The Uniting of Europe
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theoretically achieved back in the 1960s, meant the abolition of all barriers. In practice, the latter had remained a pious aspiration so long as a whole host of technical, fiscal and other barriers existed. Early in 1985 the Commission produced a white paper on establishing a single market. This, together with the report by the Dooge Committee, established at Fontainebleau to examine institutional issues, formed the major agenda when the European Council met in Milan in late June 1985 and took the crucial decisions which were to lead to the negotiation and signature of SEA. The Milan European Council was an early demonstration of the new Franco-German axis. Analysis of these events should properly focus on three critical features. First, the European Council confirmed its assumption of direct responsibility for all major decisions. In 1984 this involved enlargement and the budget. In 1985 it embraced ‘completion’ of the Community itself in the shape of the single market. Second, the actual decision to hold an inter-governmental conference (IGC), which would give a treaty base to foreign policy co-operation and revise some of the institutional arrangements, was taken by a majority despite opposition from Britain, Denmark and Greece. Italian Prime Minister Craxi as President of the European Council played a key role in this. Third, despite objections to developing European structures and institutions, Britain attached sufficient importance to the single market to accept a majority decision on the IGC. The lead up to the IGC had been long and tortuous, but the actual negotiation of the SEA was relatively simple. The IGC met in September, and by January an agreed text had emerged. The treaty itself is analysed in the next chapter. Its main features were agreement to implement the single market by the end of 1992, the establishment of a legal basis for Political Co-operation and a number of institutional reforms. Whilst not formally repudiating the Luxembourg compromise with its apparent extension of the national veto, member states seemed to have reached some understanding that in future the spirit of the original treaties would apply. The point is underlined by the fact that virtually all the provisions relating to the single market would be implemented by majority vote. In the immediate aftermath of the ratification of the SEA, some observers drew attention to the gap between aspirations expressed by Parliament in its Draft Treaty and the actual achievement. Although true, such comments are wide of the mark. In the negotiating process Parliament was little more than a bystander with the right to be heard. The member states were anxious to achieve a relaunching of the move towards unification after a period of apparent
Community-minded members accepting an extension of integration (higher overall budget) as the means of resolving a problem. Indeed, taken together with the incident over farm prices already discussed, it demonstrates the extent to which even Britain – the apparently ever-reluctant European – had under Margaret Thatcher become sucked into the Community ‘game’. Fontainebleau has to take its place as one of the most significant meetings of the European Council. It resolved a long-standing dispute which was jeopardising progress on a whole range of issues, cleared the way for Spanish and Portugese accession, and set in motion the process which was to lead to the signature of the Single European Act (SEA). None of this could have happened without agreement between France and Germany. Fontainebleau marked the re-emergence of what was earlier termed the ‘Franco-German axis’. Removal of the long-standing budgetary problem obviated the danger that Britain would simply obstruct all progress, and this brought one immediate bonus. Even though Thatcher’s predilections and policy priorities ensured that Britain would still not normally be centre stage, she was heavily committed to the notion of ‘completing’ the Community as a trading and commercial entity by establishing a single market. In the short run, Thatcher could thus work with Mitterrand and Kohl on what may be considered the first phase in their mission to regenerate the Community. They also gained a major long-term ally in the person of Jacques Delors, whose appointment as the next Commission President was also agreed at Fontainebleau. The term ‘founding fathers’ is normally used in a Community context to refer to those who inspired the original treaties in the fifties and who led the institutions at the commencement of the process of integration. As the Community developed thereafter, many individuals played important roles, but it is hard to think of occasions prior to the appointment of Delors where any were indispensable, save perhaps for Roy Jenkins in the case of the establishment of EMS. Delors, a former civil servant and government minister, was to be President of the Commission for a decade, which witnessed the SEA and the implementation of the 1992 programme, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, the inclusion of Portugal and Spain and successful negotiations for membership of Austria, Finland and Sweden. A convinced federalist, Delors was to become virtually synonymous with the Community during the decade 1985–95. With the three largest countries onside, it was logical for the new Commission to make the single market its major policy priority when it took office at the beginning of 1985. The establishment of internal free trade,
The three concerns itemised above – the continuing row over Britain’s contribution to the budget, enlargement and institutional reform – were inevitably linked. Early attempts to find a formula for resolving the budget issue were dogged by failure to recognise the need for a permanent solution rather than a temporary ‘fix’. The latter approach ensured that an increasingly irritable Margaret Thatcher was institutionally locked in to raising the issue at successive summits. Consequent explosions of ill temper did nothing to help the Community in its search for solutions to other problems, which included applications for membership from Portugal and Spain. At the end of the 1970s there were applications for membership on the table from three Mediterranean countries – Greece, Portugal and Spain. Although the subject matter of the negotiations was largely economic, particularly disparities between the three applicants and existing members, the major determinants of the new enlargements were political. Greece had been the earliest European associate of the Community, but the development of a closer relationship was put on hold after a military coup overthrew the elected government. The reestablishment of a democratic regime gave the new Greek government critical bargaining power in its bid to join, despite all the economic problems. Whatever their reservations on the readiness of the Greek economy for full membership, member states could hardly fail to offer support to the political aspirations of the new government. The second enlargement – to ten members – took place in January 1981. Negotiations were rather more protracted with Portugal and Spain. Again there were major economic problems and some member states, particularly France, expressed reservations. However, both countries had been ruled by arbitrary, neo-fascist regimes until the mid 1970s. In the last analysis the establishment of democratic regimes gave their new governments exactly the same political key to membership as Greece, but the economic issues still required resolution. The third major internal issue confronting the Community was institutional reform. This was a perennial, but the more pressing in view of continued enlargements. The crux of the problem related to voting in the Council of Ministers. Whatever view may be taken of the impact of de Gaulle and the so-called Luxembourg compromise, it is possible to argue that in a Community of only six members, voting methods were not that important. In effect, arguments about the right to national veto could be subsumed within the dynamics of a small, cosy club. This is hardly a view which could be taken of a putative Community of twelve. Further enlargement necessitated a behavioural change
