The Best of Intentions

2019 ◽  
pp. 222-249
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee

This chapter examines defense planning in the Indian military. It begins with a conceptual discussion on the role of civilians in defense planning, mainly by examining the experience of other democracies. Next, it describes the history of defense planning in India, focusing on the formulation and implementation of five-year defense plans. There are three main arguments in this chapter. First, effective defense planning requires a close partnership between civilians and the military. Second, defense planning in India is marked by a lack of civilian guidance and institutional discordance, creating friction in civil–military relations. To an extent, this is because of a lack of expertise, on the part of civilians, and an institutional design that creates strong civil–military silos. Third, notwithstanding the above, there have been periodic attempts at reforming defense-planning structures. Progress has been achieved in some sectors, but much remains to be done.

2019 ◽  
pp. 97-136
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee

This chapter examines civil–military relations and the weapons procurement process in India. It begins with a conceptual discussion, using illustrations of other democracies, on the role of civilians in weapons procurement highlighting the importance of a constant and “iterative” dialogue between civilians and the military. Thereafter, it analyzes major trends in India’s weapons procurement process, highlighting the inability of state-owned domestic industry to meet the demands of the military. Problems emerge from weaknesses on the part of both civilians and the military. Civil–military relations and the pattern of interaction between them, intrinsic to the absent dialogue argument, accentuate the difficulty inherent in the weapons procurement process.


1982 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 778-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amos Perlmutter ◽  
William M. LeoGrande

This article is an effort to establish a comparative theoretical framework for the study of civil-military relations in communist political systems. Although the literature on civil-military relations in polyarchic and praetorian polities is theoretically as well as empirically rich, theories of civil-military relations in the field of comparative communism are still at the preliminary stage of development. It is argued that civil-military relations, like all the fundamental dynamics of communist political systems, derive from the structural relationship between a hegemonic Leninist party and the other institutions of the polity. Although the party directs and supervises all other institutions, its political supremacy is necessarily limited by the division of labor among various institutions. The relative autonomy of the military and its relations with the party vary from one country to another and can be described as coalitional, symbiotic, or fused. These relations are dynamic, changing over time in each country in response to contextual circumstances. The role of the military in politics is complex and variegated: on ideological issues, there is usually little conflict between party and army; on issues of “normal politics,” the military acts as a functionally specific elite engaged in bargaining to defend its perceived institutional interests; and in crisis politics, the military is a political resource that various party factions seek to enlist against their opponents.


Author(s):  
Paul W. Chambers

The history of civil–military relations in Thailand has paralleled the gradual post-1980 primacy of monarchical power over the country. Until 1932, the monarchy ruled absolute across Siam (Thailand). From 1932 until 1980, the military held more clout than the monarchy (though the palace slowly increased its influence after 1957). Since 1980, monarchy and military have dominated the country with the military as junior partner. The two form a khakistocracy: the military’s uniform color of khaki combined with the aristocracy (monarchy). Though there have been brief instances of elected civilian governments, all were overthrown by the military. In fact, Thailand likely holds the record for the highest number of military putsches in the world. Since the death of King Bhumipol Adulyadej in 2016, the clout of the armed forces has become more centralized under his successor and son King Maha Vajiralongkorn. At the same time, post-2019 Prime Minister (and post-2014 junta leader) General Prayuth Chanocha has sought to entrench military power across Thailand. As a result, in 2021, the monarchy and military continue to enhance authoritarian rule as a khakistocracy camouflaged behind the guise of a charade form of democracy. Civil–military relations represent exclusively a partnership between the monarch and the armed forces.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (7) ◽  
pp. 1033-1047
Author(s):  
Furkan Halit Yolcu

The main paradox of the civil–military relations theory has been the protection of the political sphere from the military, which is administered by the politicians. The new dilemma lies under the paradox that occurs when the political sphere is entirely co-opted by the military, which is legitimized through democratization instead of protection of the civilian sphere. The question regarding the continuity of the pathology, the military superiority over the civil administration, has been largely omitted. This study is an attempt to respond to this conundrum related to the continuity of pathological civil–military relations. The main focus is the pathology that occurs when the military is the modernizer or the democratizer in a country. The study uses process tracing to collect the data as research attempts to unravel the rationale behind the continuity of military dominance in politics. In doing so, it will attempt to trace the causality between the lack of democratization and military dominance over politics in the case of Algeria.


