scholarly journals The European central bank and the us federal reserve as lender of last resort

2014 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hansjörg Herr
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Shadow Banking ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Us

Without a lender of last resort financial stability is not possible and systemic financial crises get out of control. During and after the Great Recession the US Federal Reserve System (Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB) took on the role of lender of last resort in a comprehensive way. The Fed stabilised the financial system, including the shadow banking system. However, the chance to fundamentally restructure the financial system was not used. The ECB was confronted with sovereign debt crises and an incomplete integration of the European Monetary Union (EMU). It followed a kind of ?muddling through? to keep the Euro area together. In the EMU not only a fundamental restructuring of the financial system is needed but also a deeper economic and political integration. The Fed and the ECB both were the most important institutions to avoid repetition of the 1930s.

The ECB as Lender of Last Resort in the Eurozone? An analysis of an optimal institutional design of Emergency Liquidity Assistance competence within the context of the Banking Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 628-668
Author(s):  
Sara Elisa Dietz
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
European Central

The latest financial crises in Europe and the United States have reminded us of the importance of the role of central banks as Lender of Last Resort. This article examines the current legal framework in the European Union with regard to the allocation of Lender of Last Resort competence, which until now has been exercised by the national central banks in the Eurozone. The new Emergency Liquidity Assistance Agreement 2017 sustains this institutional design, leaves the Emergency Liquidity Assistance competence with the national central banks and specifies the cooperation between the European Central Bank and the national central banks with regard to the veto-option of the European Central Bank to national Emergency Liquidity Assistance operations. Against this background, the paper discusses whether the current legal competence structure of the European and Monetary Union would also allow for more authority of the European Central Bank with regard to Emergency Liquidity Assistance powers. The paper concludes there is a sufficient legal basis in the monetary policy and financial stability mandate of the European Central Bank to allow it to grant Emergency Liquidity Assistance at least with regard to ‘significant’ banks, as defined under the current European Banking Supervision regime.

scholarly journals The Federal Reserve’s Dollar Swap Lines and the European Central Bank during the global financial crisis of 2007–09

2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 723-747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Carré ◽  
Laurent Le Maux
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Interest Rate ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

Abstract Although the literature has studied the role of the Federal Reserve as the global lender of last resort in 2007–09, many aspects of the Dollar Swap Lines to the European Central Bank need further exploration. Accordingly, we provide original evidence about the auction operations, allotted amounts and interest rates with regard to the Federal Reserve’s dollar swaps and the European Central Bank’s dollar provision. More specifically, we examine the demand side of the Dollar Swap Lines (whereas the existing literature mentions the supply side only) and we scrutinise the interest rate (whereas the literature concentrates on volumes) set by the Federal Reserve, and also the rate set by the European Central Bank. Our findings cast light on the nature of the relationship between the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. Finally, we contribute to the literature on the global lender of last resort by coining the notion of the financial dilemma, under the dollar system within a framework of globalised financial markets.

scholarly journals The European Central Bank Quantitative Policy and Its Consistency with the Demand for Liquidity

2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sviatlana Hlebik ◽  
Giovanni Verga
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Policy Strategy ◽  
European Central

Abstract In 2008 the European Central Bank added a new quantitative policy strategy to its traditional control of the interest rates. This new policy, sometimes called “enhanced credit support”, consists of fully satisfying the demand for liquidity of banks, with the European Central Bank deciding only the timing and characteristics of its interventions. This study analyses the market conditions in which these measures have been taken and their consistency with the demand for liquidity by the banking system. Measures in favour of the sovereign debt of PIIGS countries are also considered.

scholarly journals Macroprudential policy debate, concepts and the Brazilian context

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
Míriam Oliveira Silva Portugues ◽  
Viviane Luporini ◽  
Luis Antonio Licha
Keyword(s):  
Financial Stability ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Financial System ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Capital Inflows ◽  
Shadow Banking ◽  
Policy Debate ◽  
Macroprudential Policy ◽  
Intrinsic Nature ◽  
Economics Literature

