Matrimonial Typology in the Mongolian Heroic Epic, J̌angγar

The Mongolian heroic epic J̌angγar cycles include many independent chapters, which are all connected to the deeds of the king, J̌angγar qaγan and his warriors. N. Poppe, A. S. Kichikov, W. Heissig and Rinčindorǰi studied the structure and pattern of the Mongolian heroic epics and agreed that matrimony is a notable pattern in Mongolian epics. The marriage of Qongγor is a classical story which reflects the typology of matrimony. In this article, I analyse the chapters describing different versions of the marriage of Qongγor in Kalmyk, Mongolia and Xinjiang. In the epic, the hero’s marriage follows the monogamous pattern, and a horse and a knife are presented as signs of engagement. This is evidence of the bride-price system. In addition, the custom of competition for the bride and the exogamy are the most notable features of the matrimonial system described in J̌angγar.

Research on Key Issues of China’s Project Water Price

Focusing on China’s current water price issues, such as “difficulty in pricing, adjustment, charging, and effectiveness” and the others, the current water conservancy project water supply system has been sorted out in terms of water price formation mechanism, water price composition, influencing factors, price system structure, and pricing technology. Quantitative analysis has been carried out on the problems with prices. At the same time, based on the experience and lessons of similar policies and system reforms at home and abroad, the study puts forward the long-term mechanism of water fee collection and subsidy and the implementation of safeguard measures and recommendations for the water supply price system of water conservancy projects.

‘Come on, man!’ On errors, choice, and Hayekian behavioral economics

With respect to the views of dead thinkers, answers to many particular questions are often interpretive in Ronald Dworkin's sense. Such answers must attempt (1) to fit the materials to be interpreted and (2) to justify them, that is, to put them in the best constructive light. What looks like (1), or what purports to be (1), is often (2). That is, when a follower of Kant urges that ‘Kant would say x’, or that ‘Kantianism entails y’, the goal is to make the best constructive sense of Kant and Kantianism, not merely to adhere to something that Kant actually said. An approach to behavioral economics cannot claim to be Hayekian if it is rooted in enthusiasm for the abilities of planners to set prices and quantities, or if it sees the price system as a jumble of mistakes and errors. But within a not-so-narrow range, a variety of freedom-preserving approaches, alert to the epistemic limits of planners, can fairly claim to be Hayekian. Hayekian behavioral economics, I suggest, is an approach that (1) recognizes the importance and pervasiveness of individual errors, (2) emphasizes the epistemic limits of planners, (3) builds on individual choices rather than planner preferences, and (4) gives authority to choices made under epistemically favorable conditions, in which informational deficits and behavioral biases are least likely to be at work. The key step, of course, is (4). If it is properly elaborated, the resulting approach deserves respect. It is worthy of serious consideration, even if some of us, including the present author, would not entirely embrace it. In defending that proposition, the present essay responds to some critical remarks on behaviorally informed policy, including the resort to ‘explainawaytions’ (Matthew Rabin's term) for behavioral findings.

Hayekian behavioral economics

One of Friedrich Hayek's most important arguments pointed to the epistemic advantages of the price system, regarded as an institution. As Hayek showed, the price system incorporates the information held by numerous, dispersed people. Like John Stuart Mill, Hayek also offered an epistemic argument on behalf of freedom of choice. A contemporary challenge to that epistemic argument comes from behavioral economics, which has uncovered an assortment of reasons why choosers err, and also pointed to possible distortions in the price system. But, even if those findings are accepted, what should public institutions do? How should they proceed? A neo-Hayekian approach would seek to reduce the knowledge problem by asking what individual choosers actually do under epistemically favorable conditions. In practice, that question can be disciplined by asking five subsidiary questions: (1) What do consistent choosers, unaffected by self-evidently irrelevant factors, end up choosing? (2) What do informed choosers choose? (3) What do active choosers choose? (4) When people are free of behavioral biases, including (say) present bias or unrealistic optimism, what do they choose? (5) What do people choose when their viewscreen is broad, and they do not suffer from limited attention? These questions are illustrated with reference to the intense controversy over fuel economy standards.

Economic contestation over user fees in low-resourced healthcare systems: A literature review

This paper reviewed the literature on economic theory and assumptions that provide the rationale for using a price system to finance health care services in developing countries. The primary case in favor of a system of user fees for financing healthcare in these countries lies in allocative efficiency results to be achieved through a price system. The assumption being that, the price system signals to consumers what they must pay for health care services hence giving them an incentive to utilize those services well. However, this assumes perfect markets, where prices reflect the true marginal benefits of consuming healthcare goods and the marginal cost of their production. All equity concerns being addressed through price discrimination, a system of user fees can then allocate health care resources efficiently. Although the application of user fees in the health sector is justified by the perfect markets, there are concerns that a perfect market is less likely to be the case in health sector. Therefore, it will not be a viable way to rely on the price system to allocate resources to the population when markets of any healthcare goods and services are not available or are imperfect. Information asymmetry and uncertainty are the major obstacles to a proper function of a price system in healthcare service provision. Due to the inelastic nature of the demand for healthcare, charging fees for healthcare services can pose hard financial catastrophes to poor and lead into poverty. This suggests the need to establish healthfinancing policies that would facilitate the creation of new markets or which can improve the performance of existing ones in developing countries.

A socialist price system: answering the Austrians

According to Austrian economists, even with everyone’s best efforts, a system based on social ownership of the means of production could not effectively deploy a decentralized price system. An examination of the key writings on the question by Mises, Hayek and Lavoie reveals that this view rests on very shaky ground.

Markets and competition.

Following an introduction into the functions of the price system and a general description of markets, this chapter examines three market models in more detail: first, perfect competition viewed from the levels of the individual agricultural producer and of the whole industry; secondly, monopoly; and thirdly, monopsony. The use of monopoly power in agriculture is discussed, as well as different types of price movements in agriculture.