The Forum ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Byron E. Shafer ◽  
Raymond J. La Raja

This issue of The Forum is focused on the military in American politics. It begins by reprinting the classic overview piece from Samuel Huntington. Damon Colletta then unpacks the state of our attention since Huntington, while John Griswold follows the evolution of Huntington’s organizing focus, the National Guard. Irving Louis Horowitz considers many of these same issues in light of the current role of the U.S. in the wider world. Beth Bailey introduces the biggest piece of civilmilitary involvement, in the form of the volunteer (and predecessor conscription) armed forces. Donald Downs raises the aspect of this politics that most closely touches the university, through ROTC. Lilly Goren considers the aspect that often absorbs the greatest number of congressmen, involving base closings. Matthew Holden and Gene Giannotta think about further, fresh ways to study civil-military relations, most especially between Presidents and their generals. And Jason Dempsey and Bradley Cooper introduce the newest program aimed at a crucial aspect of the military in American life, through “Joining Forces”, the military families initiative. Three book reviews close this issue of the journal: Kenneth Mayer on Jason K. Dempsey, Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations; David Parker on David R. Mayhew, Partisan Balance: Why Political Parties Don’t Kill the U.S. Constitutional System; and Frances Lee on Gregory Koger, Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate.


Author(s):  
Vipul Dutta

The early twentieth century in India witnessed a remarkable wave of institution-building as part of the subcontinent’s wider political, social and educational transformation. This book highlights the fascinating yet unexplored history of some of India’s iconic military training and educational institutions from the 1900s until 1960. It offers an institutional perspective on Indian history foregrounding key questions of educational policy, strategy and civil-military relations. The book covers a broad network of institutions – starting from the early preparatory schools in the northwest that sprang up from the 1890s to the post-independence national institutions like the National Defence Academy (NDA) among others. In chronicling the evolution, development and management of these institutions, the book will offer insights into the process of ‘Indianisation’ of the military in India.


1993 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Knut Walter ◽  
Philip J. Williams

The recent coups and attempted coups in Haiti, Venezuela, and Peru serve as a sobering reminder of the military's central role in the political life of Latin America. Earlier assessments of the prospects for democratic consolidation now seem overly optimistic in light of these events. At a minimum, they point up the need to focus on the role of the military during transitions from authoritarianism and the consolidation of democratic regimes. As Stepan has suggested, prolonged military rule can leave important legacies which serve as powerful obstacles to democratic consolidation (Stepan, 1988: xi-xii). Understanding these legacies and the problems they present is essential in developing strategies aimed at democratizing civil-military relations.This is no less true in El Salvador, where the prospects for democratization are closely linked to the future of the country's armed forces.


Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee

Civilian control over the military is widely hailed as among the biggest successes of India’s democracy. This is a rarity, especially among postcolonial states, and is rightfully celebrated. But has this come at a cost? The Absent Dialogue argues that the pattern of civil–military relations in India has hampered its military effectiveness. Indian politicians and bureaucrats have long been content with the formal and ritualistic exercise of civilian control, while the military continues to operate in institutional silos, with little substantive engagement between the two. In making this claim, the book closely examines the variables most associated with military effectiveness—weapons procurement, jointness (the ability of separate military services to operate together), officer education, promotion policies, and defense planning. India’s pattern of civil–military relations—best characterized as an absent dialogue—adversely affects each of these processes. Theoretically, the book adopts the “unequal dialogue” framework proposed by Eliot Cohen but also argues that, under some conditions, patterns of civil–military relations may more closely resemble an “absent dialogue.” Informed by more than a hundred and fifty interviews and recently available archival material, the book represents a deep dive into understanding the power and the limitations of the Indian military. It sheds new light on India’s military history and is essential reading for understanding contemporary civil–military relations and recurring problems therein. While the book focuses on India, it also highlights the importance of civilian expertise and institutional design in enhancing civilian control and military effectiveness in other democracies.


2005 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-85
Author(s):  
J. Mark Ruhl

AbstractThe Guatemalan military dominated the country's politics for nearly half a century, but its political power declined during the 1990s. Democratically elected presidents Alvaro Arzú (1996–2000) and Alfonso Portillo (2000–2004) subordinated the armed forces to their authority and thereby gained an unprecedented opportunity to reduce the role of the military and institutionalize democratic civil-military relations. Unfortunately, neither of these tasks was accomplished. An analysis of the level of democratic control, combining Alfred Stepan's military prerogatives indicators with a newer system of measurement and classification designed by Samuel Fitch, shows that the armed forces retained substantial institutional autonomy and de facto legal immunity when Portillo left office in 2004. The role of the military in Guatemalan society, moreover, expanded again under Portillo after declining under Arzú. This study finds that the lack of sufficient civilian commitment to reform, rather than resistance from the armed forces, was the principal cause of these disappointing outcomes.


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