The concluding chapter of Trade Policy in Multilevel Government not only elaborates on the theoretical model’s explanatory power and its limits in the light of the three analysed polities, but also turns to raising questions as to the democratic legitimacy of the multilevel pattern of trade policy described in the book. Questions of democratic legitimacy in multilevel systems are complicated by the fact that a popular and a territorial logic of representation coexist and, at times, compete. Both citizens and constituent units are entitled to input into the system. The ensuing tension between popular and territorial logics of representation also permeates multilevel trade governance. In the EU and the Canadian cases, territorial legitimacy clearly takes precedence over popular representation. Seen from this perspective, the US case appears in a somewhat different light. In the face of adaptational pressures arising from economic and political globalization, popular representation could also be regarded as an additional layer of autonomy in self-rule systems of multilevel government.