Decentralization and Accountability within the Central Bank: Any Lessons from the US Experience for the Potential Organization of a European Central Banking Institution?

1989 ◽  
pp. 91-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Thygesen ◽  
Jean-Jacques Rey
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Us ◽  
Banking Institution

Central Bank Independence and European Central Banking Institution-Building

1996 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-76
Author(s):  
Miriam L. Campanella
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
European Central ◽  
Banking Institution

Abstract L’indipendenza della banca centrale dal governo viene considerata da molti studiosi come un requisito per il mantenimento della stabilità dei prezzi e per la lotta all’inflazione. L’articolo introduce la recente letteratura sull’indipendenza della banca centrale, mostrandone anche un apporto esplicativo nel caso del processo di costruzione della banca centrale europea.Benché l’indipendenza della banca centrale europea sia prevista da un articolo del Trattato di Maastricht, ci sono alcune critiche contro questa impostazione, sia perché si sostiene che l’indipendenza non sarebbe sufficiente per aumentare la credibilità, sia perché si ritiene che mantenere un basso livello di inflazione non sia di beneficio alia crescita economica.In conclusione, l’A. afferma, in accordo con gli studi sull’indipendenza della banca centrale, che in un mondo caratterizzato dalla mobilità dei capitali e dalla globalizzazione, la creazione di un ambiente finanziario stabile debba essere ritenuto uno dei più importanti fattori per la credibilità delle banche centrali.

The European Central Bank

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ioannidis
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Defining Moment ◽  
European Central ◽  
Economic Constitution ◽  
Rules And Principles ◽  
History Of

The European Central Bank (ECB) is the only central bank governed by supranational constitutional law. As such, it is not only the most important institution of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but it also marks a new stage in the history of central banking in general. Historically, the tasks and functions of the ECB have reflected the different stages of development of the EMU. The basic principles governing its function were set out in Maastricht, reflecting the interests and ideas about Europe’s economic constitution prevailing at that time. The sovereign debt crisis that hit Europe in 2010 was the second defining moment for the ECB after Maastricht. It posited the ECB–like the rest of the EMU–to challenges that some of the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty had not fully anticipated. These new challenges led to the adoption of novel instruments and the further clarification of fundamental rules and principles. Most important of these developments was the entrustment of the ECB with a new task, banking supervision, and the adoption of unconventional measures, which proved necessary to fulfil its monetary-policy mandate. Ultimately, not only did the ECB withstand the crisis but it emerged as a protagonist in securing the unity and integrity of the EMU.

Central banking and financial political power: An investigation into the European Central Bank

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 221-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manolis Kalaitzake
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Financial Sector ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Power Dynamics ◽  
European Central ◽  
Revolving Doors

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a major scholarly revival of the topic of financial political power and a refocus on questions concerning democracy, elites, and inequality. Nevertheless, there remains a dearth in the literature regarding the precise nature of the political relationship between the financial sector and central banks. This is problematic given the sharp rise in institutional prominence enjoyed by central bank officials in the post crisis era and their fundamental importance in the governance of financial markets. As a corrective, this paper develops a provisional analytical framework through which the power dynamics between the financial sector and central banks can be fruitfully explored, specifically with reference to the European Central Bank. It does so by identifying four mechanisms through which financial actors potentially influence the policy choices of the European Central Bank – revolving doors, closed policy circles, capital flight/disinvestment, Too Big to Fail – and illustrates their operation empirically in the context of the bank’s organizational functioning and post crisis interventions. The paper illustrates how financial actors enjoy systematic advantages in the domain of central bank policymaking and provides significant evidence that the European Central Bank has been a key ally of the financial sector throughout the Eurozone crisis. The paper calls for a more extensive examination by scholars of the financial sector-central bank relationship as a means to clarify the precise scope of, and limitations to, contemporary financial political power.

scholarly journals Central Banking in Rawls’s Property-Owning Democracy

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 674-698 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens van ’t Klooster
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
The Us ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government

