AbstractSome issues in the application of benefit–cost analysis (BCA) remain contentious. Although a strong conceptual case can be made for taking account of the marginal excess tax burden (METB) in conducting BCAs, it is usually excluded. Although a strong conceptual case can be made that BCA should not include distributional values, some analysts continue to advocate doing so. We discuss the cases for inclusion of the METB and the exclusion of distributional weights from what we refer to as “core” BCA, which we argue should be preserved as a protocol for assessing allocative efficiency. These issues are topical because a recent article in this journal recommends ignoring the METB on the grounds that desirable distributional effects offset its cost. We challenge the logic of this article and explain why it may encourage inefficient policies.
Abstract
Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is typically defined as an implementation of the potential Pareto criterion, which requires inclusion of any impact for which individuals have willingness to pay (WTP). This definition is incompatible with the exclusion of impacts such as rights and distributional concerns, for which individuals do have WTP. I propose a new definition: BCA should include only impacts for which consumer sovereignty should govern. This is because WTP implicitly preserves consumer sovereignty, and is thus only appropriate for ‘sovereignty-warranting’ impacts. I compare the high cost of including non-sovereignty-warranting impacts to the relatively low cost of excluding sovereignty-warranting impacts.
Abstract
The question of how to allocate scarce agricultural research and development dollars is significant for developing countries. Historically, benefit/cost analysis has been the standard for comparing the relative benefits of alternative investments. We examine the potential of shifting the implicit equal weights approach to benefit/cost analysis, as well as how a systematic variation in welfare weights may affect different groups important to policy makers. For example, in the case of Rwandan coffee, a shift in the welfare weights that would favor small coffee producers in Rwanda over foreign consumers of Rwandan coffee would increase the support for investments in small producer coffee projects. Generally, changes in welfare weights alter the ordering for selecting investments across alternative projects.
Efficiency without Apology: Consideration of the Marginal Excess Tax Burden and Distributional Impacts in Benefit–Cost Analysis