<div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span>The economics literature related to the financial system seeks to define the concepts of financial stability, systemic risk and macroprudential instruments for the purpose of drafting a policy that essentially "leans against the wind", that is, a policy that monitors macroeconomic vulnerabilities and combats system instability. Such a policy should cover all financial institutions involved in credit intermediation (not just banks) and consider the pro-cyclical and intrinsic nature of risk in the financial system, and account for the spillovers effects of policies in other countries, that is, the global context. This article summarizes the main concepts related to macroprudential policy discussed in the economics literature after the crisis the 2008 financial crisis. In addition, we describe macroprudential policy in the context of the Brazilian financial system, specifically major policies implemented in the banking regulatory environment related to Basel III and non-bank regulations related to shadow banks. After the 2008 crisis, Brazil was one of the precursors countries in operating macroprudential instruments to curb excessive credit growth and strong capital inflows. The Brazilian financial system has a broad regulatory perimeter, adhering to international standards and covering the Shadow banking system. This system has a weak connection with the banking system and is small relative to the financial assets of the national and global systems. </span></p></div></div></div>

scholarly journals Ready to Do Whatever it Takes? The Legal Mandate of the European Central Bank and the Economic Crisis

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 503-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Wilsher
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Sovereign Default ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Liability Rule ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Public Deficit ◽  
European Central

AbstractTo complement the ‘no shared liability’ rule and public deficit limits, the Maastricht Treaty gave the European Central Bank (ECB) a narrow remit to focus on price stability. Crucially, as a ‘non-sovereign’ central bank, it was unclear that the ECB would act as lender of last resort in the event of market panics. The neoliberal orthodoxy at the heart of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) held that moral hazard and inflationary risks militated against anything resembling ‘illegal monetary financing’. Following monetary union, markets under-priced risks and encouraged bubbles, but, with the onset of the crisis, sentiment overshot the other way, starving credit from banks and later sovereigns. With bailout funds limited and austerity failing to improve debt spreads, sovereigns became illiquid. ECB officials reluctantly concluded that an uncontrolled sovereign default would threaten the continuation of monetary union. The ECB was thus forced de facto to expand its mandate, first to help banks and, later, to help sovereigns facing loss of access to bond markets. Ultimately this was successful in restoring confidence, but the ECB remained uncomfortable with its role. It has continued to stress its legal limitations and has pressed for reformed governance to enforce fiscal discipline. The economic case for a lender of last resort in a crisis was always strong, but brings with it a worsening moral hazard problem that may invite leaders to avoid the deeper political changes necessary to rebalance the Eurozone.

scholarly journals United in Diversity? The Relationship between Monetary Policy and Prudential Supervision in the Banking Union

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-310
Author(s):  
Matthias Goldmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Holistic Approach ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Prudential Supervision ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
European Central

Banking Union – Single Supervisory Mechanism – Economic interplay between monetary policy and prudential supervision – Strict separation envisaged by the Single Supervisory Mechanism legal framework – Legal framework does not prevent a more holistic approach – Financial stability is a legitimate consideration for monetary policy-making – Price stability is a legitimate concern for prudential supervision – Challenge to European Central Bank legitimacy and independence – Democratising the European Central Bank

scholarly journals Private shareholding: An analysis of an eclectic group of central banks

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jannie Rossouw
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
European Central ◽  
Dividend Payments ◽  
Implementation Of Monetary Policy ◽  
The Government

Although the title seems to be a contradictio in terminis, this paper identifies a small, eclectic number of central banks with private shareholders about which little has been published. It is shown that only the central banks of Belgium, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States (US) Federal Reserve allow shareholding other than by the government of the respective countries, although not in all instances by the general public. This paper considers private shareholding in this eclectic group of central banks, despite the trend of nationalising central banks that commenced in 1935. Private shareholding is defined as shareholding in a central bank by any party other than the respective government or governments (e.g. the European Central Bank) where the central bank is located.Large differences in the classes of shareholders of these eclectic central banks and differences in their approaches to dividend payments are highlighted in the paper. The conclusions reached are, firstly, that investment only in the shares of the central banks of Belgium and Greece (albeit only for residents in the latter instance) can be regarded as growth investments. Secondly, shareholding in the Italian central bank has been used to recapitalise ailing commercial banks. Thirdly, shareholders play no role in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. Lastly, the shareholding structure of these banks contributes to improved governance in the case of the central banks of Belgium, Greece, Italy, South Africa, Switzerland and Turkey, but no evidence can be found that central banks with shareholders in any way outperform central banks without shareholders.

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