actual negotiation
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2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-138
Author(s):  
Herbert Goelzner ◽  
Abraham Stefanidis ◽  
Moshe Banai

Purpose This study aims to generalize the research findings about the impact of individualism-collectivism, ethical idealism and inter-personal trust on ethically questionable negotiation tactics, such as pretending, deceiving and lying, in a Germanic culture, namely, that of Austria. Design/methodology/approach Survey questionnaires translated from English to German were collected from 304 respondents. A regression analysis was used to test the contribution of the independent variables to the explanation of negotiators’ attitudes towards questionable negotiation tactics. Findings The research empirically corroborated a classification of three groups of negotiation tactics, namely, pretending, deceiving and lying, in Austria. Austrian negotiators who scored high on vertical individualism tended to score high on the endorsement of the pretending tactic; those who scored high on horizontal collectivism tended to score low on the endorsement of the deceiving and lying tactics; those who scored high on vertical collectivism tended to score high on the endorsement of the deceiving and lying tactics; and those who scored high on inter-personal trust tended to score low on the endorsement of the pretending negotiation tactic. Idealistic negotiators tended not to endorse the use of pretending, deceiving and lying negotiation tactics. Research limitations/implications The study investigated the respondents’ perceptions, rather than their actual negotiation behavior. Findings are limited to Germanic culture. Practical implications The study provides negotiators in Austria with a tool that has the potential to predict the extent to which Austrian negotiators would use various ethically questionable negotiation tactics. Originality/value This is the first study to present a model of the antecedents of negotiation tactics in a Germanic cultural context, where negotiation studies are limited. This study validates in Austria three questionable negotiation tactics groups of varying severity, which had previously been studied only in non-Germanic cultures. This research significantly contributes to the generalization of a model of the antecedents of the endorsement of questionable tactics across cultures.



2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-339
Author(s):  
Michael E. Ricco ◽  
Patrik Hultberg

Synopsis The dilemma down under is a two-party distributive negotiation with integrative potential. A large airline, Transpacific Airlines (TPA), created an internal tour operator brand named Transpacific Vacations as a separate profit center. After licensing its brand to Global Tour Services and establishing operations in the UK, negotiations to take over the internal tour operations of TPA-Australia are about to begin. The case involves the negotiation between Mr Edwards, representative of GTS, and Ms Bentley, representative of TPA-Australia. Research methodology The dilemma down under is based on a real negotiation with altered names and facts. All names of companies have been changed. All names of protagonists have been changed. The year of the case has also been altered. The case was created after an extensive interview with an individual engaged in the actual negotiation. Relevant courses and levels Students in courses related to negotiation and/or decision making. The case also works in international management/strategy courses where students are asked to apply market entry mode decisions along with the accompanying negotiations. The case is most appropriate for undergraduate courses, but can be used for graduate courses. The case can easily be used with common negotiation textbooks, such as Negotiation, 7th edition by Lewicki et al. (2014). Theoretical bases The exercise will be able to reinforce basic distributive negotiation concepts, including identifying issues, positions, interests, alternatives to a negotiated agreement, reservation (resistance) points, target (aspiration) points and opening bids, while at the same time challenge students to look for integrative potential among and across the issues. The case also provides an opportunity to explore the connection between negotiation and international market entry choice.



2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Forester

The future of sustainability is tied to the future of our ability to manage interconnectedness and interdependence, and thus to our abilities to engage in cooperative, value-creating public deliberations and negotiations. To understand these issues, we need a better understanding of the micro-politics of planning and public participation, the relationships between our received theories and our practices, and in particular, the work of public dispute resolution and its implications for democratic deliberation and governance. We need better to understand the differences between dialogue, debate, and negotiation, as well as the corresponding work of facilitating a dialogue, moderating a debate, and mediating an actual negotiation. Contrasting processes and practical attitudes of dialogue, debate, and negotiation can teach us, in the context of creating a sustainable future, that we must devise discursive and conversational political processes and institutions that explore possible commitments so that we not only know the right things to do but actually bring ourselves and one another to do those right things.



Author(s):  
Heidi Keinonen

Despite the growing number of publications on television formats, specific theorisations regarding formats and format adaptation, in particular, are still rare. In this article, I introduce a synthesizing approach for studying format appropriation. Drawing on format study, media industry research and structuration theory, I suggest that television formats should be understood and studied as a process of cultural negotiation in which global influences and local elements amalgamate on various levels of television culture (i.e., production, text, and reception); every level includes several sites of symbolic or actual negotiation. These sites emerge in the duality of structure and human agency.



