Sextus Empiricus on Religious Dogmatism

Author(s):  
Máté Veres

I present a reading of Sextus Empiricus’ two major discussions of philosophical theology (PH 3. 3–12 and M 9. 14–191) on which they offer divergent but compatible strategies for suspension of judgement about specific theological tenets. In Section 1, I focus on PH 3. 12 and M 9. 49 in order to make the case that the two discussions follow the same philosophical agenda. In Section 2, I argue that Pyrrhonists can participate in religious cult without compromising their suspensive stance. In Section 3, I analyse the argument of PH 3 with an eye to the dogmatic proposals concerning the conception, existence, and providence of god that it targets. In Section 4, I turn to M 9 to show that Sextus relies on dogmatic material to make the case for suspension not only concerning divine existence but also concerning the natural or conventional origin of the concept of god.

Author(s):  
Jeff Speaks

Philosophical theology is the attempt to use reason to determine the attributes of God. An ancient tradition, which is perhaps more influential now than ever, tries to derive the attributes of God from the principle that God is the greatest possible being. This book argues that that constructive project is a failure. It also argues that the principle that God is the greatest possible being is unsuited to play two other theoretical roles. The first of these is the role of setting the limits of the concept of God, particularly in the context of debates over the existence of God. The second is the role of explaining the meaning of ‘God.’ This leaves us with three unanswered questions. If the principle that God is the greatest possible being can’t deliver results about the divine attributes, define the concept of God, or give the meaning of the name ‘God,’ what can? The last chapter makes some initial steps toward answering these questions.


Romanticism ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-176
Author(s):  
Li Ou

This essay discusses Keats's affinity with Pyrrhonian scepticism as recorded by Sextus Empiricus in Outlines of Scepticism in the following aspects: the investigative, non-dogmatic attitude towards the truth, the ability to set out oppositions and to realise the equipollence in opposed accounts of the truth, suspension of judgement, and the goal of tranquility. It also speculates on the implication of the common medical background Sextus and Keats shared by linking the ethical values of ancient scepticism to the humanitarian concerns of medicine that might have shaped Keats's scepticism. Although the connection between Keats, Sextus, and medicine is speculative, Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy – carefully studied by Keats – mentions Sextus, from which we can assume Keats's exposure to Sextan scepticism. The Renaissance revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism provides us with stronger evidence about its indirect influence on Keats through Montaigne and Shakespeare as its important inheritors.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaul Tor

Following the lead of Duncan Pritchard’s “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism,” this paper takes a further, comparative and contrastive look at the problem of justification in Sextus Empiricus and in Wittgenstein’sOn Certainty. I argue both that Pritchard’s stimulating account is problematic in certain important respects and that his insights contain much interpretive potential still to be pursued. Diverging from Pritchard, I argue that it is a significant and self-conscious aspect of Sextus’ sceptical strategies to call into question large segments of our belief systemen masseby exposing as apparently unjustifiable fundamental propositions which are closely related in their linchpin role to Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions. In the first instance, the result is a more complex account of both a deeper affinity between Wittgenstein’s approach to hinge propositions and Sextus’ approach to what I termarchaipropositions and a divergence between the two. In the second instance, I suggest how the comparison withOn Certaintycan be illuminating for the interpreter of Sextus. In particular, it can help us to see how the Pyrrhonist’s everyday conduct—common assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding—involves rational procedures of justification, in line with a naturalism reminiscent of Wittgenstein. Furthermore, it can help us to reflect on the Pyrrhonist’s attitude to what Wittgenstein would have called her ‘worldview’. Throughout, I suggest that the comparison with Wittgenstein is interesting, although it must be cashed out differently, not only on the interpretation—or, perhaps, strand—of ancient Pyrrhonism which has the sceptic exempt ordinary beliefs from her suspension of judgement, but also on the interpretation (or strand) which has her disavow all beliefs categorically.


1970 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-169
Author(s):  
Kai Nielsen

The center of theology, I shall argue, is philosophical theology, that is, philosophical analysis of fundamental religious concepts and claims. Whether there can be any revelation, general or special, and which putative revelation or revealed theology, if any, is genuine must be settled by reference to philosophical criteria. Whether the very concept of God itself is a coherent concept such that there could be a revelation, a legitimate object of faith, and a source of religious truth, must be made out on philosophical grounds. … The critical question is: Can philosophy justifiably be the kind of arbiter I am maintaining it can?


Author(s):  
Denis Maslov

The article tackles the question whether the Pyrrhonian skeptic can be happy having “pathe” in his life. Thus, the consistency of Pyrrhonian skepticism is discussed. In the first section, I consider the notions of ataraxia and tarache. The source of unhappiness is considered by Sextus to be beliefs about the good and the evil, which give rise to intense longing that creates anxiety. Sceptical suspension of judgement extirpates beliefs and therefore this anxiety. In the second section, the notion of pathe is analyzed in comparison with the Stoics. Pathe, such as hunger, thirst, pain, etc., are inevitably and involuntarily present in the life and they create a certain kind of distress. Because of their unreasonable and necessary nature, pathe cannot be disposed of but are nevertheless moderate and hence bearable. The question is, therefore, whether pathe can cause distress directly or through compelling people to form beliefs, which is examined in the third section. Sextus clearly distinguishes between these things as being dependent (beliefs) and independent (pathe) from us. A presupposition that beliefs are exclusively in our power was widely held at the time. On that ground, I argue that pathe do not originate anxiety for they cannot compel us to form beliefs. In addition, such conditions do not cause great agitation and therefore they cannot be a source of unhappiness. Those who hold something for good or true are burdened with a double distress – mental suffering from beliefs and from pathos. Thus, the skeptical life is better off than the dogmatic one. In the last section, I try to show on example of mental pathe, which are not bodily (the search for truth, love for people, the ethos of the community), that even they do not compel the sceptic to form beliefs.


