Origins and evolution of enactive cognitive science: Toward an enactive cognitive architecture

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 169-178
Author(s):  
Leonardo Lana de Carvalho ◽  
Denis James Pereira ◽  
Sophia Andrade Coelho
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Enactive Cognitive Science

Précis ofUnified theories of cognition

1992 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Newell
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Convincing Evidence ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Unified Theories

AbstractThe book presents the case that cognitive science should turn its attention to developing theories of human cognition that cover the full range of human perceptual, cognitive, and action phenomena. Cognitive science has now produced a massive number of high-quality regularities with many microtheories that reveal important mechanisms. The need for integration is pressing and will continue to increase. Equally important, cognitive science now has the theoretical concepts and tools to support serious attempts at unified theories. The argument is made entirely by presenting an exemplar unified theory of cognition both to show what a real unified theory would be like and to provide convincing evidence that such theories are feasible. The exemplar is SOAR, a cognitive architecture, which is realized as a software system. After a detailed discussion of the architecture and its properties, with its relation to the constraints on cognition in the real world and to existing ideas in cognitive science, SOAR is used as theory for a wide range of cognitive phenomena: immediate responses (stimulus-response compatibility and the Sternberg phenomena); discrete motor skills (transcription typing); memory and learning (episodic memory and the acquisition of skill through practice); problem solving (cryptarithmetic puzzles and syllogistic reasoning); language (sentence verification and taking instructions); and development (transitions in the balance beam task). The treatments vary in depth and adequacy, but they clearly reveal a single, highly specific, operational theory that works over the entire range of human cognition, SOAR is presented as an exemplar unified theory, not as the sole candidate. Cognitive science is not ready yet for a single theory – there must be multiple attempts. But cognitive science must begin to work toward such unified theories.

Foundations of enactive cognitive science

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-141
Author(s):  
Etienne B Roesch ◽  
Slawomir Nasuto ◽  
J Mark Bishop
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Enactive Cognitive Science

scholarly journals Folk psychology, eliminativism, and the present state of connectionism

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-196
Author(s):  
Vanja Subotic
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Short Term Memory ◽  
Distributed Processing ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Connectionist Models ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Long Short Term Memory

Three decades ago, William Ramsey, Steven Stich & Joseph Garon put forward an argument in favor of the following conditional: if connectionist models that implement parallelly distributed processing represent faithfully human cognitive processing, eliminativism about propositional attitudes is true. The corollary of their argument (if it proves to be sound) is that there is no place for folk psychology in contemporary cognitive science. This understanding of connectionism as a hypothesis about cognitive architecture compatible with eliminativism is also endorsed by Paul Churchland, a radical opponent of folk psychology and a prominent supporter of eliminative materialism. I aim to examine whether current connectionist models based on long-short term memory (LSTM) neural networks can back up these arguments in favor of eliminativism. Nonetheless, I will rather put my faith in the eliminativism of the limited domain. This position amount to the following claim: even though that connectionist cognitive science has no need whatsoever for folk psychology qua theory, this does not entail illegitimacy of folk psychology per se in other scientific domains, most notably in humanities, but only if one sees folk psychology as mere heuristics.

Cognitive Architecture, Humor and Counterintuitiveness: Retention and Recall of MCIs

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 189-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Grant Purzycki
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Present Model ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Better Than

AbstractThe recent surge of interest in the cognitive science of religion has resulted in a number of studies regarding the memorability of minimally counterintuitive ideas (MCIs). The present model incorporates ontological templates and their respective inferences, as well as delineates between two major types of violations: schema- and template-level violations. As humor is also defined by its counter-intutiveness at the schema level, this study was designed to find effects this emotion has on retention. Results suggest that humorous statements with parallel violations are recalled significantly better than statements which have only template-level violations, affective statements with only schema-level violations, as well as intuitive statements in both immediate and 1-week follow-up sessions.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto G. de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Language Of Thought ◽  
Conceptual Representation ◽  
Jerry Fodor ◽  
Present Book ◽  
Cognitive Revolution ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Language Of Thought Hypothesis

