Public Choice Theory and Political Science

1999 ◽  
pp. 105-109
Author(s):  
Gerald A. Cory
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Public Choice Theory

A Critique of “Democratic Administration” and Its Supporting Ideation

1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 1488-1507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert T. Golembiewski
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Public Administration ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Major Work ◽  
Democratic Administration ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Intellectual Crisis

This paper analyzes Vincent Ostrom's major work, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, which he offers as providing paradigmatic direction for public administration and political science. The analysis urges caution as to that theory's status, especially from five analytic perspectives. Basically, attention is directed at the methodology or mode of inquiry associated with Ostrom's grounding of his argument in public choice theory, with special attention to the role of values. The adequacy of major assumptions of Ostrom's argument as descriptions of reality also is evaluated. Moreover, the critical lack of content in several key concepts is established. In addition, the analysis shows how opposite and simultaneous courses of action are implied by the argument. Finally, attention is directed at how Ostrom's argument can lead to unexpected consequences, even some that are opposite those effects Ostrom intends.

Fonctions de vote et prévisions électorales, une application à la présidentielle française de 2007

2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Jérôme ◽  
Véronique Jérôme-Speziari
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Public Policies ◽  
National Level ◽  
Revealed Preferences ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Politiques Publiques

Résumé. Prévoir le vote en tant que révélation des préférences des citoyens dans les choix collectifs permet d'évaluer les chances de succès des sortants ou de l'opposition et d'anticiper les politiques publiques futures. Dans cet article, nous donnons une prévision de l'élection présidentielle de 2007 en France à partir d'une fonction de vote mobilisant les apports de la théorie des choix publics et de la science politique des comportements électoraux. Les prévisions générées au niveau territorial sont plus pertinentes pour le second tour que pour le premier tour. Nous offrons quelques éléments d'explication et des pistes d'amélioration pour 2012.Abstract. Forecasting votes understood as citizens revealed preferences in collective choices allow to evaluate electoral success opportunities both for incumbents and opposition and to anticipate future public policies. In this paper, we provide forecasts for the 2007 French presidential election gathering contributions from Public Choice theory and Political science dealing with electoral behaviors. Forecasts generated at a sub-national level exhibit more accuracy at the second round than at the first one. We propose some explanation and improvements for 2012.

Collective Decision-making: FIFA from the Perspective of Public Choice

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Follert ◽  
Lukas Richau ◽  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
World Cup ◽  
The World ◽  
Selection Of

AbstractVarious scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.

Financial Indicators as Determinants of Mayoral Elections

2020 ◽  
pp. 27-53
Author(s):  
Serena Santis ◽  
Francesca Citro ◽  
Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros ◽  
Marco Bisogno
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Capital Expenditure ◽  
Financial Indicators ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
The Public ◽  
Mayoral Elections ◽  
Local Politicians ◽  
Italian Context

The chapter seeks to contribute to the literature on determinants of local government election by adopting a different perspective focused on the effects of financial indicators on the elections of mayors. Using the agency and the public choice theory, this study implements a model where specific financial indicators—whose selection takes into account the increased autonomy and responsibility of local politicians—have been included to document their effect on mayoral re-election. Focusing on the Italian context, the chapter examines a sample of 129 municipalities during the period 2008-2014, where several elections were held. By using different estimators, findings indicate that the re-election of mayors is affected by the level of indebtedness and the current equilibrium. In addition, current spending is better valued by citizens/voters than capital expenditure, which increases the probability of being re-elected.

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