Background to Crisis

This chapter discusses in general terms the origins of the arms embargo imposed on Turkey in 1974, emphasizing both the controversy over opium and the invasion of Cyprus. It also briefly relates the history of US-Turkey relations from the arrival of American missionaries and traders in the early nineteenth century to the advent of the Cold War. It explains the significance of the infamous Johnson letter of 1964. It concludes with the author’s reflections on a visit to a tense Cyprus in the summer of 1969.

Making Turkey Pay

This chapter details the international response to the outbreak of violence on Cyprus, resulting in the Turkish intervention. It focuses on the effective efforts of Greek Americans to lobby on behalf of Cyprus, using national and local organizations throughout the country and garnering support from Armenian allies. It explains how key activists in Congress, with the crucial support of ethnic lobbyists, successfully organized to press the Ford administration to accept an arms embargo. Finally, it reveals the initial inadequacies of the White House in trying to counter this insurgency.

“They Have Made a Mess of Cyprus”

This chapter opens with the 1976 presidential campaign. Each candidate made efforts to attract Greek Americans’ support, but Carter criticized Ford’s handling of Cyprus, promising to do more for the island, and won them over. Vice President Mondale played a major role in formulating foreign policy and also served as liaison with his former colleagues in Congress. The new administration had to decide quickly how to deal with Cyprus. The US-Turkey Defense Cooperation Agreement that Ford had submitted to Congress caused some awkwardness for the Democrats. The new president sent senior statesman Clark Clifford to the eastern Mediterranean to gather information. Following Clifford’s report, the administration seemed ready to pursue a bizonal solution on the island, which Archbishop Makarios was willing to accept. With Makarios’s unexpected death and Turkey’s continuing resistance to US pressure, however, the White House paid less attention to the island, turning its attention to other regional troubles.

Turning Congress

This chapter follows the Ford administration’s efforts throughout 1975 to lobby Congress to lift the embargo and embargo supporters’ response to this pressure, highlighting the successes and failures of each. It examines the lobbying efforts of Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Americans to maintain the sanctions on Turkey. It discusses the reasons for the initial failure to pass the Scott bill in the summer of 1975, followed by the administration’s more successful campaign in the fall of that year. It focuses on the critical role of John Rhodes and the minority Republicans in this controversy. Finally, it discusses the elimination of the opium issue as a factor in US-Turkish relations by the end of 1975.

Conclusion

The Turkish arms embargo stands out not as a revolution but as an insurgency. The threatened transformation of US foreign policy did not eventuate. The embargo came about due to unique conditions that are unlikely to be repeated. Rather than looking at these events as a crisis of good order, we should consider how successfully the various elements of our democratic system rose to the challenge. This experience set US-Turkey relations on a straight path for the next four decades.

The Embargo Must Go

The Carter administration wanted to proceed with the Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey, but it faced considerable opposition in Congress. Rather than suffer a defeat, the president’s top advisers urged him to try to lift the embargo instead. This goal seemed more easily achievable, though not without challenges. Carter became energized, but so did the Greek American community, which supported the leadership of Brademas and Sarbanes in Congress. From May to August 1978 the two sides battled for a majority in the House. The administration used the organizational skills it had mastered during the debate over the Panama Canal treaties. The president won a razor-thin majority, but only with strong support from the Republicans. Following the campaign, Carter did all he could to win back ethnic support, but it was not enough.

Killing America’s Children

This chapter examines Turkey’s role in the US heroin epidemic of the late 1960s and early 1970s and explains how this issue complicated American attitudes and policies toward Ankara. It focuses on the nature of the epidemic and the misunderstanding, generated in part by popular films, regarding Turkey’s responsibility. It elaborates on the drug policy of the Nixon administration, as well as Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s decision to renew poppy cultivation and the bitter American response, including measures to punish Turkey. It examines the involvement of key political figures, such as Representative Lester Wolff, Senator Walter Mondale, and Charles Rangel, chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, in the movement toward embargo.

Epilogue

Conditions on Cyprus have evolved in predictable ways. The two communities have moved further apart; the Republic of Cyprus has become economically successful, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus remains something of a backwater. Attempts to resolve differences have failed. The discovery of nearby oil and gas reserves has only exacerbated these differences. US administrations have maintained a low-profile approach to the dispute, urging the United Nations to take the lead. The Reagan administration came to rely on Turkey as a point of stability in the region, and US assistance increased accordingly.