Behavioral Economics in Military Personnel Research and Policy

Behavioral economics is a burgeoning field of research that is being used to increase the effectiveness of military policies, programs, and operations. This chapter provides an overview of the origins of behavioral economics, key concepts, how behavioral economics research translates into applied behavioral change, and the rise of behavioral economics teams in government around the world. The chapter outlines how behavioral economics is being used within the military, with specific examples from Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel research to illustrate how this field is being applied to military behavioral sciences.

Liberal International Relations Theory and the Military

While much of the study and practice of international relations is anchored in the centuries-old tradition of realism, this chapter explores the important contributions that another theoretical tradition, liberalism, has made to the study of international security and the role of military power. Emerging from Enlightenment beliefs about the rationality of individuals and the potential for progress in human affairs, liberal theories and policy ideas have focused on offering alternative means for states seeking security, alternatives that might break the endless competition and warfare that realists see as inevitable in an anarchic world. Liberal theories emphasize how rules and institutions can help self-interested states achieve mutual interests, they see economic interdependence as a potent incentive for states to avoid war, and they argue that democracies enjoy more peaceful relations with other democracies. The chapter traces the history of liberal international relations theory as it matured in response to the mass violence and chaos of the twentieth century, and it examines a number of examples – like European integration, the post-World War II global economic order, and the control of nuclear weapons – to showcase how liberal ideas in practice might reduce the dangers of war and enhance the prospects for global cooperation.

“New” Military History

This chapter provides an overview of the development of “New military history,” a general term for the broadening – in subject, approaches and methods – of the traditional, narrow operational military historiography. It first deals with the influence of the social, cultural, gender, and global “turns” in general historiography on military historiography. Next, the benefits and possibilities of these new perspectives in military historiography are analyzed, followed by the risks and potential dangers. Finally, the question of what the core of military history should be is discussed and an attempt is made to describe a “comprehensive approach” to analyze military action taken in the past, with a multifaceted “plan of attack” with several possible “axes of attack.” “New” military historians who use a comprehensive approach are best placed to explain how the course of military action has influenced the general course of history and thereby can make a full-fledged contribution to general historiography. This unique quality also gives them the ability and the right to participate in or even initiate broader academic debates.

Evolution of Joint Warfare

The ability to employ force across the physical warfighting domains of air, land, maritime, and space is essential in contemporary conflict. In NATO doctrine, the term “joint operations” refers to military actions “in which elements of at least two services participate.” While doctrinal definitions differ slightly across Western militaries, the basic premise remains that “jointness” in military operations entails significant action in at least two of the physical warfighting domains. This chapter provides an overview of joint warfare, beginning with a brief discussion of its development over the past century. It then turns its attention to the development of joint doctrine and the joint functions. It concludes with a brief discussion of what some military theorists see as the next iteration of joint warfighting: multi-domain operations (MDO).

Empirical Research on Military Ethical Behaviour

This chapter presents an overview of key empirical research examining ethical and unethical behaviour in the military. Early research examined the impact of atrocities on the psychological well-being of Vietnam War veterans. In later conflicts, researchers examined battlefield attitudes, behaviours, willingness to report fellow unit members for ethical violations, and the adequacy of training. In addition to battlefield ethics, researchers have also investigated individual, situational, and organizational factors that increase the risk of unethical behaviour (i.e., ethical risk factors). This chapter summarizes research that highlights how individual differences in moral identity and malevolent traits can impact ethical and unethical behaviour among military personnel. It also discusses how situational factors, such as sleep deprivation and anger, can increase the likelihood of military personnel engaging in unethical behaviour. Lastly, the chapter discusses how organizational factors, such as ethical climate and culture and ethical leadership, play a role in ethical and unethical behaviour.

Military Operations

Military operations can be a complex and cumbersome undertaking, involving millions of soldiers and tonnes of equipment. Even though war has been part of human experience for time immemorial, systematic thinking about how to prepare, conduct, and use military operations is nonetheless a rather new undertaking. This chapter explores the history of thinking about military operations, broadly defined, and narrows down on operations as the concept is used today.After the historical exploration, the chapter investigates how military operations can be studied. In principle, there are four different ways to approach operations as a field of study. The most common methods are the historical method and operations research, i.e., making heuristic models of reality. Game theory and axiomatic foundationalism are the other two but are far less used than the former two.The development of modern military thinking notwithstanding, it is still difficult to convert military power to strategic gains, and the latter part of the chapter explains why. Military commanders and planning groups do not always get the what and why from the political level, making it difficult to find the how. Military operations are also intrinsically difficult because your opponent will try to make it difficult for you. The concept of an operational level of command is also problematic, since it tends to do the opposite of what is intended. Instead of pulling tactics and strategy closer together, it tends to push them apart. And finally, the word “art” in “operational art” is perhaps also an unfortunate misnomer?

Rationality and Irrationality in Military Organizations

This chapter delves into a variety of issues dealing with rationality, irrationality, and everything in between, as they occur in military organizations. Respectively, this contribution examines the rationality behind the structure of military organizations, including its room for improvement based on contemporary experiences and insights, such as modular organizing. Next, the chapter deals with the possible McSoldiering of the military and the risk that rationality may turn irrational. Subsequently, the limits of rationality in military decision-making will be examined, after which elements of organizational hypocrisy in military action will be assessed. At the end, the phenomenon of collateral damage as a consequence of military action and the way the military often deals with this phenomenon, are considered. The aim of this chapter is to spawn insights and understanding of the many dilemmas that military organizations face continuously, on and off the area of operations, consciously and subconsciously.