Representation or Redistribution? Evidence from Iraq

This chapter considers Iraq, a case in which majoritarian and redistributive understandings of democracy imply very different preferences for the main sects. When democracy is believed to be a fundamentally political arrangement (elections, freedom to criticize government, etc.), Shi`a (the majority group) have reason to favor democracy, while the formerly powerful Sunni minority have reason to oppose it. Communal prayer pushes individuals' regime preferences further in the direction of these sectarian interests; i.e., mosque attendance increases support for democracy among Shi`a but decreases such support among Sunnis. However, when democracy is considered in economic terms, namely, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, the interests of each sect change. Sunnis, now poorer than Shi`a on average, have an incentive to support redistributive democracy, while Shi`a have reason to fear democratic redistribution. The effect of communal prayer follows these same patterns: in this case, mosque attendances enhances support for democracy among Sunnis but has the opposite effect among Shi`a. Evidence from the second wave of the Arab Barometer, conducted in 2011, is used to support each of these claims.

The Religious Experience Communal Prayer and Group Identity

This chapter describes the religious experience in sectarian environments as expressed by the participants themselves. This chapter provides essential texture to the analysis by allowing worshipers to speak for themselves. Using responses from open-ended interview questions in both Lebanon and Iraq, it reveals the ways in which communal worship promotes sectarian solidarity and group-centric political preferences. The Lebanese interviews illustrate the link between communal worship and political preferences. Distinct themes emerged between sects; while communal prayer heightened sectarian identity for all sects, each sect reported different political messages. For Christians, the emphasis was on preserving their community's privileges in a changing political landscape. For Sunnis, the emphasis was on avoiding divisions imposed from outside. For Shi`a, political messages stressed political and economic marginalization and called for an end to the sectarian system. In each of these cases, interviews indicated that religious-political messaging in places of worship clearly reflects political circumstances and sectarian interests, a relationship explored in-depth in subsequent chapters.

An Interest-Based Theory of Religion and Support for Democracy

This chapter presents a new theory of religion, sectarian interests, and regime preferences. Religious behaviors shape regime preferences, and do so through a sectarian lens. Communal religious practice heightens the intensity of sectarian identity, and in doing so, frames regime politics as a group issue. Depending on the interests of the group with respect to democracy (namely, the rights and privileges that a group would gain or lose in the event of democratization), communal prayer may have pro- or anti-democratic effects. A number of potential benefits and threats may accompany democracy; certain groups may gain or lose political voice, while others may benefit or suffer due to economic redistribution. In either case, group interests help to predict when religion will enhance support for democracy---and when it will do just the opposite.

Conclusion

This chapter concludes, placing these findings in the context of religion and political behavior broadly considered. It tests my theory in a large sample of countries using the World Values Survey. Cross-national tests indicate that the pattern described in the above cases is evident in much of the world: the general trend is that for small sects, communal prayer decreases support for democracy, while the opposite is true for large groups. Larger groups can expect to benefit from free elections due to their sheer size, so increased salience of sectarian identity---such as that created by communal worship---should promote democratic attitudes; the reverse logic holds for smaller groups, who would be unlikely to win elections. Finally, the chapter uses the suggestive evidence from the World Values Survey to describe some of the conditions under which this theory should---and should not---apply.

After Syria

This chapter reveals how changing political circumstances---a new axis of political competition---dramatically altered the political interests of Lebanon's sects and therefore adjusted the effect of communal prayer on regime preferences. Using an original, nationally-representative survey of over 1,200 Lebanese respondents, I show that the Syrian conflict has centered political contestation around the Sunni-Shi`a cleavage, with Christians divided on their relationship with each of these sects and on the Syrian conflict itself. Sunnis, relatively better-represented and wealthier than Shi`a, now have reason to fear Shi`a ascendance in Lebanese politics. Since the new lines of political conflict have created a zero-sum situation between these two sects, democracy is no longer a palatable option for many Sunnis. Consequently, the effect of communal prayer on regime attitudes has shifted: for Shi`a, mosque attendance continues to have a pro-democratic effect, but for Sunnis, this effect has reversed; fearing Shi`a dominance, practicing Sunnis now tend to oppose democracy more than their less observant counterparts.

Christians and Muslims in Lebanon Before the Syrian Civil War

This chapter examines perhaps the most famous illustration of sectarian politics: Lebanon. It provides an account of Lebanon before the Syrian Civil War using data from the first wave of the Arab Barometer, conducted in 2007. This chapter considers communal prayer and support for democracy through a Christian-Muslim sectarian lens. Before the war in Syria---which pitted Sunnis and Shi`a against each other in a more severe way than any time in the country's recent history---it was possible for both Sunnis and Shi`a to consider issues of representation through a Christian-Muslim perspective rather than through the Sunni-Shi`a divide. Since both Muslim sects were under-represented in politics and relatively poorer than Christians, their incentives with respect to democracy were aligned, despite their differences on other issues. Communal prayer therefore had a pro-democratic effect among Muslims, while the opposite was true for Christians, who sought to maintain their disproportionate influence in Lebanese politics as well as their greater wealth.

Introduction

This chapter introduces the key issues addressed in the book. Why does religion sometimes strengthen support for democracy and sometimes do just the opposite? This book argues that theological explanations alone cannot account for the wide variety of influences that religion can have on political preferences. It argues, instead, that we must consider the role of group interests. The book presents a new theory that uses an interest-based approach to explain these complex relationships. Evidence from Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere supports these claims.