Arrow of time is well known problem in physics and concerns explanation of
the status of the second law of thermodynamics. The problem, however, soon
made noise in various philosophical discussions: on knowledge, causality,
etc. David Lewis, partially motivated by his counterfactual analysis of
causality, introduced the problem of arrow of time in discussion on
counterfactuals. After his article in which he had tried to ground asymmetry
of counterfactuals in the second law of thermodynamics, there were numerous
reactions on such kind of project. In the first part, I will introduce Lewis'
theory in detail, and in the second part I will introduce some of the main
critiques of such a view, focusing on Elga's critique. The third part will be
saved for Loewer's and Albert's argument in favor of a very broad view of
Lewis' project. In the part four, I will present strengthening of their
argument, while explaining how we could apply it closer to Lewis' original
view. Finally, I will make some concluding remarks regarding possible
confusion on argument for supporting Lewis, as well as the additional
requirements for any future work in that direction. Also, because of the
nature of the mentioned arguments, in the appendix I will, very briefly,
present an overview of the arrow of time problem from the perspective of
physics.