scholarly journals Can Speech by FDA-Regulated Firms Ever Be Noncommercial?

2011 ◽  
Vol 37 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 388-421
Author(s):  
Nathan Cortez

For over a century, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or the Agency) and its precursors have regulated what companies say about their products. The FDA itself notes that the regulatory scheme imposed by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act “depends on the use of words” and that its requirements can “explicitly limit speech.” For seventy years, the FDA had little reason to worry about First Amendment constraints. But since 1976, when the Supreme Court reversed its longstanding position that the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech, the Agency has had to confront–perhaps more than any other federal agency–the free speech rights of regulated firms.But how far do those rights extend, and what room do they leave for regulators like the FDA? The answer largely depends on another question: Is the speech commercial or noncommercial? The distinction is paramount. If speech by a regulated firm is commercial, then the FDA can ensure that it is not false or misleading; the Agency can require or compel certain speech; it can impose prior restraints; and it can even limit truthful speech, all within certain parameters.

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (02) ◽  
pp. 182-197
Author(s):  
F. H. Buckley

Abstract:Corruption of public officials is the silent killer of the U.S. economy, and we should reflect carefully on how it might be reined in. That’s the thought behind campaign finance laws. But broad grants of discretion to authorities, which might work in New Zealand, are more likely to be abused in low-trust America, and campaign finance laws are one example of this. First Amendment free speech rights, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, represent its reflection on the American character and the possibility of abuse when Congress tries to restrict political speech. So conservatives are apt to think, and not entirely without reason.


This chapter focuses on the Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986) case – the United States Supreme Court's second review of students' speech rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It discusses the test created in the case for determining when schools can regulate students' speech. This test, referred to as the Bethel test or the Fraser test authorizes schools to censor students' speech if the speech is vulgar, lewd, plainly offensive or obscene. The chapter also discusses the Supreme Court's decision on the scope of students' free speech rights. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to analyze the Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser case in order to determine if it empowers schools to censor off-campus student speech.


2020 ◽  
pp. 174387212095030
Author(s):  
Howard Schweber ◽  
Eric Segall

Students and faculty at public colleges and universities frequently find themselves in conflict with administrators over questions of free speech. Unfortunately, the courts have provided precious little guidance. Lower courts are struggling with a diverse set of issues: the appropriate rules for student protests; which campus spaces constitute open forums for speech and which can be closed off or regulated; how much control administrators can wield over student-invited speakers; and whether or when student online speech can be punished, among many other problems. The Supreme Court has provided virtually no helpful guidance to lower court judges or public college administrators as to how or when the First Amendment limits their discretion. This article provides a helpful forum-based approach to the analysis of many of these questions and proposes specific solutions in the hope of bringing more predictability and stability to this confusing area of constitutional law.


AmeriQuests ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Percy DeWitt

David M. O’Brien’s Congress Shall Make No Law: The First Amendment, Unprotected Expression, and the Supreme Court serves as a significant contribution to the field of First Amendment Law by offering an overview of crucial issues and, moreover, by emphasizing the outlook for the future of free speech. O’Brien’s credentials position him favorably for the task; he was a judicial fellow and research associate with the Supreme Court, he has written numerous articles and books on the Supreme Court, and he is currently the Leone Reaves and George W. Spicer Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. Considering the daunting task of compiling a succinct account and analysis of the history of free speech in the United States, Professor O’Brien does well to allow readers to better understand the complexities of free speech policy in the United States.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raghav Kohli

Abstract Unlike the US First Amendment, Article 19 of the Indian Constitution expressly enumerates eight grounds on which free speech may be restricted. Despite being a fundamental issue of constitutional interpretation, the question of whether Article 19 provides for an exhaustive list of restrictions has largely been neglected in academic literature and Indian jurisprudence. The latest site of contestations on the scope of the free speech clause has been the case of Kaushal Kishor, where the Supreme Court is currently hearing arguments on whether speech can be restricted by invoking fundamental rights beyond Article 19. This Article seeks to develop a principled answer by excavating the meaning of constitutional silences on the relationships between fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution. It argues that a strict textualist approach leads to a distinct form of rights absolutism that is both doctrinally incoherent and inconsistent with Indian jurisprudence. Examining the shift in the Supreme Court’s interpretive outlook from strict textualism to interpretive holism, it finds that the Court’s rich fundamental rights jurisprudence allows importing restrictions on speech from beyond Article 19. Such an approach also provides a meaningful framework for resolving intra-right, inter-right, and right-interest conflicts in the constitutional adjudication of free speech issues.


