Getting Off the Back of a Tiger: The Deposit Insurance Crisis in the United States

Author(s):  
Claudia Campbell ◽  
Hyman Minsky
2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
George C. Nurisso ◽  
Edward Simpson Prescott

This article traces the origin of too-big-to-fail policy in modern US banking to the bailout of the $1.2b Bank of the Commonwealth in 1972. It describes this bailout and those of subsequent banks through that of Continental Illinois in 1984. During this period, market concentration due to interstate banking restrictions is a factor in most of the bailouts and systemic risk concerns were raised to justify the bailouts of surprisingly small banks. Finally, most of the bailouts in this period relied on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's use of the Essentiality Doctrine and Federal Reserve lending. A discussion of this doctrine is used to illustrate how legal constraints on regulators may become less constraining over time.


Author(s):  
Gleeson Simon ◽  
Guynn Randall

This chapter looks at the history and fundamental elements of resolution authority as it has been developed and used in the United States. The goal of resolution authority in the United States has been to deal with failed banks and other financial institutions in a manner that stems runs, avoids contagion and preserves critical operations, the same goal as deposit guarantee schemes. First introduced in the United States in 1933 as part of the deposit insurance programme for banks, resolution authority was originally little more than the method by which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation honoured its obligations to insured depositors before evolving to its current state. Resolution authority, as conceived in the United States, has two principal components—the core resolution powers and the claims process. The core resolution powers consist of the authority to quickly separate the assets and viable parts of a failed bank's business (the good bank) from its capital structure liabilities (the bad bank), so that its critical operations are preserved and runs and contagion are avoided. It is virtually always completed in the United States over a weekend commonly known as resolution weekend. The claims process involves determining the validity and amount of the claims of individual holders of capital structure liabilities in accordance with ordinary principles of due process and distributing the residual value of the good bank to such holders in satisfaction of their claims. The claims process typically takes at least six to nine months to be completed in order to comply with ordinary principles of due process for potential claimants.


2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Sanders

Newspaper and Television commentaries in the United States and Europe abound with references to “outbursts of populism” in United States as a stereotypically American response to economic crisis.1 Their story lines trivialize historic Populism in the U.S., both its substance and its contribution to financial regulation. American Agrarian movements arose in response to grievances rooted in pathologies of mature, weakly regulated capitalism. The agrarians had real grievances linked to rigidities of the gold standard and bank control of note issue, monopoly control of long distance transportation and crop storage, the use of the growing power of large firms to repress labor, and a rising cost of living due to growing monopolization and high tariffs. Most of the policy solutions demanded by late 19th century populism and its progressive era legatees were enacted in some form in the two spurts of regulation during the early 20th century (the progressive era and New Deal). There are indeed some commonalities between public criticism of capitalist greed in those periods and the present; but scorn for “populist outbursts” against the risks taken by greedy financiers who made billions while bringing financial ruin to the global economy distracts our attention from the destructive folly of those financial actors, and presumes that public outrage is unjustified and counter-productive. In fact, it is neither. That such a small number of actors could wreck such havoc on the world is surely a cause for outrage among reasonable people around the globe. Recognition of error is essential for human learning and the evolution of institutions. It would be quite peculiar, and disturbing, if there were no wave of criticism in the face of such unethical and damaging conduct. No American reform surge has occurred in absence of such public outrage. It was public offense over corporate malfeasance that gave us the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act, the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act, the 1894 income tax law (and the 1913 Constitutional amendment needed to overcome Supreme Court objections), the 1913 Federal Reserve Act, the Child Labor Acts, the 1933-34 laws taking the dollar off gold, the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (which moved the nation away from the protectionist disaster of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff and toward trade expansion), the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, the 1933 Glass-Steagall Banking Act, the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933, the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act, and many other laws that served this country, and the world economic system quite well for many decades.


1985 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Gorton

The pre-1914 U.S. banking industry is not easily characterized as a market operating through a price system. The endogenous development of the clearinghouse as the industry's organizing institution can be explained by inherent characteristics of demand deposits. During banking panics the clearinghouse united banks into an organization resembling a single firm which produced deposit insurance.


1981 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-557 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene Nelson White

Before the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933, several states established deposit guarantee funds. The key factor influencing the adoption of deposit insurance by a state was the structure of its banking industry. In states where small unit banks were dominant, there was strong support for guarantee funds to protect deposits; in other states there was more interest in branch banking. The failure to design the guarantee funds in accordance with sound principles of insurance brought about their demise and led to increased branch banking.


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