2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (03) ◽  
pp. 661-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
SUSANA NICOLA ◽  
EDUARDA PINTO FERREIRA ◽  
J. J. PINTO FERREIRA

This paper proposes a novel framework for modeling the Value for the Customer, the so-called Conceptual Model for Decomposing Value for the Customer (CMDVC). This conceptual model is first validated through an exploratory case study where the authors validate both the proposed constructs of the model and their relations. In a second step the authors propose a mathematical formulation for the CMDVC as well as a computational method. This has enabled the final quantitative discussion of how the CMDVC can be applied and used in the enterprise environment, and the final validation by the people in the enterprise. Along this research, we were able to confirm that the results of this novel quantitative approach to model the Value for the Customer is consistent with the company's empirical experience. The paper further discusses the merits and limitations of this approach, proposing that the model is likely to bring value to support not only the contract preparation at an Ex-Ante Negotiation Phase, as demonstrated, but also along the actual negotiation process, as finally confirmed by an enterprise testimonial.



2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abbas Foroughi

A survey was taken of negotiation practices in business and industry. Of particular interest was the extent to which computer technology is being used to enhance and support negotiation. The most widely used types of computer support were costing of anticipated demands, mathematical models and contract analysis. Pre-negotiation and post-negotiation activities had been more widely supported by computers than had actual negotiation sessions. A large number of organizations expressed a willingness to use computer support for future negotiations, and the consensus was that pre-negotiation activities could most benefit from such support. Those who had not yet used computer support for negotiations felt that costing and contract analysis could cost benefit from such support. The survey identified areas in need of improvement in the negotiation process and provided the basis for identifying solutions to these problems which could be provided by the used of innovative computerized negotiation support.



theoretically achieved back in the 1960s, meant the abolition of all barriers. In practice, the latter had remained a pious aspiration so long as a whole host of technical, fiscal and other barriers existed. Early in 1985 the Commission produced a white paper on establishing a single market. This, together with the report by the Dooge Committee, established at Fontainebleau to examine institutional issues, formed the major agenda when the European Council met in Milan in late June 1985 and took the crucial decisions which were to lead to the negotiation and signature of SEA. The Milan European Council was an early demonstration of the new Franco-German axis. Analysis of these events should properly focus on three critical features. First, the European Council confirmed its assumption of direct responsibility for all major decisions. In 1984 this involved enlargement and the budget. In 1985 it embraced ‘completion’ of the Community itself in the shape of the single market. Second, the actual decision to hold an inter-governmental conference (IGC), which would give a treaty base to foreign policy co-operation and revise some of the institutional arrangements, was taken by a majority despite opposition from Britain, Denmark and Greece. Italian Prime Minister Craxi as President of the European Council played a key role in this. Third, despite objections to developing European structures and institutions, Britain attached sufficient importance to the single market to accept a majority decision on the IGC. The lead up to the IGC had been long and tortuous, but the actual negotiation of the SEA was relatively simple. The IGC met in September, and by January an agreed text had emerged. The treaty itself is analysed in the next chapter. Its main features were agreement to implement the single market by the end of 1992, the establishment of a legal basis for Political Co-operation and a number of institutional reforms. Whilst not formally repudiating the Luxembourg compromise with its apparent extension of the national veto, member states seemed to have reached some understanding that in future the spirit of the original treaties would apply. The point is underlined by the fact that virtually all the provisions relating to the single market would be implemented by majority vote. In the immediate aftermath of the ratification of the SEA, some observers drew attention to the gap between aspirations expressed by Parliament in its Draft Treaty and the actual achievement. Although true, such comments are wide of the mark. In the negotiating process Parliament was little more than a bystander with the right to be heard. The member states were anxious to achieve a relaunching of the move towards unification after a period of apparent

2006 ◽  
pp. 84-84


Author(s):  
Alan K. Henrikson

Why do diplomatic encounters—international meetings of all kinds, including major international conferences—occur where they do? What are the reasons for and what may be the effects of the selection of one meeting site rather than another for discussions between nations? The focus of attention, for diplomats themselves as well as for scholars of diplomacy, usually has been on the participants, on their instructions and interests, on their tactics and strategies, on the interplay of these in actual negotiation, and on the outcomes of the process in terms of formal agreement and other results. The fascination of diplomacy is thought to lie in the “foreground”—that is, the dynamics of the meeting itself. The physical setting, including the geographic location, of diplomatic encounters tends to be taken for granted. The purpose of this chapter is not to propose that this emphasis be reversed, but rather to suggest that the question of where diplomacy takes place is of much greater significance than is generally appreciated. Moreover, it is to suggest that the selection of a diplomatic venue—the physical location and surrounding environment—is not entirely free or a matter of arbitrary choice. Territorial and other factors, including the history of diplomacy, work to produce a field, or geography, of diplomacy that conditions and can even constrain the choice of site and setting. On one level, the issues involved in what here is called “the geography of diplomacy” are pragmatic in nature and sometimes can be the primary ones. The “where” question is often the first one to be considered. “Site selection, in fact, is always an important decision in negotiation,” as the analysts of negotiation Jeswald Salacuse and Jeffrey Rubin point out. “Parties frequently negotiate long and hard about where they are to meet long before they sit down to discuss what they will negotiate. The reason for this concern is that disputants almost always assume— and with good reason—that the particular location in which they negotiate will have consequences for the ensuing process and, ultimately, its results.”



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