2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 514-530
Author(s):  
Sonia M. Suter

AbstractThe Supreme Court and lower courts have not articulated a clear or consistent framework for First Amendment analysis of speech restrictions in health care and with respect to abortion. After offering a coherent doctrine for analysis of speech restrictions in the doctor-patient relationship, this piece demonstrates how potential legislation restricting patient access to information from reproductive testing intended to limit “undesirable” reproductive choices would violate the First Amendment.


Author(s):  
Timothy Zick

Chapter 7 addresses the relationship between the Free Speech Clause and the Second Amendment’s right to “keep and bear Arms.” Relative to the other non-speech rights examined in the book, recognition of an individual right to keep and bear arms occurred relatively recently (the Supreme Court recognized the right in 2008). As a result, the relationship between free speech and Second Amendment rights is still developing. The chapter focuses primarily on two aspects of their intersection. The first is the extent to which the nature and scope of Second Amendment rights ought to be modeled on Free Speech Clause doctrines and principles. The chapter considers the pros and (mostly) cons of “borrowing” the Free Speech Clause for this purpose. The second aspect of the relationship between the Free Speech Clause and the Second Amendment relates to potential conflicts between them. The chapter addresses two tension points—the effect on free speech of openly carrying firearms at public protests and demonstrations, and the effect on academic freedom and inquiry from the presence of firearms in university classrooms. The chapter argues that the future of the Second Amendment will not be determined by explicit borrowing of Free Speech Clause doctrines. However, in terms of constructing the modern right to keep and bear arms, there is much we can learn from the nation’s long experience with free speech rights.


Hypatia ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 94-109
Author(s):  
Melinda Vadas

The Supreme Court dismissed the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance as an unconstitutional restriction of speech. The Court's dismissal itself violates the free speech of the proposers of the Ordinance. It is not possible for both pornographers to perform the speech act of making pornography and feminists to perform the speech act of proposing the Ordinance. I show that the speech act of proposing the Ordinance takes First Amendment precedence over the speech act of making pornography.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane

This essay, which introduces a symposium on “The Expanding First Amendment” considers when, many Americans perceive that their capacity to speak freely is increasingly being imperiled in ways for which they have no legal recourse even though the Supreme Court has expanded the domain of communicative activity covered by the First Amendment’s “speech” protection and has limited in other ways the capacity of government to regulate communication based on content. The essay attributes the paradox in significant measure to the rise of private digital platforms as venues for public expression. At the same time that digital technologies (along with print, broadcast, and cable) provide unprecedented opportunities for people to share provocative views, many people may find that they enter public debate only at risk of unleashing a torrent of personal attack that may be a source of embarrassment and worse.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jud Campbell

Free speech doctrine generally protects only expression, leaving regulations of nonexpressive conduct beyond the First Amendment’s scope. Yet the Supreme Court has recognized that abridgments of the freedom of speech “may operate at different points in the speech process.” This notion of protection for nonexpressive conduct that facilitates speech touches on many of the most contentious issues in First Amendment law— restrictions on photography and audiovisual recording, limits on campaign contributions, putative newsgathering privileges for journalists, compelled subsidization of speech, and associational rights, to name just a few. Scholars, however, have generally approached these topics in isolation, typically focusing on downstream effects on speech as the touchstone for First Amendment coverage. The usual conclusion is that the Supreme Court’s decisions are in disarray. This Article argues that key features of doctrine are easily overlooked when employing a granular focus on particular rights. Instead, the Article presents an overarching framework that brings together, descriptively and normatively, otherwise disparate strands of free speech law. The guiding principle of this framework is that First Amendment coverage for nonexpressive conduct depends on whether the government uses a rule that targets speech (e.g., a special tax on newspapers), not on whether expression is indirectly burdened by particular applications of otherwise constitutional rules (e.g., a child labor law applied to newspapers). Applications of this “anti-targeting” principle vary by context, but the general concept offers a surprisingly comprehensive account of most Supreme Court decisions. Tracing the development of the anti-targeting principle also reveals an underappreciated shift in the way that the Court has dealt with claims based on nonexpressive conduct. This historical argument shows that the reasoning in many of the Court’s foundational cases—including Buckley v. Valeo, Branzburg v. Hayes, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, and Roberts v. United States Jaycees—is now out of step with current doctrine.


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