It is patent that the so-called cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s was the result of ideas emerging at the confluence of psychology, linguistics, philosophy, computer science, and neuroscience—what became known as cognitive science. In the last 60 years or so, Jerry Fodor has been one of the most important exponents of this revolution. He has advanced key ideas on the foundations of cognitive science, in particular on the nature of mental representation and on mental processes seen as computations over symbols. Many of his contributions have been the subject of deep divides and have generated classical controversies. The chapter provides a rough guide to Fodor’s contributions to psycholinguistics, to the modularity of mind, to atomism as a theory of conceptual representation, to the language of thought hypothesis, and to cognitive architecture more broadly—topics that figure prominently in the present book.

Précis of The Modularity of Mind

1985 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry A. Fodor
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Background Knowledge ◽  
Perceptual Integration ◽  
Faculty Psychology ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
New Look

AbstractThe Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the “New Look” or “interaetionist” view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive to the organism's beliefs and desires. In fact, according to modularity theory, perceptual processes are computationally isolated from much of the background knowledge to which cognitive processes have access. The postulation of autonomous, domain-specific psychological mechanisms underlying perceptual integration connects modularity theory with the tradition of faculty psychology, in particular, with the work of Franz Joseph Call. Some of these historical affinities, and some of the relations between faculty psychology and Cartesianism, are discussed in the book.

Meaningful Relations

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Media Studies ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Sense Making ◽  
Critical View ◽  
Enactive Cognitive Science ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
The Mind

This collection of works is a contribution to the current debates on the mind-body-problem. It discusses how mind and body make contact in sense-making processes from the point of view of enactive cognitive science and 4E approaches to cognition. It also offers a critical view on non-representational approaches to cognition. The book covers sociology, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, computer science and HRI, media studies, literature and cognitive science. It offers cutting-edge research both for students and for junior and senior researchers in the fields mentioned above.

scholarly journals Mark Making and Human Becoming

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lambros Malafouris
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Intelligence ◽  
Material Engagement Theory ◽  
Human Becoming ◽  
Engagement Theory ◽  
Potential Index ◽  
Enactive Cognitive Science ◽  
Single Discipline ◽  
Blombos Cave ◽  
Opening Up

AbstractThis is a paper about mark making and human becoming. I will be asking what do marks do? How do they signify? What role do marks play in human becoming and the evolution of human intelligence? These questions cannot be pursued effectively from the perspective of any single discipline or ontology. Nonetheless, they are questions that archaeology has a great deal to contribute. They are also important questions, if not the least because evidence of early mark making constitutes the favoured archaeological mark of the ‘cognitive’ (in the ‘modern’ representational sense of the word). In this paper I want to argue that the archaeological predilection to see mark making as a potential index of symbolic representation often blind us to other, more basic dimensions of the cognitive life and agency of those marks as material signs. Drawing on enactive cognitive science and Material Engagement Theory I will show that early markings, such as the famous engravings from Blombos cave, are above all the products of kinesthetic dynamics of a non-representational sort that allow humans to engage and discover the semiotic affordances of mark making opening up new possibilities of enactive material signification. I will also indicate some common pitfalls in the way archaeology thinks about the ‘cognitive’ that needs overcome.

The Fragmentation of Belief

2021 ◽  
pp. 78-107
Author(s):  
Joseph Bendaña ◽  
Eric Mandelbaum
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Web Of Belief

Belief storage is often modeled as having the structure of a single, unified web. This model of belief storage is attractive and widely assumed because it appears to provide an explanation of the flexibility of cognition and the complicated dynamics of belief revision. However, when one scrutinizes human cognition, one finds strong evidence against a unified web of belief and for a fragmented model of belief storage. This chapter uses the best available evidence from cognitive science to develop this fragmented model into a nascent theory of the cognitive architecture of belief storage.

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