Efficient Income Measures and the Partially Regulated Firm

Author(s):  
Shimon Awerbuch
Keyword(s):  
1996 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francois Melese ◽  
David L. Kaserman ◽  
John W. Mayo
Keyword(s):  

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-115
Author(s):  
Joanna Gray

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to report on the company directors' disqualification proceedings following the failure of FSA‐regulated firm.Design/methodology/approachThe paper outlines the facts surrounding the decision and comments on the ruling.FindingsIt was found that this whole question of overlapping laws in highly complex and regulated business sectors is a real one and is set to become a growing problem for courts to manage and boards to predict.Originality/valueThe paper highlights the real, practical problems that can arise when different legal regimes criss‐cross the same factual domain.


2011 ◽  
Vol 37 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 388-421
Author(s):  
Nathan Cortez

For over a century, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or the Agency) and its precursors have regulated what companies say about their products. The FDA itself notes that the regulatory scheme imposed by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act “depends on the use of words” and that its requirements can “explicitly limit speech.” For seventy years, the FDA had little reason to worry about First Amendment constraints. But since 1976, when the Supreme Court reversed its longstanding position that the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech, the Agency has had to confront–perhaps more than any other federal agency–the free speech rights of regulated firms.But how far do those rights extend, and what room do they leave for regulators like the FDA? The answer largely depends on another question: Is the speech commercial or noncommercial? The distinction is paramount. If speech by a regulated firm is commercial, then the FDA can ensure that it is not false or misleading; the Agency can require or compel certain speech; it can impose prior restraints; and it can even limit truthful speech, all within certain parameters.


1992 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 337-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Goodwin ◽  
Robert H. Patrick

1983 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rolf Fare ◽  
James Logan

2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Darryl Biggar

Why regulate natural monopolies? Conventional economic theory points to the price-marginal cost margin and the ensuing deadweight loss. But this hypothesis does a poor job of explaining the way that regulators behave in practice. This paper proposes an alternative hypothesis: that natural monopoly regulation exists to protect the sunk investments made by consumers of the regulated firm. This hypothesis explains many of the practices of regulators which make little or no sense under conventional economic theory, such as the desire to pursue stable prices, the aversion to Ramsey pricing, and the role of incremental cost as a pricing floor.


Author(s):  
David Henriques

Abstract The literature on access prices and investment has suggested that firms under-invest when subject to an access provision obligation combined with a fixed access price per consumer. In this paper, I study an access price per consumer for an innovative service such as superfast broadband provided by a regulated firm that is a function of its geographical coverage (indexation approach). The indexation approach can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price under a set of standard assumptions. In particular, it can simultaneously induce the firms to set lower retail prices, lead to wider geographical coverage of innovative services and higher social welfare level compared with a fixed access price. Moreover, in the model, the indexation may be used to achieve approximately the Ramsey outcome, or the first-best coverage level. I address how a regulator can set the access price indexation optimally, based on the coverage cost plus an incentive. I highlight the potential role of indexation as a tool to reduce the need for public subsidies and the associated tax distortions when compared with a fixed access price.


1986 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-447
Author(s):  
Lawrence Martin

This article develops a simple model of a firm's privately optimal choice of the degree to which it will abide with regulations. The model allows for the firm to disguise its illegal actions in order to avoid detection and to expend resources to mitigate possible punishment for violations. Both price and quantity type regulatory schemes are considered. Under quantity regulation noncompliance increases the total amount of the regulated activity and distorts efficiency in production. Price regulation, on the other hand, introduces a kind of dichotomy between the real production plan of the firm and its illegal activity. Even though price regulations are substantially evaded, the total amount of the regulated activity remains unchanged, and the firm continues to produce efficiently.


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