The Best of Intentions

This chapter examines defense planning in the Indian military. It begins with a conceptual discussion on the role of civilians in defense planning, mainly by examining the experience of other democracies. Next, it describes the history of defense planning in India, focusing on the formulation and implementation of five-year defense plans. There are three main arguments in this chapter. First, effective defense planning requires a close partnership between civilians and the military. Second, defense planning in India is marked by a lack of civilian guidance and institutional discordance, creating friction in civil–military relations. To an extent, this is because of a lack of expertise, on the part of civilians, and an institutional design that creates strong civil–military silos. Third, notwithstanding the above, there have been periodic attempts at reforming defense-planning structures. Progress has been achieved in some sectors, but much remains to be done.

Tumultuous Times

This chapter discusses contemporary civil–military relations in India, engaging with, and occasionally refuting, a number of narratives. It begins with an overview of four main controversies—the dispute about withdrawal of troops from the Siachen glacier, the contrasting views over the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), the tenure of General V. K. Singh (chief of army staff from 2010 to 2012), and issues arising from pay commission reports and the equivalence between civilians and the military. These issues highlight the overall theme of this book—that there is considerable distrust and tension between civilians and the military. Next, it briefly discusses civil–military relations under the Modi government. Thereafter, it examines the issue of defense reforms, considered by many as a panacea to overcoming these difficulties. This is followed by an analysis of the divergence in the positions typically taken across all three levels—political, bureaucratic, and the military leaders.

Simply the Best?

This chapter examines officer promotion and selection policies in India. It begins with a conceptual discussion of the role of civilians in this process, examining its practice in other democracies. Thereafter it describes the historical evolution in the Indian military’s officer promotion and selection policies. In doing so it makes three broad arguments. First, promotion policies are an almost exclusive military affair, and civilians have little to do with the processes. As in other established democracies, senior officer promotions are subject to the approval of political authorities; but, exceptions apart, there is little evidence that civilians have actively shaped these policies. Second, a lack of civilian guidance exacerbates parochial divisions within the military. Third, military promotion policies would be better served with greater (but informed) civilian oversight. There is a need therefore to create conditions for a dialogue on promotion, selection, and placement policies. Such a measure, however, also needs to create safeguards to prevent politicization of the military.

The Coordinators

This chapter examines jointness—defined as the ability of the three services (army, air force, and navy) to operate together. It is informed by the widely held assumptions that jointness enhances military effectiveness but also requires civilian intervention. It chiefly argues that the single-service approach is still prevalent in India and that there has been an “incomplete transition” to jointness. This is primarily because of a lack of forceful and informed civilian intervention. The absent dialogue perfectly describes civil–military interaction on this issue. While making these claims, the chapter examines jointness in five major wars—the 1962 China war, the 1965 and 1971 India–Pakistan wars, the military intervention in Sri Lanka in the 1980s, and the 1999 Kargil war. It concludes by explaining why civilians have not intervened more forcefully on this issue.

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the central claims in the book. It begins by describing some recent vignettes in India’s civil–military relations, which convey the disquiet and its recurring crises. Next, it presents the main argument of this book—India’s pattern of civil–military relations has had an adverse impact on the variables associated with military effectiveness. The pattern, termed an “absent dialogue,” emerges from different factors but, in effect, results in creating strong silos between civilians and the military. Thereafter, the chapter explains why these conditions persist. It then highlights the relevance of this book. The penultimate section describes the sources and methodology, and the chapter concludes with an overview of the rest of the chapters in this book.

The False Promise of Self-Reliance

This chapter examines civil–military relations and the weapons procurement process in India. It begins with a conceptual discussion, using illustrations of other democracies, on the role of civilians in weapons procurement highlighting the importance of a constant and “iterative” dialogue between civilians and the military. Thereafter, it analyzes major trends in India’s weapons procurement process, highlighting the inability of state-owned domestic industry to meet the demands of the military. Problems emerge from weaknesses on the part of both civilians and the military. Civil–military relations and the pattern of interaction between them, intrinsic to the absent dialogue argument, accentuate the difficulty inherent in the weapons procurement process.

Conclusion

The concluding chapter revisits some of the main arguments in this book. It begins by examining the relevance of the absent dialogue framework in describing India's civil–military relations. It thereafter examines whether this framework is unique to India or if resonates with larger debates sorrouding democratic civilian control. Thereafter, relying on insights from India, it revisits the theoretical debates and the problems associated with democratic control and military effectiveness. In terms of theoretical implications, the chapter rejects the Huntingtonian notion of “objective control” and instead argues in favor of what Eliot Cohen calls the “unequal dialogue.” The penultimate section discusses avenues for further research, and the chapter concludes by discussing the prospects for change in India’s pattern of civil–military relations.

An “In-House” Affair

While examining professional military education (PME) in the Indian military, this chapter makes three main arguments. First, informed civilian intervention is crucial for an effective system of PME. Such intervention is important for enforcing jointness, emphasizing education over training, and creating a role for civilian academics. Second, this type of intervention has not happened in India, and PME remains almost exclusively in the military’s domain. Third, India’s unique pattern of civil–military relations, the absent dialogue argument, has accentuated weaknesses in its PME. Hindered by a lack of expertise and the norm in civil–military relations, civilians do not actively shape PME. In making these arguments, the chapter describes the history of PME, highlighting the lack of civilian participation and the weaknesses therein.

Convenient Narratives

This chapter explains the historical evolution of civil–military relations in India. While doing so, it focuses on leadership style and civil–military relations under five wartime prime ministers—Jawaharlal Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, and Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Together, they were at the helm of affairs for almost five decades after independence and significantly influenced the narrative on civil–military relations. Relying on archival sources, it sheds new light especially on events preceding the 1962 border war with China. It highlights variance in the pattern of civil–military relations under these leaders that, in turn, shaped military effectiveness. Next, the chapter focuses on an essential element shaping civil–military relations—the interaction between civilian bureaucrats and military officers.

Forging the Sword

This chapter explains the book’s theoretical underpinnings. It begins by discussing the contrasting views of Samuel Huntington and Eliot Cohen on the preferred role and “balance” of civil–military relations. Next, it examines patterns of democratic civil–military relations to argue that they are shaped largely by three factors—the struggle over military autonomy, the issue of civilian expertise, and institutional design, specifically the manner in which the Ministry of Defence interacts with the services. The next section discusses the concept of military effectiveness as adopted in this book. Drawing inspiration from previous works, it examines five processes associated with effective militaries. These variables, analyzed subsequently in separate chapters, are weapons procurement, jointness, professional military education, officer promotion policies, and defense planning. The chapter then discusses the study of the Indian military and its effectiveness and concludes by describing the analytical framework adopted in the rest of the book.