What We Know about the Problem of the Century: Lessons from Social Science to the Law, and Back

Author(s):  
Susan T. Fiske
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 102 (5) ◽  
pp. 63-64
Author(s):  
Robert Kim

A case in California reaffirms that courts are reluctant to intervene when families are concerned about school curricula. In CAPEEM v. Torlakson, parents of Hindu children complained that the state’s history and social science standards are framework discriminated against them by inaccurately and disparingingly representing their faith. Bob Kim describes the plaintiffs’ arguments, the case’s journey through the courts, and how the court’s ruling against the plaintiffs relates to other cases involving objections to school curricula.


1990 ◽  
Vol 15 (01) ◽  
pp. 149-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adelaide H. Villmoare

In reading the essays by David M. Trubek and John Esser and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, I thought about what I call epistemological moments that have provided contexts within which to understand the relationship between social science research and politics. I will sketch four moments and suggest that I find one of them more compelling than the others because it speaks particularly to social scientists with critical, democratic ambitions and to Trubek and Esser's concerns about politics and the intellectual vitality of the law and society movement.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-256
Author(s):  
Abraham Abraham

sociology of law examines why humans obey the law and why it fails to obey the law and the social factors that influence it. as a relatively new branch of sociology, the science of legal sociology was developed to explain the interrelationships of patterns of behavior and law that cannot yet be explained by other branches of social science.


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 132-145
Author(s):  
Jerome H. Neyrey

Did Jesus of Nazareth, born of a woman and born under the law, confess the Shema like all other Israelites? Was he a monotheist? Although scholarship argues that there were many types of monotheism, we focus here on strict Israelite monotheism (Deut 6:4). What does Jesus have to say for himself? This article does not go over plowed ground, but seeks to add to the conversation the use of two social science models: understanding “role” and “status,” and interpreting data in terms of the relationships of Patron-broker-client. These models necessarily serve to clarify much scholarship on monotheism, as well as clarify for us whether people worshiped Christ or prayed to him. In short, Jesus always functioned in two roles, either as God's client or as broker between God-Patron and Israel-client. Paul and other NT authors always put him in this place, namely, in a client or broker role, who never encroached on God's uniqueness or sovereignty.


2000 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryant G. Garth

Celebrations of the career of Willard Hurst tend to concentrate, quite understandably, on his scholarship in legal history. Most of those who now read and comment on his works are professional legal historians, and they tend to read and define Hurst according to that professional identification. This article takes a different approach, concentrating on Hurst's own role in the more general politics of legal scholarship. Hurst was not content with making a mark in legal history. He sought to challenge the legal establishment. We see the legacy of his efforts in the development of the field of law and social science, institutionalized in the mid 1960s in the Law and Society Association (LSA). Therefore, my focus is on the sociology and politics of scholarship rather than on intellectual history. I will not examine the relationship of Hurst's particular works to those who came before or after him, nor will I go through the exercise of suggesting what was good or lasting or useful about his work for present purposes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-72
Author(s):  
Saeful Bahar Bahar

This article highlights the controversy of revised act of corruption commission (UU KPK) and of the Book of Criminal Law (KUHP) which had heated up. By using legal gap theory, this writing uncovers the legal gap between the contents of revised KUHP and living laws. Consequently, people in the grassroots level seem more enthusiastic about the issue, for example, the fines because livestock entering other people yards than weakening KPK issues that drive a wave of demonstrations at the level of well-educated people. Many studies in the sphere of sociology of law that have conducted gave much attentions to the living law or norm in the mods of society. However there is not much of them which gave attention to the legal gap phenomena, it is the incompatibility between living law and formal one. Whereas, such an approach tend to be considered late if it we aim to put the sociology of law as one discipline of social science which is useful in strengthening the law enforcement. In the hilt of the matter, there is an issue of the legal gap which should have been expressed from the beginning, mainly as to the compatibility between formal and informal law when legislation was going on. By utilizing literature study, the research found that; firstly, the resistance against revised KUHP is the logical consequence of legal gap phenomena that has potential legal conflict. Secondly, there are four major manners could be done to resolve the gap; repression, counseling, reformation and restorative justice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-421
Author(s):  
William Cullerne Bown

The possibility of measuring the success of the criminal justice system in distinguishing the guilty from the innocent is often dismissed as impossible or at least impractical. Here I claim to demonstrate that such epistemic measurement would only be difficult. All measurement consists of two steps, the acquisition of observations and their processing through a computational framework. The law has lacked both, but I have recently put forward a computational framework and here I set out how the necessary observations can be obtained. This completes the conceptual foundations necessary for the development of jurisprudence as a social science, for policymaking in the law that is rooted in rational concern for epistemic outcomes, and for us to fulfil the modern, trustworthy and democratic promise that our forebears found in Blackstone’s ratio.


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