Interest group strategies in multi-level Europe

2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Constantelos
2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 476-478
Author(s):  
Gary McKissick

In an age when commercials bombard us with plain folk (from central casting) ruminating about the latest proposal in Congress and when "astroturf" more often refers to syn- thetically manufactured grassroots activity than to stadium playing fields, evidence that groups frequently "go public" is easy to come by. Nevertheless, these efforts to reach and use the public have received little systematic attention from political scientists. Ken Kollman aims to fill this substantial gap in interest group scholarship. Outside Lobbying is an impressive effort, one that should invigorate further inquiry into this important aspect of interest group advocacy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joost Berkhout ◽  
Marcel Hanegraaff ◽  
Patrick Statsch

Policy-specific actor-constellations consisting of party- and group-representatives commonly drive the effective establishment of new policy programmes or changes in existing policies. In the EU multi-level system, the creation of such constellations is complicated because it practically requires consensus on two dimensions: the European public policy at stake and the issue of European integration. This means that, for interest groups with interests in particular policy domains, and with limited interest in the actual issue of European integration, non-Eurosceptic parties must be their main ally in their policy battles. We hypothesise that interest groups with relevant European domain-specific interests will ally with non-Eurosceptic parties, whereas interest groups whose interests are hardly affected by the European policy process will have party-political allies across the full range of positions on European integration. We assess this argument on the basis of an elite-survey of interest group leaders and study group-party dyads in several European countries (i.e., Belgium, Lithuania, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, and Slovenia) in a large number of policy domains. Our dependent variable is the group-party dyad and the main independent variables are the European policy interests of the group and the level of Euroscepticism of the party. We broadly find support for our hypotheses. The findings of our study speak to the debate concerning the implications of the politicisation of European integration and, more specifically, the way in which party-political polarisation of Europe may divide domestic interest group systems and potentially drive group and party systems apart.


2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. de Figueiredo ◽  
Rui J.P. de Figueiredo

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions—legislative, administrative, and legal—is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage that cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, (1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, (2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and (3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court.


1994 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Maloney ◽  
Grant Jordan ◽  
Andrew M. McLaughlin

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the place of groups in the consultative process in British policymaking. It stresses the importance of consultation even under the Thatcher government and distinguishes between consultation, bargaining and negotiation. The paper identifies the important divide between the relatively few groups with privileged status and the greater number of groups who find themselves consigned to less influential positions. The discussion revisits the insider/outsider typology often used to differentiate interest group strategies and status in policy development. It suggests that the insider group term is associated with a particular style of policy making, and offers amendments to the existing use of the terms to avoid the difficulties which occur from the conflation of group strategy and group status.


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