1988 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Leftow

The claim that God is eternal is a standard feature of late–classical and mediaeval philosophical theology. It is prominent in discussions of the relation of God's foreknowledge to human freedom, and its consequences pervade traditional accounts of other kinds of divine knowledge, of God's will, and of God's relation to the world. So an examination of the concept of eternity promises to repay our efforts with a better understanding of the history of philosophical theology and with insight into the concept of God. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann's ‘Eternity’ is a forceful, sophisticated presentation and defence of the notion of eternity. Our treatment of eternity will focus on two of Stump and Kretzmann's claims. First, Stump and Kretzmann contend that eternity isa kind of ‘atemporal duration’. We will see that while this is true, it is only part of the story. Second, Stump and Kretzmann claim to provide a viable account of how the existence of an eternal being can be simultaneous with some temporal event. We will see that and why they have not done so.


Classics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Bett

While ideas that can loosely be called skeptical may be found from very early in Greek philosophy, skepticism as an organized method of thinking in Greco-Roman antiquity appears in the post-Aristotelian period. There are two distinct traditions or movements of skeptical thought: Pyrrhonian and Academic. The hallmark of ancient Greco-Roman skepticism, in both traditions, is suspension of judgement, brought about by the juxtaposition of equally persuasive opposing views on any given question. In the Pyrrhonist version, but not the Academic, this is claimed to have a practical benefit: ataraxia or tranquility. In both traditions, however, skepticism is understood not merely as a topic of theoretical reflection, but as something to be lived. The Pyrrhonian tradition claimed inspiration from Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 bce), who is usually considered the first Greek skeptic. However, the exact nature of Pyrrho’s thinking is very hard to reconstruct, given the scarcity of the evidence. Pyrrho’s direct influence seems to have been short-lived. But shortly after Pyrrho another skeptical movement arose in the Academy, the school founded by Plato. The first head of the Academy to take the school in a skeptical direction was Arcesilaus of Pitane (316/5–241/0 bce). Whether Pyrrho was an influence on him is a disputed question. But some aspects of Socrates’ activity, as Plato portrays him, might seem to encourage skepticism, and Arcesilaus is said to have acknowledged this influence. The skeptical Academy lasted for roughly two centuries, its other major figure being Carneades of Cyrene (214–129/8 bce). By the early 1st century bce the skepticism of the Academy seems to have moderated considerably, and it was at this point that the Academy itself, as an institution, came to an end. But in reaction to this softening of the skeptical attitude came a new skeptical movement led by Aenesidemus of Cnossos (dates uncertain, but active in the early first century bce), repudiating the Academy and instead identifying itself with Pyrrho. This later Pyrrhonian movement continued for roughly three centuries. We know the names of a few Pyrrhonists. But the only complete Pyrrhonist works we have are the extensive surviving writings of Sextus Empiricus (probably late 2nd or early 3rd century ce). Because Oxford Bibliographies for Pyrrho of Elis and The Academy already exist, this bibliography is somewhat weighted toward the later Pyrrhonist tradition stemming from Aenesidemus.


1984 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-78
Author(s):  
Ivor Leclerc

There is a long tradition in Western philosophical theology of conceiving God as ‘a being’. It dates back to the Hellenistic period, more particularly to the conjunction of Greek philosophy and the Hebrew religion in Alexandria with Philo, and it became orthodox in the Christian tradition through Augustine. In our time most aspects of this religious tradition have been subjected to a salutary re-examination, but in this the concept of God as ‘a being’ has been relatively neglected. After such a long acceptance of so fundamental a doctrine, it is liable largely to have sunk to the status of a presupposition, entailing a loss of intellectual awareness of what precisely it implies. Even where the Augustinian philosophical argument upon which this concept is based is recognized, as it has been in the long Neoplatonic tradition, it has come to appear as essentially self-evident and thus has not been subjected to fundamental critical examination. Significant of this is that even where the personalistic conception of God has been abandoned, e.g. by the idealist philosophy of the Absolute, the conception nevertheless persists of God as ‘a being’.


2021 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-587
Author(s):  
Stéphane Marchand

Abstract The aim of this paper is to determine how a Pyrrhonian (as she/he is described by Sextus Empiricus) considers the Law and can respond to Aristocles’ objection that a Pyrrhonian is unable to obey laws. First (1), we analyze the function of the Law in the 10th Mode of Aenesidemus, in order to show laws as a dogmatic source of value. But (2) Sextus shows also that the Sceptic can live in a human society by following laws and customs, according to so-called ‘sceptical conformism’. In the light of Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes (Pyr.) 1.23–24 and Against the Mathematicians (Math.) 11.162–164, I discuss the validity of the label ‘conformism’ in order to understand the nature of the political effect of the suspension of judgement. (3) The real nature of the political position of Pyrrhonian Scepticism – that lack of commitment does not mean indifference to politics but rather a criticism of fanaticism and praise for political cautiousness – appears by comparison with the Scepticism of the New Academy.


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