Capital recovery for the regulated firm under certainty and regulatory uncertainty

1992 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 337-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Goodwin ◽  
Robert H. Patrick
Author(s):  
Irene Spagna

This chapter analyzes the growth of OTC derivatives before the global financial crisis of 2008 and the role of credit default swaps, in particular, in the near collapse of the global economy. It begins by exploring the basic characteristics of derivatives used as risk management instruments by investors to hedge against or exploit the volatility of asset prices. The analysis further reveals that the pre-crisis period was characterized by a broad-based consensus favoring deregulated markets and globally designed private rules. While not always unanimously supported, permissive public regulatory choices were often encouraged by interest group lobbying, the market-friendly views of many domestic authorities, and concerns about regulatory uncertainty and international competitiveness.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 352-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Baumann ◽  
Tim Friehe

AbstractThis paper analyzes the effects of regulatory uncertainty regarding labor costs on investment in a liberalized market. We distinguish between the external investment margin (market entry) and the internal investment margin (technology), and establish that regulatory uncertainty affects these margins differently, encouraging market entry, but discouraging technological investment. As a consequence, the impact of regulatory uncertainty on competition in liberalized markets is a combination of these two countervailing forces.


1996 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francois Melese ◽  
David L. Kaserman ◽  
John W. Mayo
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 05 (01) ◽  
pp. 1550015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Yonce

The investment behavior of US firms exhibits systematic variation over the political cycle. After controlling for investment opportunities, US firms reduce investment expenditures approximately 2.0% during Presidential election years, 5.3% during periods of single-party government, and 8.7% during Republican presidential administrations. Neoclassical investment theory has little to say about direct links between investment and the political environment. I show that the empirical results arise naturally in a model of investment under regulatory and political uncertainty, provided that (i) regulatory policy affects the cash flows of the firm, (ii) firms have flexibility over the scale of their investments and (iii) regulatory uncertainty resolves quickly.


2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-115
Author(s):  
Joanna Gray

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to report on the company directors' disqualification proceedings following the failure of FSA‐regulated firm.Design/methodology/approachThe paper outlines the facts surrounding the decision and comments on the ruling.FindingsIt was found that this whole question of overlapping laws in highly complex and regulated business sectors is a real one and is set to become a growing problem for courts to manage and boards to predict.Originality/valueThe paper highlights the real, practical problems that can arise when different legal regimes criss‐cross the same factual domain.


2013 ◽  
Vol 37 (10) ◽  
pp. 879-892 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markos Tselekounis ◽  
Dimitris Varoutas

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 374-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Plous Kresch

This paper documents how regulatory uncertainty may undermine public service when different levels of government share a mandate on public service provision. I examine the Brazilian water and sanitation sector, which presents a natural experiment of shared provision between state and municipal companies. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I study a legal reform that clarified the relationship between municipal and state providers and eliminated any takeover threat by state companies. I find that after the reform, municipal companies almost doubled their total system investment, leading to significant increases in system access and decreases in child mortality. (JEL H77, L95, O13, O18, Q53)


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