Attributing Beliefs and Judgements In plato’s gorgias, meno, and theaetetus

In Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates explains what it is to have a doxa, a judgement or belief. A doxa is a self-addressed affirmation or denial that comes into existence when, after giving a question thought, the subject settles on one answer. Two passages seem to conflict with this account of doxa. In the Gorgias, a belief is attributed to Polus on the strength of what he is committed to by his other beliefs. But Socrates is trying to show complexity in an apparently universal consensus on Polus’ side, and the point of the belief-attribution cannot be understood without recognizing that Socrates speaks of what other people, not only Polus himself, believe. In the Meno, a slave in the grip of perplexity is said to contain true doxai. But Socrates does not mean that the slave at that time believes the answer to the geometrical problem.

Aristotle on Spontaneous Generation, Spontaneity, and Natural Processes

Aristotle contrasts standard animal generation with ‘spontaneous generation’, which happens when some material putrefies and gives rise to a new organism. This paper addresses two interrelated puzzles about spontaneous generation. First, is it of the same ‘fundamental kind’ of causal process as standard generation? Second, is it ‘spontaneous’, as understood in Physics 2.4–6: rare, accidentally caused, and among things that are for the sake of something? I argue that both puzzles turn on the same questions about the process types involved. I show that the type putrefaction plays a more important role in spontaneous generation than has been recognized so far. Because putrefaction does not play this role in standard generation, the two processes are of different ‘fundamental’ kinds. Moreover, spontaneous generation happens rarely in that it is rare for processes of putrefaction to happen in such a way that they can also be described in terms of concoction.

Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations: A Sceptical Reading

Cicero wrote his later philosophical works as an Academic sceptic. In those dialogues, he often writes speeches for and against a proposition, leaving the reader’s judgement free. But in his Tusculan Disputations, Cicero speaks only against an interlocutor’s stated belief. He does this five times. The theses of Cicero’s five arguments form a Stoic outlook on happiness. Can the Tusculans be sceptical? I argue that Cicero aims to convince neither his interlocutor, nor the reader, of the truth of what he argues for. Rather, he aims to argue us out of each stated belief, and not into any other. I further argue Cicero the author chooses to argue against exactly the five beliefs of his interlocutors not to argue for any dogmatic position, but to argue against five beliefs that are very widely believed, and troubling to believe. Academic scepticism can relieve us of those beliefs and troubles.

Ancient Philosophy, Ancient History

Fifty papers, more than half dealing with philosophy at Rome, half a dozen classic pieces; all elegant, many diverting as well as instructive; and all eminently sane (a rare phenomenon). The drama takes place in Rome. The time, from the Gracchi to Marcus Aurelius. The protagonists, Cicero and Seneca, with Pliny as a comprimario, and a large supporting cast. Pawn your grandmother’s tea-spoons and buy a copy. A question unites the volume: how did philosophy affect Rome’s statesmen? Some historians offer a sceptical answer: ‘Philosophy? Window-dressing.’ Others urge that philosophical doctrines did determine political actions, that (say) the Gracchi’s reforms were grounded on Stoic dogma. Miriam Griffin doubts the influence of doctrine, but she is not a sceptic: the politicians were affected not by theory but by a habit of mind. When they pondered practical questions, they applied the methods and conceptual resources they had learned from their philosophical studies.

What is eikasia?

This paper defends a reading of eikasia—the lowest kind of cognition in the Divided Line—as a kind of empirical cognition that Plato appeals to when explaining, among other things, the origin of ethical error. The paper has two central claims. First, eikasia with respect to, for example, goodness or justice is not different in kind to eikasia with respect to purely sensory images like shadows and reflections: the only difference is that in the first case the sensory images include representations of value properties. Second, eikasia is not the bare awareness of images or simply a label for an error (mistaking image for original) but a kind of empirical, image-confined cognition, and one that has an important part to play in characterizing the cognitive abilities of the non-rational parts of the soul.

Demonstration By Reductio Ad Impossibile In Posterior Analytics 1. 26

In Posterior Analytics 1. 26, Aristotle states that direct demonstrations are better than demonstrations by reductio ad impossibile. The former, he argues, proceed from premisses that are prior in nature to the conclusion, whereas the latter proceed from premisses that are posterior in nature to the conclusion. While Aristotle’s thesis in Posterior Analytics 1. 26 has been widely influential, his argument for it has proved difficult to understand and is often taken to be incoherent. I argue that Aristotle’s thesis relies on a deductive framework in which the only direct demonstrations are those that derive a universal conclusion. The relevant relation of priority in nature is determined by the order of terms in acyclic chains of immediate universal affirmations. Given this characterization of priority in nature, Aristotle’s argument in Posterior Analytics 1. 26 can be shown to be coherent and successful.

Sextus Empiricus on Religious Dogmatism

I present a reading of Sextus Empiricus’ two major discussions of philosophical theology (PH 3. 3–12 and M 9. 14–191) on which they offer divergent but compatible strategies for suspension of judgement about specific theological tenets. In Section 1, I focus on PH 3. 12 and M 9. 49 in order to make the case that the two discussions follow the same philosophical agenda. In Section 2, I argue that Pyrrhonists can participate in religious cult without compromising their suspensive stance. In Section 3, I analyse the argument of PH 3 with an eye to the dogmatic proposals concerning the conception, existence, and providence of god that it targets. In Section 4, I turn to M 9 to show that Sextus relies on dogmatic material to make the case for suspension not only concerning divine existence but also concerning the natural or conventional origin of the concept of god.

Plato On The Unity of the Political Arts (Statesman 258 D–259D)

Plato argues that four political arts—politics, kingship, slaveholding, and household-management—are the same. His argument, which prompted Aristotle’s reply in Politics I, has been universally panned. I consider and reject three ways of saving the argument, and argue for a fourth. On my view, Plato assumes that politics is identical with kingship, just as he does elsewhere, but he begs no questions because the point of his argument is to identify the public arts of politics and kingship with the private arts of household-management and slaveholding. He does this successfully by addressing three reasons why one might distinguish the private from the public arts. His argument leaves room for Aristotle to propose other reasons. One of them—involving differences among men and women and slaves—is unfortunate, but another is more promising. The Aristotelian can assume that political expertise is a matter of know-how gathered by experience of the particular actions which differ in the public and private arts. But Plato might well be right to reject this, and to insist that the essential difference between the expert and non-expert—the dividing line between good and bad rule—is not in experience but in their grasp of their goals.