second part, I take into account Husserl’s explanation of why, albeit independent of natural numbers, the system is nonetheless correct. It is shown that its justification involves, on the one hand, a new conception of symbols and symbolic thinking, and on the other, the recognition of the question of “the formal” and formalization as pivotal to understand “the mathematical” overall.

Excès du témoignage, déhiscence du témoin. Søren Kierkegaard, Emmanuel Lévinas, Jean-Louis Chrétien

This text articulates the concept of subjective truth developed by Søren Kierkegaard in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, in connection to a conception of testimony which both exceeds and reveals the possibilities of thinking and acting of the witness. This imbalance between the testimony and the witness finds an important extension in the distinction between the Saying and the Said made by Emmanuel Lévinas in Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence. This distinction opens up an understanding of thought as affectivity and allows witnessing to be viewed in the light of responsibility to the other. By being part of this philosophical heritage, Jean-Louis Chrétien shows how the testimony of the infinite is also phenomenalized in the experience of a chant that discovers its own modalities in this excess of beauty on the voice that tries to say it.

Testimony and Engagement: On the Four Elements of Witnessing

In order to develop a hermeneutic-phenomenological analysis of testimony, this essay will first argue that testimony is “said in many ways” without being homonymous and that contemporary epistemological approaches to testimony are not capable of accounting for all paradigmatic forms of testimony. Second, it is argued, following and extending the work of Paul Ricoeur, that by emphasizing the sense of engagement or Bezogenheit as a basic characteristic of testimony, we may find another approach to testimony that offers a phenomenological alternative to the observational model of witnessing and the accompanying conception of testimony as report. Third, this approach is further developed and analyzed in terms of the four elements of testimony, namely, subject matter, witness, act of testifying, and addressee.

Knowledge by Hearing

In this paper, I argue that Husserl offers an important, although almost completely neglected so far, contribution to the reductionist/antireductionist debate about testimony. Through a phenomenological analysis, Husserl shows that testimony works through the constitution of an intentional intersubjective bond between the speaker and the hearer. In this paper I focus on the Logical Investigations, a 1914 manuscript now published as text 2 in Husserliana 20.2, and a 1931 manuscript now published as Appendix 12 in Husserliana 15. I argue that, in those texts, Husserl highlights three essential phenomenological features of testimony: a) testimony is personal, meaning that it only takes place among persons, b) testimony is social, meaning that it requires the joint effort of multiple cognitive agents, c) testimony is community-building, meaning that it generates a long-lasting social bond among the parts involved.

Pourquoi avons-nous besoin du témoignage ?

This article proposes to analyze the relations between ethics and the poetics of testimony. It does so by testing Paul Ricoeur’s analyses of testimony with the literary work of the Belarusian Nobel Prize winner Svletana Alexievitch. After having shown why witnessing occupies a type of expressivity that is singular in contemporary times, and then having been surprised by the strong links that unite witnessing and the experience of evil, Alexievitch’s work is chosen to explain what the resource of the poetic could be, in the face of the question of evil. Ultimately, the consequences are drawn for the development of a practical wisdom in which testimony would be in a good place.

Image and Original in Plato and Husserl

I compare Plato’s and Husserl’s accounts of (i) the non-original appearance (termed phantasma in Plato and phantasm in Husserl) and (ii) the original with a focus on their methodologies for distinguishing between them and the phenomenological—i.e., the answer to the question of the what and how of their appearance—criteria that drive their respective methodologies. I argue that Plato’s dialectical method is phenomenologically superior to Husserl’s reflective method in the case of phantasmata that function as apparitions (the false phantasma/phantasm that is not recognized as such). Plato’s method has the capacity to discern the apparition on the basis of criteria that appeal solely to its appearance, whereas Husserl’s method presupposes a non-apparent primitive distinction between the original qua primal impression and the phantasm as its reproductive modification. On the basis of Plato’s methodological superiority in this regard, I sketch a reformulation of the Husserlian approach to appearances guided by the original interrogative context of Plato’s dialectical account of the distinction between true and false appearances, eikones and phantasmata.

Eastward: On Phenomenology and European Thought

Płotka and Eldridge’s book is an important addition to the literature on phenomenology and phenomenological history, showing that phenomenology had a lively efflorescence in Eastern Europe during its first four decades. Historians have recently shown phenomenology’s intellectual, cultural, and social importance in postwar Eastern Europe, but this volume demonstrates that phenomenology’s independent East European trajectory began long before World War II—indeed from the earliest years of the movement. The review essay also raises the question of phenomenology’s social and political influence beyond academic circles.