Dummett’s Conception as Theory of Meaning for Hintikka’s Type of Game-theoretical Semantics (I) (‘Use’ and ‘Language-game’ in Wittgenstein and Dummett)

Author(s):  
Heda Festini
Author(s):  
Erwin Erwin ◽  
Nasarudin Nasarudin ◽  
Husnan Husnan

The purpose of this research is to explain the importance of the student organizations and describe their efforts to improve the speaking skills of students at the Mahad Khalid Bin Al Waleed at the University of Muhammadiyah Mataram. This research uses the qualitative approach with the descriptive type. The result shows the student organizations play an important role based on their objectives and functions. The objectives are to help the foundation and all parties in the Ma'had develop the students’ potential and qualification, and to be the place for the students to share their problems and complaints, while the functions are as one of the media to develop students’ quality, both the members of the non-member, and as the good examples and pioneers of any good deeds. The efforts done by student organizations in improving speaking skills are such as by making activities that lead to improving students' speaking skills like sticking vocabularies in each class and Friday activities such as language game, Arabic debate and short lecture.


Author(s):  
Roy Tzohar

This, the conclusion of this book, draws out those features and themes that are common to the various accounts of metaphor presented in the preceding chapters and examines their possible applications. The text also briefly examines further ways in which these features may be applied to deepen and enrich our understanding of the Buddhist and more generally Indian philosophical engagement with figurative language. As a quick case study, the final part of the discussion explores how the Yogācāra theory of meaning sheds light on the concrete use of distinct figures, focusing on a list of similes prevalent in the school’s literature.


Author(s):  
Roy Tzohar

This book is about what metaphors mean and do within Buddhist texts. More specifically, it is about the fundamental Buddhist ambivalence toward language, which is seen as obstructive and yet necessary for liberation, as well as the ingenious response to this tension that one Buddhist philosophical school—the early Indian Yogācāra (3rd–6th century CE)—proposed by arguing that all language use is in fact metaphorical (upacāra). Exploring the profound implications of this claim, the book presents the full-fledged Yogācāra theory of meaning—one that is not merely linguistic, but also perceptual.Despite the overwhelming visibility of figurative language in Buddhist philosophical texts, its role and use have received relatively little attention in scholarship to date. This book is the first sustained and systematic attempt to present an indigenous Buddhist philosophical theory of metaphor. By grounding the Yogācāra’s pan-metaphorical claim in its broader intellectual context, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, the discussion reveals an intense Indian philosophical conversation about metaphor and language that reached across sectarian lines, and it also demonstrates its potential contribution to contemporary philosophical discussions of related topics. The analysis of this theory of metaphor radically reframes the Yogācāra controversy with the Madhyamaka; sheds light on the school’s application of particular metaphors, as well as its unique understanding of experience; and establishes the place of Sthiramati as an original Buddhist thinker of note in his own right, alongside Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.


Author(s):  
Craige Roberts

This essay sketches an approach to speech acts in which mood does not semantically determine illocutionary force. The conventional content of mood determines the semantic type of the clause in which it occurs, and, given the nature of discourse, that type most naturally lends itself to a particular type of speech act, i.e. one of the three basic types of language game moves—making an assertion (declarative), posing a question (interrogative), or proposing to one’s addressee(s) the adoption of a goal (imperative). There is relative consensus about the semantics of two of these, the declarative and interrogative; and this consensus view is entirely compatible with the present proposal about the relationship between the semantics and pragmatics of grammatical mood. Hence, the proposal is illustrated with the more controversial imperative.


Author(s):  
Sarah E. Murray ◽  
William B. Starr

This essay sketches an approach to speech acts in which mood does not semantically determine illocutionary force. The conventional content of mood determines the semantic type of the clause in which it occurs, and, given the nature of discourse, that type most naturally lends itself to serving as a particular type of speech act, that is, to serving as one of the three basic types of language game moves-making an assertion (declarative); posing a question (interrogative); or proposing to one’s addressee(s) the adoption of a goal (imperative). This type of semantics for grammatical mood is illustrated with the imperative.


Author(s):  
Paul M. Pietroski

Examples of adverbial modification, as in ‘Alvin chased Theodore gleefully yesterday’, were supposed to illustrate virtues of the Davidsonian conjecture reviewed in chapter four. But it is argued that such examples provide further evidence against the conjecture. A theory of meaning, for an expression-generating procedure that children can acquire, is concerned with how expressions like ‘Alvin chased Theodore’ are understood (not how the expressions are related to the events that occurred). A theory of truth is concerned with how expressions are related to the events that occurred (not how the expressions are understood). If one forces a plausible theory of meaning to also serve as a theory of truth, then ordinary action reports present deep metaphysical puzzles, as opposed to mundane “framing effects” that reveal the representational format that humans use to understand linguistic expressions.


Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

This chapter examines some puzzling reflections by Ludwig Wittgenstein on the possibility of understanding concepts of the colours of things different from those already familiar to us. It begins with a discussion of Wittgenstein’s statement: ‘Someone who has perfect pitch can learn a language-game that I cannot learn’. In particular, it considers how Wittgenstein draws a connection between perfect pitch and concepts of colours and invites us to imagine people who speak of colours intermediate between red and yellow by means of fractions in a kind of binary notation representing different proportions of the colours at each end of the range from red to yellow. The chapter also analyses Wittgenstein’s views on whether the number system and the colour system ‘reside in our nature or in the nature of things’.


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