scholarly journals Rationality and Irrationality in Military Organizations

Author(s):  
Joseph Soeters

AbstractThis chapter delves into a variety of issues dealing with rationality, irrationality, and everything in between, as they occur in military organizations. Respectively, this contribution examines the rationality behind the structure of military organizations, including its room for improvement based on contemporary experiences and insights, such as modular organizing. Next, the chapter deals with the possible McSoldiering of the military and the risk that rationality may turn irrational. Subsequently, the limits of rationality in military decision-making will be examined, after which elements of organizational hypocrisy in military action will be assessed. At the end, the phenomenon of collateral damage as a consequence of military action and the way the military often deals with this phenomenon, are considered. The aim of this chapter is to spawn insights and understanding of the many dilemmas that military organizations face continuously, on and off the area of operations, consciously and subconsciously.

2000 ◽  
Vol 44 (12) ◽  
pp. 2-618-2-621
Author(s):  
Karl Perusich ◽  
Michael D. McNeese

As socio-technical systems increase the capability to acquire, analyze, and disseminate information, the concept of a multi-dimensional battlespace has been developed as a means to understand the ways a myriad of socio-cognitive / macroergonomic factors interact and impact the execution of a plan of action. Defined within this battlespace are various ways in which individual actors and teams of actors can access information and the impact their decisions will have on the overall evolved problem space. Although convenient for conceptualizing the many complexities and dimensionalities involved in the modern military decision making environment, a specific battlespace often lacks substance. Being aware of the dynamics and intricacies of the battlespace is a key determinant of whether team situation awareness is present, so without a contextual definition it has little value in understanding or improving the military decision making process. In this paper, the methods and results of constructing a battlespace using fuzzy cognitive maps will be described. The example was developed as part of a multi-team exercise that constructed rules of engagement for tasking various Air Force assets dealing with SCUD attacks in a hypothetical North Korean attack against South Korea.


1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elton Akins ◽  
Hank Dodge ◽  
Colleen Duffy ◽  
Brian Gollsneider ◽  
James Imlay

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-31
Author(s):  
Paul TUDORACHE

Abstract: The manifestation of different dissensions regarding the use of planning methodologies in the operations process has become a reality, both at national level and within NATO. Therefore, this research paper contributes to the theoretical clarification on defining the specific methodologies, respectively their employment in relation to the level of Land Forces military operations. Another objective of this paper is to make a comparative analysis between the design methodology, military decision making process (MDMP) and troop leading procedures (TLP), targeting the military structures within the Land Forces, and those belonging to NATO. Also, at the end, the paper highlights some perspectives of improving planning, as the primary activity which starts the operations process.


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