The dramatic events of the crisis have reignited debates on the independence of central banks and the scope of their mandates. In this article, I contribute to the normative understanding of these developments by discussing John Rawls’s position in debates of the 1950s and 1960s on the independence of the US Federal Reserve. Rawls’s account of the central bank in his property-owning democracy, Democratic Central Banking (DCB), assigns authority over monetary policy directly to the government and prioritizes low unemployment over price stability. I contrast DCB with Central Bank Independence (CBI), which requires that the central bank is independent of the government and pursues low inflation. I evaluate DCB by asking whether justice as fairness requires democratic control of the central bank and argue that it does not. Instead, so I argue, the choice between DCB and CBI should be justified in terms of the difference principle. By reflecting on central banking in a property-owning democracy, I cast new light on the Rawlsian realistic utopia of a just capitalist society, while also investigating democratic objections to today’s independent central banks.

scholarly journals The Gender Promotion Gap: Evidence from Central Banking

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Laura Hospido ◽  
Luc Laeven ◽  
Ana Lamo
Keyword(s):  
Gender Differences ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Gender Wage Gap ◽  
Wage Gap ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Career Progression ◽  
European Central ◽  
Public Commitment ◽  
Using Data

We examine gender differences in career progression and promotions using personnel data from the European Central Bank (ECB) during the period 2003-2017. A gender wage gap emerges within a few years of hiring, despite broadly similar entry conditions. We also find a gender promotion gap prior to 2010 when the ECB issued a public commitment to diversity. Following this change, the promotion gap disappears. Using data on promotion applications, we find that there is a gender application bias, partly driven by preferences for competition. Following promotion, women perform better in terms of salary progression.

Central Bank Policy-Making in Israel: The Horowitz Governorship (1954–1971)

1975 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Prager
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Banking Institution ◽  
And Control

The functions of a modern central bank are manifold, but fall into a few general categories — technical, advisory, and control. Technical activities do not demand a separate central banking institution; they could be performed equally well by alternative arrangements. These functions are of a clerical nature and do not require continuous decision-making. For example, central banks typically handle the government's financial accounts, making its payments and collecting its receipts, paying interest on debt as well as the principal when the debt matures, and marketing the securities when issued. In effect, the central bank acts as an agency of the Finance Ministry, the latter making the decisions, the former implementing them. Similarly, central banks typically monopolize currency issue, but in so far as this is an automatic procedure — issuing currency to whomever wishes to acquire it — no decision-making is involved. Indeed, these two functions have often been performed by the Treasury itself, and even today occasionally still lie in the domain of some treasuries.

scholarly journals The Charisma of the European Central Bank: From Political Sacrifice to Monetary Rituals

2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-365
Author(s):  
Marco Goldoni
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Cultural Analysis ◽  
High Price ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Us ◽  
Sovereign Authority ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The One

The article expands Paul Kahn’s cultural analysis of the US Supreme Court’s charisma to EU institutions and, in particular, to the European Central Bank. The aim is twofold: on the one hand, the intention is to show the rich potential of the cultural study of law for understanding different constitutional experiences; on the other hand, the aim is to show that political sacrifice may not be the only material for building constitutional imagination. As the analysis of the ECB’s unconventional intervention into the Euro-crisis tries to establish, other forms of sacrifice might be conjured up, in a context where the constitutional order is held together more by rituals rather than violent commitments. Although the ECB does not enjoy sovereign authority, it has been able to maintain stable (though at a high price, not only metaphorically) the eurozone legal order.

scholarly journals The European central bank and the us federal reserve as lender of last resort

2014 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hansjörg Herr
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Shadow Banking ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Us

Without a lender of last resort financial stability is not possible and systemic financial crises get out of control. During and after the Great Recession the US Federal Reserve System (Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB) took on the role of lender of last resort in a comprehensive way. The Fed stabilised the financial system, including the shadow banking system. However, the chance to fundamentally restructure the financial system was not used. The ECB was confronted with sovereign debt crises and an incomplete integration of the European Monetary Union (EMU). It followed a kind of ?muddling through? to keep the Euro area together. In the EMU not only a fundamental restructuring of the financial system is needed but also a deeper economic and political integration. The Fed and the ECB both were the most important institutions to avoid repetition of the 1930s.

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