Interest Groups and Public Policy: The Insider/Outsider Model Revisited

1994 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Maloney ◽  
Grant Jordan ◽  
Andrew M. McLaughlin

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the place of groups in the consultative process in British policymaking. It stresses the importance of consultation even under the Thatcher government and distinguishes between consultation, bargaining and negotiation. The paper identifies the important divide between the relatively few groups with privileged status and the greater number of groups who find themselves consigned to less influential positions. The discussion revisits the insider/outsider typology often used to differentiate interest group strategies and status in policy development. It suggests that the insider group term is associated with a particular style of policy making, and offers amendments to the existing use of the terms to avoid the difficulties which occur from the conflation of group strategy and group status.

2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. de Figueiredo ◽  
Rui J.P. de Figueiredo

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions—legislative, administrative, and legal—is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage that cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, (1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, (2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and (3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court.


Author(s):  
Tom Holyoke

This chapter examines Theodore J. Lowi’sThe End of Liberalism,which issued dire warnings about the growing scope of government power and assumed responsibility in the United States as well as the dominance of interest groups over public policy-making. Lowi tackles the delegation of policy-making authority to the executive branch, the abdication of Congressional responsibility, and the erosion of representative government responsive to the popular will. The chapter assesses the book’s impact on political science and public policy scholarship, by considering how it brought together public policy and interest group politics. It then turns to Lowi’s views about interest group pluralism and how liberal politicians harnessed pluralist theory to replace elected representation with interest groups as proxies for citizen participation. Finally, the chapter analyzes the influence of Lowi’s book on public administration and the rule of law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Rasch ◽  
Florian Spohr ◽  
Rainer Eising ◽  
Simon Ress

Abstract This article discusses web collection of interest group statements on bills as a data source. Written statements allow the identification of actors active in policy-making as well as those actors’ positions, lobbying coalitions and issue saliency. These data also can contribute to the measurement of interest groups’ influence on legislation. Taking web collection from the German parliament’s and ministries’ web pages as an example, we demonstrate the collection process and the merits and limitations of employing written statements as identificatory data. Our analysis of statements submitted by interest groups, private firms and policy experts to four federal ministries and the respective parliamentary committees in the years 2015 and 2016 reveals differences between parliamentary and ministerial consultations. Although ministries have invited written statements for fewer draft laws than parliamentary committees, they received far more statements from interest groups. The reason is that German ministries often issue open calls, in which all actors are given the opportunity to comment on legislation, whereas the German parliament invites selected interest group representatives and other experts. As a further result, ministries are mostly contacted by business groups, whereas parliamentary committees use their gatekeeper function to balance interests.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-541
Author(s):  
Stephanie L. DeMora ◽  
Loren Collingwood ◽  
Adriana Ninci

In recent years scholarship has drawn attention to the role of large multi-issue interest groups in policy networks and in public policy diffusion. This paper develops this field of study by demonstrating empirically the leverage of the ‘sustained organisational influence’ theory of policy diffusion. Specifically, it focuses on the role of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) in diffusing the Stand Your Ground policy across US state legislatures. By comparing ALEC’s template policy to bills introduced and legislation subsequently enacted within state legislatures, we demonstrate that ALEC has positioned itself as a ‘super interest group’, exerting sustained organisational influence across an expanding number of states. In doing so, this paper moves theory beyond the typical advocacy coalition framework that implicitly assumes policymaking occurs discretely among specialists on an issue-by-issue basis. It also highlights the democratic implications of the role of super interest groups in shaping policy behind the scenes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-88
Author(s):  
Anželika Gumuliauskienė

The article analyzes the management of the influence of organized interests on public policy. The article reveals the concept of organized interests, the essential differences in comparing the concepts of organized interests and interest groups. The article takes the view that organized interests are a more neutral concept that better explains the nature of all actors seeking to influence public policy-making. The author of the article is of the opinion that the concept of interest groups – due to the disagreement of scientists in defining it – causes a lot of confusion when comparing the results of different researches and using the theoretical insights of other scientists. Organized interests interact with other public policy makers to influence policy outcomes. This article analyzes the ways in which organized interests can influence public policy. According to the author of the article, by identifying the ways of influencing public policy, it is possible to envisage ways to manage that influence. The article applies methods of analysis, synthesis, generalization and comparative analysis of scientific literature.


Author(s):  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Owen Parker ◽  
Ian Bache ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Charlotte Burns

This chapter focuses on the so-called organized interests, whose interaction with the formal European Union (EU) institutions is a central component of the EU’s decision-making process. The term ‘interest group’ refers to a range of organizations outside of the formal institutions that seek to influence decision making. They provide a link between state actors and the rest of society, also known as ‘civil society’. The chapter first considers the general growth of interest group activity at the European level before discussing the types of group that try to influence EU policy making and the forms of representation open to interests. It then explores the strategies and tactics that interest groups use to try to influence the different institutions. Finally, it analyses the issue of regulating interest group access to the EU institutions.


1990 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 269-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven P. Erie

Recently historians have ventured a multifaceted critique of boss rule, suggesting that the very existence of the political machine has been exaggerated, that machines did not materially affect patterns of political mobilization, had only a limited role in the making of public policy, and (contrary to pluralist theory) did little to improve the welfare of the ethnic working class. For these revisionists the boss was really a bit player in the era when he allegedly held center stage. As Terrence McDonald argued the case in the last installment of this annual, “ethnicity, patronage, and the machine” represent unduly narrow ways of viewing urban political development. According to Jon Teaford and David Thelan, urban political history needs to replace the party boss and his ethnic clientele with interest groups—business, labor, taxpayers, and consumers of municipal services—and their impact on local policies concerning economic development, taxation, and service delivery. In their view, the study of public policy making must take precedence over the allocation of party patronage.


1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 390-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack L. Walker

Rather than striving to measure the influence of groups in the policy-making process this article concentrates instead on the ways in which interest groups are created and the means by which they remain in existence. A survey by mail was conducted during 1980-1981 of all voluntary associations that are open to membership and concerned with some aspects of public policy at the national level. The sample of groups was chosen from the Congressional Quarterly's Washington Information Directory. Questionnaires were delivered to 913 interest groups, and usable responses were received from 564, yielding a response rate of 64.8%.Most studies of groups have concerned the tactics employed by group leaders in attracting and holding their members. This study demonstrates that the origins and maintenance of groups depends even more upon the success of group leaders in securing funds from outside their membership which are needed to keep their groups in operation. Estimates of patronage from different sources are provided as well as data on the congruence between the policy goals of groups and their patrons.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document