The anti‐money laundering and counter financing of terrorism policy in Pakistan: Is it truly combating or just a high‐level desk work bureaucracy?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nasir Sultan ◽  
Norazida Mohamed ◽  
Muhammad Adnan Bashir ◽  
Muhammad Farhan Bashir
2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 81-94
Author(s):  
Walid Muhammad Masadeh ◽  
Abdullah Tayel Al Hassan

This study aims to identify the extent of the response of operating banks in Jordan to the anti-money laundering and terrorism financing instructions set by the Central Bank of Jordan, and to enumerate the effectiveness of these sets of laws, the echelon of cooperation with the relevant government agencies and the impact of contiguous political and security conditions on the anti-money laundering and financing of terrorism. To attain the objectives of this study and to test its hypotheses, a descriptive analytical method was followed based on related data of the Central Bank instructions and the engaged procedures by operating banks to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism. Therefore, a questionnaire was designed and distributed to the managers of anti-money laundering departments in operating banks in Jordan. The study shows various outcomes, the most important is the high responding of operating banks in Jordan to the instructions of the anti-money laundering and terrorism financing issued by the Central Bank of Jordan. The existence of practical application of money laundering and terrorism financing instructions fights against money laundering and terrorism financing in banks in Jordan at a soaring level. In addition to the functional cooperation by the competent governmental authorities in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, this study introduces a set of recommendations to reinforce the cooperation level for every related party to achieve a high level of cooperation in the field of the anti-money laundering and financing terrorism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (518) ◽  
pp. 132-140
Author(s):  
V. V. Rysin ◽  
◽  
A. R. Karpets ◽  

Activities to counter laundering the money, obtained by criminal means, require constant monitoring of the market, monitoring the activities of financial and non-financial institutions in order to prevent capital loss and financing of terrorism, as methods of money laundering are gaining new features every year. The article is aimed at systematizing the latest money laundering schemes appearing in the financial market and developing measures to prevent the implementation of such schemes through financial institutions. An analysis of data by the State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine (SFMS) on the number of detected suspicious financial operations showed that the large majority of reports concerning such operations comes from banks. In view of this, the role of banks in countering the legalization of criminal income in Ukraine remains decisive today. The expansion of the range of financial instruments led to the emergence of new money laundering schemes. Such schemes can be based on P2P technologies, implemented through crowdfunding platforms, in particular through crowdinvestment. The authors also focused on the possibilities of using cryptocurrencies and online gambling tools for the purposes of legalizing criminal revenues. The peculiarities of applying the risk-oriented approach in the process of due diligent verification of clients of financial institutions and the operations they carry out, as well as the list of threats to financial institutions in case of their joining the money laundering activities, are determined. Such threats are manifested in reputational and legal aspects, and in the future inevitably lead to financial losses. The use of the latest technologies for the legalization of criminal income requires banks and non-bank institutions to improve the software used to detect and register suspicious transactions, improve cybersecurity, as well as maintain a high level of qualification of employees. The State own regulators should ensure proper control over the activities of highly risky financial infrastructure entities, as well as raise public awareness of the risks and consequences of criminal capital legalization.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgios Pavlidis

Purpose Thirty years after its creation, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has become a prime example of a norm-building process that transcends the traditional avenues of public international law, while compelling a high level of compliance and assuring quick adaptation to norms and practices that better address money laundering and the financing of terrorism in their evolving form. On the occasion of FATF’s 30th anniversary, this paper aims to revisit the unique characteristics of FATF and the factors behind FATF’s success as standard-setter and as implementation-reviewer in the anti-money laundering (AML)/CFT context. Design/methodology/approach This paper draws on primary sources of law, legal scholarship, reports and other open source data to analyse the FATF norm-building process and the factors behind its success. Findings Thirty years after its creation, the FATF has established itself as the key standard-setter, implementation-reviewer and force for reform in the AML/CFT context. Though the FATF norm-building process has been very successful, owing to its flexibility, adaptability and expansiveness, significant challenges lay ahead due to the evolving nature of money laundering and financing of terrorism. Originality/value This is a comprehensive study examining the achievements, impact, strengths and weaknesses of the FATF norm-building process on the occasion of the organisation’s 30th anniversary.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Iwona Karasek-Wojciechowicz

