Identity Politics in the European Union: The Case of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)

Author(s):  
Daniela Engelmann ◽  
Hans-Joachim Knopf ◽  
Klaus Roscher ◽  
Thomas Risse
2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
LB ◽  
JHR

In between the writing of this editorial and the publication of this issue of EuConst, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, in everyday parlance the ‘Fiscal Compact’, will have been signed by the representatives of the governments of the contracting parties — the member states of the European Union minus the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. The Fiscal Compact is intended to foster budgetary discipline, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area.


Author(s):  
Eugenia Dumitriu Segnana ◽  
Alberto de Gregorio Merino

The Council of the European Union (EU) occupies a central place in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), even more so than in any other Union policies. It exercises in this area a variety of roles going from a forum for coordination of national policies to legislative functions and executive powers. The different crises that affected the Union and in particular the euro area in the last ten years have strengthened its prominent position, in no small part due to the Council’s ownership by the Member States. Alongside the Council, the Euro Group, which is presided by a fixed-term president, has developed itself as the informal forum where Ministers from the Member States whose currency is the euro discuss matters of common interest. Its role has been decisive, in particular in the Cypriot and Greek crisis, which could have put into question the very existence of the euro area as a whole.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-237
Author(s):  
László Andor

The article provides a critical assessment of how the Economic and Monetary Union was designed, implemented and reformed in the European Union and discusses the risks of a slow-motion reform process. It is argued that the fact that the euro area economy has recovered in the last few years has become a source of complacency and delays. In particular, powerful forces continue to downplay the importance of systemic reconstruction and the risk of disintegration remains high despite the relative tranquillity of markets in the 2014–2018 period. Finally, the article evaluates competing paradigms about the eurozone crisis and the pros and cons of fiscal capacity building.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (22) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Luengo Escalonilla Lucía Vicent Valverde

<p> </p><p>The article reflects about the viability and implications of the Economic and Monetary Union from a Southern periphery of the European Union perspective, especially that of the Spanish economy. The argument is developed through two ideas: a) euro zone’s reconfiguration carried out by community leaders has preserved and also has sharpened imbalances and asymmetries that triggered the economic crisis, b) the debate on how to overcome it contains and transcends the dilemma that arises from being  part of the European Monetary area, or not.</p><p> </p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Barbara Murphy

<p>Following 10 years in operation, the European Monetary Union (EMU) has been shaken by the global financial crisis and some peripheral states have experienced significant economic shock. The pitfalls of currency unions have been well documented in the literature of International Political Economy (IPE), so the situation that these states find themselves in cannot come as a surprise to any member country. Without highly synchronised economies, some states will suffer significantly in the event of an exogenous shock. This begs the question why a country would make an "irrational" choice to join the monetary union to begin with. The predominant IPE theories on how the EMU was formed are explained using rational choice with material interests as the focus for interstate bargaining. By arguing that they really have no choice to begin with, rational choice theory renders small states impotent. Unsatisfied with this reductionist answer, this body of work explores the participation of one of the states currently in trouble by introducing a constructivist theory of economic identity politics. Exploring the historical record of Ireland in the period of 1978 and 1992, this work reveals that Ireland in fact had choices, and the "irrational" choices it made were significantly influenced by Irish identity politics. However Ireland's "irrational" motivation can only be understood by including economic identity politics into the analysis. It will reveal that the supranational institutions of the European Union can serve as economic instruments to further nationalist goals. In the process the institution can become embedded in the nation such a country like Ireland is now a hybrid - highly European monetarily while it still remains distinctively Irish. As small states now make up the majority of the European Union this thesis adds to our understanding of small state participation in its most ambitious institution thus far.</p>


Author(s):  
Richard Griffiths

Twenty years ago, amid a great fanfare of enthusiasm, the Treaty of Maastricht created the European union and inaugurated the process for creating a single European currency for most of the then members (except the UK and Sweden, and later Denmark, that were given a temporary exemption) and all future members. Twenty years later, the anniversary of the treaty passed almost unnoticed (European Policy Centre, 2012). On that day, however, the impact of the treaty was never far from the headlines, as had also been the case for almost every day over the previous months. The Lehman brothers bankruptcy in September 2008 not only triggered a financial crisis that threatened to engulf the world, but it set in motion a series of shocks that have since reverberated through the Euro-area. It is fair to say that the crisis-management has not been an example of stream-lined efficiency, and there are lessons to be learned from that experience.However, the development of the Euro, and the crisis that has subsequently engulfed it, holds lessons in another direction. The European Union has long been held as a model, or an inspiration, for other experiments in regional cooperation and integration, including Mercosul, ASEAN and SADC. The model embodied an sequence of steps leading to ‘ever closer union’ that moved from a free trade area through a customs union and a single market and culminated in economic and monetary union. With the signing and implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Union had embarked on the penultimate step in this progression. But only half of it – a monetary union without a fiscal union. The Euro-crisis has now called that achievement into question and, in the process, undermined the authority of those espousing a European route towards closer integration, both for themselves as well as for other nations. As a convinced federalist, myself, I would not recommend abandoning the European example altogether, but if there is a lesson to be learned from this sorry episode, it is this: “if you are going to do it, do not do it this way”.This article examines the European experience with economic and monetary union from three perspectives – the design, the implementation and the management of the euro – before exploring the implications of the current crisis.


2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-185
Author(s):  
Leone Niglia

Abstract The European Union is undergoing a structural transformation—a regression from integration through law as an anti-hegemonic project of equal membership to a condition in which member state orders, under a transformed European Union law, gravitate around unequal relations of subordination. Alongside the surveillance mechanisms that constrain the member states to conform to the requirements of the Economic and Monetary Union are private law arrangements (the “memoranda of understanding” qua “contracts”) that equally, and with greater force, produce subordination. Adopting a critical comparative-historical approach, this Article delves into Europe’s collective legal memory, and the past of colonial relations, to make intelligible the deployment of the memoranda contracts whose harsh terms have been dramatically changing the condition of the “debtor countries” for the worse; in the arcana of private law lies the truth about the changing condition of sovereign power in contemporary Europe and about the potential to change direction and counter the “jurisdomination” turn.


Author(s):  
Erik Jones

The purpose of this chapter is to explain why so many experts were surprised by the politics that surrounded Europe’s economic and monetary union (EMU) both during and after the financial crisis that dominated the first two decades of the twenty-first century. This question is important because it has changed fundamentally the relationship between the euro as a single currency and the European Union (EU) as a larger project. Before the crisis, it was fair to say that the euro existed to serve the EU, as one of the many important building blocks in the wider project of European integration. During and after the crisis, it became more common to assert that an end of the euro would entail the end of the European project. That inversion of priorities was unexpected–and it explains, more than anything else, why the politics of economic and monetary union can no longer be ignored.


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