A Year After Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned at One Coastal Trauma Center

2007 ◽  
Vol 142 (2) ◽  
pp. 203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Sariego
Blood ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 110 (11) ◽  
pp. 4026-4026
Author(s):  
Jed Baron Gorlin ◽  
Sertac Kip ◽  
Dawn Hansen ◽  
Jonathan Pohland

Abstract Following 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina there has been a concerted effort to prepare and organize for disasters. Blood transfusion, a key element of disaster response, has been previously documented to be an important factor in decreasing fatalities from disaster-related injuries, provided there is an organized system of transfusion. Reviews of blood usage following other domestic disasters have generally revealed only modest use of transfusable products that generally do not overwhelm local supplies of blood. We conducted a survey to enumerate the amount of blood and blood products used in Minnesota following the I- 35W bridge collapse that took place on 8/1/07. The bridge is for a major interstate highway that crosses the Mississippi river collapsed under the weight of evening commute traffic. The bridge normally carries 140,000 vehicular trips daily. About 100 individuals presented to local hospitals the evening or day following the incident and 9 individuals died at the scene or by the time of arrival at the trauma center. All critically injured were brought to Minnesota’s largest level 1 trauma hospital that fortuitously was adjacent (less than 1/2 mile) to the disaster site. Within 1/2 hour of the event, the local community blood center sent additional blood to all customer hospitals likely to receive patients, prior to any estimates of the number of injured patients expected at that hospital. However, no blood products were transfused for bridge accident victims at the other surrounding hospitals. Of 25 patients presenting by ambulance to the level 1 trauma center, only 5 received blood following the event. Only 2/5 received emergency group O units, and since both were male, they each received 2 group O Rh(D) + before being switched to type specific units. In total, 14 units of red cells were transfused the evening of the disaster to four of those patients. 30 additional units were required for the 5 patients requiring transfusion over the ensuing week-10 days following hospitalization. One apheresis platelet, 2 jumbo cryoprecipitate units (derived from 600 ml plasmapheresis donations) and 4 FFP were also administered to these same 5 patients the evening of 8/1. The FFP included 2 units of thawed AB plasma that are maintained in the transfusion service for immediate release to emergency patients at all times. Media response uniformly encouraged blood donation and community response was overwhelming resulting in one local community blood center receiving over 11,000 phone calls in the two days following the disaster. The usual collection of ∼400 units/day was doubled to almost 800 units and on the second day after the disaster (8/3/07) the blood center issued press releases noting that the immediate needs had been met. Lessons learned include the importance of disaster drills to prepare staff for such events. In addition, the best disaster preparation is to have adequate supplies at all times, since components from donations that follow the event may not be available for several days.


2008 ◽  
Vol 65 (5) ◽  
pp. 1126-1132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sidney B. Brevard ◽  
Sharon L. Weintraub ◽  
James B. Aiken ◽  
Edward B. Halton ◽  
Juan C. Duchesne ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Jacob J Glaser ◽  
Adam Czerwinski ◽  
Ashley Alley ◽  
Michael Keyes ◽  
Valentino Piacentino ◽  
...  

Background: REBOA has become an established adjunct to hemorrhage control. Prospective data sets are being collected, primarily from large, high volume trauma centers. There are limited data, and guidelines, to guide implementation and use outside of highly resourced environments. Smaller centers interested in adopting a REBOA program could benefit from closing this knowledge gap. Methods: A clinical series of cases utilizing REBOA from Grand Strand Medical Center, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina were reviewed. This represents early data from a busy community trauma center (ACS Level 2), from January 2017 to May 2018. Seven cases are identified and reported on, including outcomes. Considerations and ‘lessons learned’ from this early institutional experience are commented on.   Results: REBOA was performed by trauma and acute care surgeons for hemorrhage and shock (blunt trauma n=3, penetrating trauma n=2, no- trauma n=2). All were placed in Zone 1 (one initially was placed in zone 3 then advanced). Mean (SD) systolic pressure (mmHg) before REBOA was 43 (30); post REBOA pressure was 104 (19). N=4 were placed via an open approach, n=3 percutaneous (n=2 with ultrasound). All with arrest before placement expired (n=3) and all others survived. Complications are described.   Conclusions: REBOA can be a feasible adjunct for shock treatment in the community hospital environment, with outcomes comparable to large centers, and can be implemented by acute care and trauma surgeons. A rigorous process improvement program and critical appraisal process are critical in maximizing benefit in these centers.


