From Second-order Cybernetics to Enactive Cognitive Science: Varela's Turn From Epistemology to Phenomenology

2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 631-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Froese
2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-141
Author(s):  
Etienne B Roesch ◽  
Slawomir Nasuto ◽  
J Mark Bishop

Author(s):  
Irina V. Chernikova ◽  
◽  
Yuliya V. Loginovskaya ◽  

At the present stage of consciousness research, there is an extraordinary variety of models of consciousness proposed by science and philosophy. In this regard, the construction of a typology of consciousness concepts is appropriate, as well as the dialogue of philosophy and cognitive science in the research of consciousness. The article compares the main approaches to the phenomenon of consciousness in cognitive science: neurobiological (neural network), informational (quantum informational), and nonlinear dynamic. The authors propose to include a global evolutionary approach in this typology. The global evolutionary approach is close to a nonlinear dynamic view, but the understanding of consciousness is refined by the inclusion of control parameters that exerted impact to the sociocultural stage of universal evolution. Creativity has a special role to play in this approach. The classification is based on ideas about the real evolution of consciousness and its participation in the global evolutionary process. In such a context, consciousness is understood as a complex self-developing system, but its functioning is conditioned by the cognitive activity of the brain, body, culture, and the world. The article reveals the concepts, in which the explanation of consciousness can be correlated with the global evolutionary approach. They include the emerging modern concepts of embodied cognition, the theory of spatio-temporal neuroscience by G. Nortoff, as well as the concept of consciousness by T. Metzinger. The authors generate the hypothesis about the expediency of using the methodology of the second-order observer to discuss the problem of a unified theory of consciousness. The article indicates the correlation of these theories with the global evolutionary approach, in which the functioning of consciousness is not reduced to neural network structures of the brain, but extended to a view that consciousness is a part of the world and at the same time includes it. Thus, consciousness has a creative evolutionary potential, due to which it builds holistic images and encompasses irrational, creative parameters. The authors suggest a hypothesis about the possibility to combine first-person and third-person studies of consciousness based on the methodology of the second-order observer. In this assumption, they assess consciousness performing the function of an observer on the basis of the methodology of the second-order observer (V.I. Arshinov) and the interpretation of observation as an operation that reproduces the observer (D. Becker). The observer of complexity (the observer of the second order) in this context is consciousness, or rather self-consciousness. The observer simultaneously observes and generates processes, forming a kind of an “assemblage point” of reality, in which the agent-based properties of the observer of complexity are manifested.


2021 ◽  

This collection of works is a contribution to the current debates on the mind-body-problem. It discusses how mind and body make contact in sense-making processes from the point of view of enactive cognitive science and 4E approaches to cognition. It also offers a critical view on non-representational approaches to cognition. The book covers sociology, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, computer science and HRI, media studies, literature and cognitive science. It offers cutting-edge research both for students and for junior and senior researchers in the fields mentioned above.


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lambros Malafouris

AbstractThis is a paper about mark making and human becoming. I will be asking what do marks do? How do they signify? What role do marks play in human becoming and the evolution of human intelligence? These questions cannot be pursued effectively from the perspective of any single discipline or ontology. Nonetheless, they are questions that archaeology has a great deal to contribute. They are also important questions, if not the least because evidence of early mark making constitutes the favoured archaeological mark of the ‘cognitive’ (in the ‘modern’ representational sense of the word). In this paper I want to argue that the archaeological predilection to see mark making as a potential index of symbolic representation often blind us to other, more basic dimensions of the cognitive life and agency of those marks as material signs. Drawing on enactive cognitive science and Material Engagement Theory I will show that early markings, such as the famous engravings from Blombos cave, are above all the products of kinesthetic dynamics of a non-representational sort that allow humans to engage and discover the semiotic affordances of mark making opening up new possibilities of enactive material signification. I will also indicate some common pitfalls in the way archaeology thinks about the ‘cognitive’ that needs overcome.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Crippen

This article examines how Modern theories of mind remain even in some materialistic and hence ontologically anti-dualistic views; and shows how Dewey, anticipating Merleau-Ponty and 4E cognitive scientists, repudiates these theories. Throughout I place Dewey’s thought in the context of scientific inquiry, both recent and historical and including the cognitive as well as traditional sciences; and I show how he incorporated sciences of his day into his thought, while also anticipating enactive cognitive science. While emphasizing Dewey’s continued relevance, my main goal is to show how his scientifically informed account of perception and cognition combats skepticism propagated by certain scientific visions, exacerbated by commonplace notions about mind, that jointly suggest that human beings lack genuine access to reality.


Topoi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel A. Di Paolo ◽  
Hanne De Jaegher

AbstractEnactive cognitive science combines questions in epistemology, ontology, and ethics by conceiving of bodies as open-ended and mutually transforming through activity. While enaction is not a theory of ethics, it can contribute to its foundations. We present a schematization of enactive ideas that underlie traditional distinctions between Being, Knowing, and Doing. Ethics in this scheme begins in the relation between knowing and becoming. Critical of dichotomous thinking, we approach the questions of alterity and ethical reality. Alterity is relevant to the enactive approach, but not in the radical sense of transcendental arguments. We propose difference, instead, as a more generative concept. Following Simondon, we see norms and values manifest in webs of past and future acts together with their potentialities for becoming. We propose a transindividual concept of moral attunement that includes ethical know-how and consciousness raising. Through generative difference and attunement to configurations of becoming, enaction underpins an ethics of participation linking virtue ethics and ethics of care.


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