AbstractThis article is an attempt to reconcile the requirements of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and anti-money laundering and combat terrorist financing (AML/CFT) instruments used in permissionless ecosystems based on distributed ledger technology (DLT). Usually, analysis is focused only on one of these regulations. Covering by this research the interplay between both regulations reveals their incoherencies in relation to permissionless DLT. The GDPR requirements force permissionless blockchain communities to use anonymization or, at the very least, strong pseudonymization technologies to ensure compliance of data processing with the GDPR. At the same time, instruments of global AML/CFT policy that are presently being implemented in many countries following the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, counteract the anonymity-enhanced technologies built into blockchain protocols. Solutions suggested in this article aim to induce the shaping of permissionless DLT-based networks in ways that at the same time would secure the protection of personal data according to the GDPR rules, while also addressing the money laundering and terrorist financing risks created by transactions in anonymous blockchain spaces or those with strong pseudonyms. Searching for new policy instruments is necessary to ensure that governments do not combat the development of all privacy-blockchains so as to enable a high level of privacy protection and GDPR-compliant data processing. This article indicates two AML/CFT tools which may be helpful for shaping privacy-blockchains that can enable the feasibility of such tools. The first tool is exceptional government access to transactional data written on non-transparent ledgers, obfuscated by advanced anonymization cryptography. The tool should be optional for networks as long as another effective AML/CFT measures are accessible for the intermediaries or for the government in relation to a given network. If these other measures are not available and the network does not grant exceptional access, the regulations should allow governments to combat the development of those networks. Effective tools in that scope should target the value of privacy-cryptocurrency, not its users. Such tools could include, as a tool of last resort, state attacks which would undermine the trust of the community in a specific network.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 465-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domitilla Vanni

Purpose This paper aims to analyse the evolution of European anti-money laundering discipline passing from the First Money Laundering Directive 91/308/EEC, that was only referred to banks and financial intermediaries, that has been furthermore extended to some activities and professions outside the financial sector. The research examines the different steps done buy Italian Legislation in the field of economic crime: at first Law n. 14/2003 of 3 February 2003 (Community Law 2002), they transposed the 2001 Directive 2001/97/EC and then the Law n. 56/2004 of 20 February 2004, that has implemented Directive 2001/97/EC. Now it is urgent to implement Directive 2005/60/EC that has extended the scope of the legislation, including the fight against the financing of terrorism and modified anti-money laundering obligations. Design/methodology/approach This paper deals with the Legislations of some European States (in particular UK and Italy) interpreting them by a comparative method. Findings This paper has put in clear some differences and some analogies between national legislations of different countries. Research limitations/implications In Italy, at first Law n. 14/2003 of 3 February 2003 (Community Law 2002), has transposed the 2001 Directive 2001/97/EC and then the Law n. 56/2004 of 20 February 2004, has implemented Directive 2001/97/EC. In 2005, Directive 2005/60/EC has extended the scope of the legislation, including the fight against the financing of terrorism and modified anti-money laundering obligations. Practical implications In the context of economic crime, capital investigations represent one of the most effective tools to fight the activities of organized crime in the phase of managing wealth illicitly produced and its immission in the circuit of the legal economy. Social implications The need of fighting economic crime must always be harmonized with the protection of right to privacy that has been acknowledged by Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights of 1950 as a fundamental right. Originality/value This paper develops the need to balance the right to privacy of every European citizen (Article 8 CEDU) with investigative power exercised by Public or Private Authorities, considering the possibility to comprise the first – if necessary – to allow the regular exercise of the second.


Author(s):  
Оlga Pereverzyeva ◽  
Vasif Gadjiev

The article is devoted to the peculiarities of the legal nature of FATF, the process of its creation, the legal principles of activity,as well as the speciality of its legal entity. Attention is also devoted to the main Conventions, which were signed on the eve of The FirstWorld War and after The Second World War and shows the main preconditions and reasons for the creation of the intergovernmentalorganization FATF.The ongoing growth of the drug business, the expansion of its geographical boundaries, increasingly sophisticated and dangerousforms of this criminal business, the struggle of states on large-scale crime related to the legalization of criminal proceeds led to the creationof FATF and it achieved important results in this area.FATF cannot be considered by an international organization because it has not been established on the basis of an internationaltreaty and does not have an approved statute. However, despite this, FATF has a decision to establish a group – this is the legal basisfor its activities and is an intergovernmental organization. Analysis of FATF’s activities shows that FATF’s initial priority was to combatlaundering of proceeds from drug trafficking. Today FATF’s activities have three main directions: expanding the actions of its adoptedrecommendations to all continents and regions of the globe; checking how member states are executed and how anti-money launderingmeasures are implemented in other states, based on 40 plus 9 FATF recommendations that are guidance to action; tracking worldwidemethods and schemes of laundering criminally used capital and developing countermeasures. To date, a set of 40 FATF recommendationsand 9 Special Recommendations for Countering The Financing of Terrorism is a set of universal standards that lead to a successfulfight against money laundering. The new version of this document was adopted in 1996, 2003 and 2012. One of FATF activities is todefine so-called non-cooperative countries and territories and make their list, which is called the «blacklist». Although the country’sinclusion in the “blacklist” does not lead to the application of sanctions by the world community, it indicates a degree of trust in it onthe part of foreign investors. Lacking the status of an international legal act, FATF’s recommendations in practice received generalrecognition as universal international standards in the field of anti-money laundering. Successful work on counteracting the launderingof dirty funds should be carried out simultaneously at two levels – at international and national levels. FATF functions – to monitor theprocesses of implementation of such measures, to study ways and techniques of money laundering, to develop preventive and preventivemeasures, to promote the global implementation of anti-money laundering standards. FATF’s recommendations in practice receivedgeneral recognition as universal international standards in the field of anti-money laundering. Every year FATF organizes meetings onthe analysis of methods and trends related to combating the laundering of criminal proceeds and financing of terrorism.


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