2009 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-12
Author(s):  
Kusuma Madamala ◽  
Claudia R. Campbell ◽  
Edbert B. Hsu ◽  
Yu-Hsiang Hsieh ◽  
James James

ABSTRACT Introduction: On Aug. 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Gulf Coast of the United States, resulting in the evacuation of more than 1.5 million people, including nearly 6000 physicians. This article examines the relocation patterns of physicians following the storm, determines the impact that the disaster had on their lives and practices, and identifies lessons learned. Methods: An Internet-based survey was conducted among licensed physicians reporting addresses within Federal Emergency Management Agency-designated disaster zones in Louisiana and Mississippi. Descriptive data analysis was used to describe respondent characteristics. Multivariate logistic regression was performed to identify the factors associated with physician nonreturn to original practice. For those remaining relocated out of state, bivariate analysis with x2 or Fisher exact test was used to determine factors associated with plans to return to original practice. Results: A total of 312 eligible responses were collected. Among disaster zone respondents, 85.6 percent lived in Louisiana and 14.4 percent resided in Mississippi before the hurricane struck. By spring 2006, 75.6 percent (n = 236) of the respondents had returned to their original homes, whereas 24.4 percent (n = 76) remained displaced. Factors associated with nonreturn to original employment included family or general medicine practice (OR 0.42, 95 percent CI 0.17–1.04; P = .059) and severe or complete damage to the workplace (OR 0.24, 95 percent CI 0.13–0.42; P < .001). Conclusions: A sizeable proportion of physicians remain displaced after Hurricane Katrina, along with a lasting decrease in the number of physicians serving in the areas affected by the disaster. Programs designed to address identified physician needs in the aftermath of the storm may give confidence to displaced physicians to return.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S1) ◽  
pp. s81-s81 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Reilly

IntroductionImmediately following a major public health emergency or complex humanitarian emergency such as the South East Asian Tsunami in 2004, the Haitian Earthquake in 2010 or Hurricane Katrina in 2005, there is a critical need to rapidly and as accurately as possible gather information not limited to morbidity and mortality, but necessary to assess the stability and existence of a public health or medical infrastructure, logistic supply chain, condition of food, water and shelter for victims and rescue workers, and particularly the security and stability of the region following the incident. With this information, only then can an effective humanitarian response be planned and executed that meets the actual versus perceived needs of an affected population.MethodsSpecific disaster risk assessment and medical intelligence techniques will be presented that are currently used by a variety of relief organizations. Specific topics of discussion include: Disaster epidemiology; Indicators of health in populations; Systems of surveillance; Impact of weather and climate; Displaced populations and refugee health; Tactical and combat medical intelligence; Zoonotic diseases; Agricultural trends and food security; Public health and health system infrastructure assessment; and Personal and physical security concerns.ConclusionsUtilizing case reports, best-practices and lessons learned from numerous international humanitarian responses, this session will guide participants though the performance of a rapid disaster assessment and the gathering of critical medical intelligence to determine the kinds and types of resources needed in an affected area. And the process of utilizing limited information to plan humanitarian relief efforts.


Author(s):  
Michael R. Mabe

According to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (2006), emergency management professionals realized first-hand that preplanning and coordination is essential when mounting an effective reaction to natural disasters. This chapter describes how leaders in Chesterfield County, VA learned similar lessons in 2001 during Hurricane Irene. In comparison to Katrina the amount of damage caused by Irene was minimal but the impact on county leaders was severe. Based on lessons learned during Irene and an unexpected wind storm nine months later, Chesterfield County leaders now include the Chesterfield County Public (CCPL) in their official disaster relief plans. When activated, CCPL will serve as an information hub, double as a daytime relief shelter and participate in mass feeding if necessary. Selected library branches are available to be used as overnight relief shelters for mass care when the activation of a standard sized shelter facility is not warranted. These changes have made a notable difference.


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