The road to The General Theory: J. M. Keynes, F. A. Hayek, and the Genealogy of Macroeconomics

ABSTRACT The criticism made by Friedrich A. Hayek to A Treatise on Money by John Maynard Keynes, and the subsequent controversy that followed with the involvement of members of the Cambridge Circus, sustained important elements to Keynes’ abandonment of his earlier ideas and to his way to General Theory. The figure and position of Hayek operated to clarify the underlying differences and the new theoretical routes for Keynes, one that was more explicitly opposite to critical authors drawing from Knut Wicksell. To some degree, the road to General Theory was paved in the famous 1931 controversy - in particular the rejection of the Wicksell connection.

Bancor Comes of Age: A Case for an Indian Bitcoin Reserve

John Maynard Keynes proposed the concept of ‘Bancor’ 1940 as a supranational currency that would serve as the international reserve currency. The concept did not take off at the time, although the underlying need to liberate the international system from the hegemonic tendencies of a national currency serving as a global medium of exchange. The emergence of Bitcoin makes it possible to revive the idea of a de-nationalised global medium of exchange. This article examines the feasibility of such an idea by examining a viable state policy for adoption and use in the international realm.

John Maynard Keynes Between Old and New Institutionalism

The article considers the possible compatibility (in epistemological and ontological terms) of the conceptions of convention and institutions in the thought of John Maynard Keynes, Thorstein Veblen and Douglass North. We argue, first, that while Veblen suggests an approach to institutions based on instincts, North sustains an approach to institutions based on rational choice, which implies distinct conceptions about institutions and the social world. We then present Keynes's ontological commitments and the epistemological implications of his ontology. We conclude that there is a background ontological compatibility between Keynes and the late North in that both accept that the socioeconomic world is fundamentally uncertain and non-ergodic; also that Keynes is epistemologically closer to North than Veblen in studying the economy as a market system embedded in social institutions; and finally that Keynes's treatment of individual action is closer to Veblen’s than North’s, in that both Keynes and Veblen see human action as based on instincts and not only on rationality.

KEYNES’S TREATISE, STATISTICAL INFERENCE, AND STATISTICAL PRACTICE IN INTERWAR ECONOMICS IN THE UNITED STATES

In his Treatise on Probability John Maynard Keynes criticized the tools of statistical inference derived from probability that were coming into use in the early twentieth century, and outlined an alternative approach to statistical inference based on the logic of induction. This essay argues that Keynes’s ideas were embraced and echoed by several leading US economists during the 1920s and 1930s, including those developing and applying the most sophisticated statistical methods of the day. These economists expressed views regarding statistical inference that were quite similar to those found in Keynes’s Treatise, often citing Keynes as an authority in support. Also, the inferential methods recommended and actually employed by these writers were consistent with Keynes’s ideas about the proper methods of statistical inference.

THE DIARY OF FREDERIC HARMER

Forgive me writing to you after an interval of what I think must be forty-five years. Let me explain why I am writing. In the process of tidying up my room in the Marshall library, I found a diary of the Bretton Woods Conference. It was a typescript copy on foolscap paper. It was fascinating. It was obviously written by someone very much more alive and intelligent than the ordinary Treasury civil servant. By a process of elimination, I arrived at you as the almost certain author. I sent it to Donald Moggridge, who has edited the Bretton Woods volume in our Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. He confirmed that it was not among the Keynes papers in the King's College archive.

Globalization of capital, erosion of economic policy sovereignty, and the lessons from John Maynard Keynes

This article observes that current macroeconomic policy modeling, centered on domestic agents or agencies, fails to recognize the role that global investors play in determining the space for effective domestic macroeconomic policies, and argues that these actors must be brought to the center of macro analysis if one wants to understand how policies work in the global financial context. The article describes the key features of global investors, discusses their power to determine the prices at which public-sector liabilities (money and debt) trade in the international markets, and considers how this power affects the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies by national governments. As a result, no government is truly sovereign in a globalized world, and every government is subject to an intertemporal budget constraint (IBC), although, of course, not all governments are born equal and not all IBCs are equally binding: government IBCs are elastic, endogenous to global investor decisions, and yet ineluctable. The article concludes that choosing the correct country policy stance in today's financial global context would benefit from revisiting some of the key policy lessons that John Maynard Keynes left with us, considering his deep knowledge of global financial markets and how they affect country economies.

THE GERMAN ANTI-KEYNES? ON WALTER EUCKEN’S MACROECONOMICS

The work of Walter Eucken (1891–1950), founder of German ordoliberalism, is often described as being in direct opposition to that of John Maynard Keynes. Our paper challenges this claim by making two main arguments. First, we show that Eucken supported a proto-Keynesian stimulus program at the height of the Great Depression, the so-called Lautenbach plan of 1931. Second, we analyze his critique of full employment policy, which reveals that Eucken’s approach to solving macroeconomic problems is fundamentally different from, if not necessarily contrary to, that of Keynes.

Alteration of Consumption Habits in Turkey Over Time

Simon Kuznets and John Maynard Keynes did research on the subject of propensity to consume. Kuznets asserted that people do not alter their consumption/saving ratio and spend more when they have more disposable income. Keynes alleged that when disposable income increases, the rate of saving also increases over time because people tend to keep their consumption habits steady. Namely, the consumption/saving ratio of households or individuals tends to decrease as disposable income goes up. And in this study, the Keynesian consumption function is investigated in the Turkish economy. The result of this research might give insight into the future of the consumption/saving ratio in Turkey. In the study, the ARDL econometric model is operated with data from the Turkish Statistical Institute. The result of the study is that people change their consumption habits with the increase of disposable income. As a result, the consumption level has been slowing down, and the propensity to consume diminishes. That proves that the Keynesian consumption function holds in Turkey.

Weight of Evidence

This chapter analyzes and operationalizes a concept of “weight” as denoting the relative degree to which evidence has been developed on the basis of which to determine disputed claims. This concept was coined by John Maynard Keynes and later applied in the context of judicial proof by a number of scholars. The author distinguishes weight from the degree to which evidence favors one side over the other, and then assays the different ways this concept of weight can be operationalized. He identifies the strengths and weaknesses of various theories, and advocates a conception of weight that emphasizes its connection to fundamental policy choices about the importance of accuracy in litigation and, perhaps, the allocation of the risk of error. He argues that a common failure to appreciate the differences between ordinary decision-making under uncertainty and formal adjudication is responsible for confusion about the role of weight in the latter.