Kirche und Zivilgesellschaft – Reformatorische Impulse und Gestaltungsaufgabe der Kirchen in Europa

Church and Civil Society – Impulses of Reformed Theology and the Role of the Churches in Shaping Europe. This contribution seeks to answer the role religions and churches, especially the Reformed churches, could play in developing and consolidating civil society and democracy. This study will examine the role of the Church in the Central and Eastern European social and political contexts. Therefore, we will first make an overview of the specifics of this phenomenon in the context of the region's recent history. Then we will look for the normative and substantive meanings of the term for the present going beyond its contextual definition. Finally, we will take note of the impulses of Reformed theology that can contribute to the strengthening of civil society and democratic culture. Will we do this in the context of the particular approach of Reformed theology, in the theological context of the threefold offices (triplex munus) of Christ. The Church, which shares in the royal, priestly and prophetic offices of Christ, shall assume special responsibilities in the life of the society following the threefold ministry of his Lord. In social and diaconal service, the Church must offer new, innovative solutions that promote quality of life (royal office) by working for a culture of reconciliation and compassion. The Church can move from the interior life of piety into the social sphere (priestly office), and through self-criticism and sober social critique, it can advocate for those most disadvantaged by political, economic and social processes (prophetic office). This paper is an edited version of a presentation given at the 2018 German-Hungarian Reformed Theological Conference in Soest, Westphalia. The author attended this conference with an esteemed colleague Béla S. Visky, and now dedicates this paper to him with much appreciation and love on his 60th birthday. Keywords: civil society, contextuality of churches, reconciliation, advocacy, threefold offices of Christ

The Nature and Potential Applications of Contextual Definition in Philosophy of Law

The paper analyses the nature and potential applications of contextual definitions in modern philosophy of language and jurisprudence. It is shown that the distinction between a contextual definition and a genus–differentia definition proposed by some legal philosophers, where the latter is considered ineffective and unproductive in analyzing legal concepts, is sometimes deceptive. The weaknesses of the argument about this distinction are shown by examining the constitutional legal rules, which can be considered an example of the application of contextual definitions in legal science. On the basis of this claim, it is shown that these two types of definition may well coexist at least in legal language and in some sense complement each other when different areas of their applicability are taken into account.

The Problem of Definition of Legal Concepts with “Open Texture”

Introduction: The article discusses the problems associated with the definition of legal concepts which have the feature of “open texture”. The introduction presents the nature and meaning of “open texture”, which is understood as a special kind of indeterminacy. Such concepts are considered in the form in which they were postulated in the works of the Austrian linguistic philosopher Friedrich Waismann and the British legal philosopher Herbert Hart. Theoretical Basis. Methods. It is contested that, in Hart’s interpretation, “open texture” appears in legal concepts in borderline cases, when the meaning of the term of “concept” becomes indeterminate, unclear, uncertain, and we do not know whether or not it should be applied. Such cases should be distinguished from clear-cut cases where such doubt does not arise. The methodological basis of the study is Hart’s thesis stating that legal concepts have “core” and “penumbra” of meaning. The “core” meaning indicates a set of certain conditions, in which the use of the term “concept” is clear, while a “penumbra” meaning refers to conditions in which the its use becomes less clear. “Open texture” in this case, is an irreducible feature of legal concepts. Results. The main result of the study is the assertion that “open texture” as an irreducible feature of legal concepts, can be disproved by changing its definition. It is shown that the most appropriate kind of definition of open-textured legal concepts is the definition or contextual definition, widely used in analytical philosophy.

Unleashing the Latent Potential of Young People in Africa: The Example of Dalumuzi Happy Mhlanga and Salathiel Ntakirutimana

This paper tells the story of two young people, Dalumuzi Happy Mhlanga from Zimbabwe and Salathiel Ntakirutimana from Burundi, to show how they have defied the lack of structured opportunities to impact on the development of their home countries and to make a mark globally. The intention is to highlight the potential of young people and to show how this might be unleashed when they are allowed to innovate and flourish. The paper begins by providing a contextual definition of youth from global and African perspectives, followed by an insight into youth participation. Their stories are then told, based on my personal interaction with them during their two years at Waterford Kamhlaba, United World College of Southern Africa in Swaziland, their activities in school, university and in their home communities, their postings on social media and interviews. The discussion identifies Dalumuzi and Salathiel as social entrepreneurs and servant leaders with an enlightened vision of community development and the empowerment of young people. They demonstrate the interrelationship between youth empowerment and sustainable national development. The paper concludes with a message for African leaders and institutions around the world that it is essential to invest creatively in young people as they can be powerful catalysts for African development.

Infinitesimals, Magnitudes, and Definition in Frege

Frege offers a contextual definition of infinitesimal in Grundlagen and in his review of Hermann Cohen’s book on infinitesimal methods. A scholarly puzzle is that Frege explicitly rejects exactly that definition in Grundgesetze, without any explanation of the change in view. This paper aims to provide some historical context for Frege’s original definition and his change of mind, including other definitions of infinitesimal that were current and an area of mathematics (Algebraic invariant theory) familiar to Frege in which contextual definitions by equations were used. The paper also draws on Frege’s discussion of the Riemann integral in an unpublished fragment originally intended for Grundgesetze. The examination reveals some unnoticed connections between issues of mathematical method and Frege’s concern for sharp definition of objects, as well as some additional complexity to the already complex discussion of the definition of number in Grundlagen sections 60-68.

Herbert Hart’s Theory of Definition in the Context of Analytical Legal Philosophy

The article presents Herbert Hart’s theory of definition in the context of modern analytical legal philosophy. Dissatisfaction with the applicability of the traditional method of definition by the genus and differentia to the elucidation of legal concepts led Hart to the development a new method of definition. It is shown that Hart not only modifies the paraphrase of Jeremy Bentham, but also tries to adapt to the analysis of legal concepts the definition in use borrowed from analytical philosophers and logicians. It has been established that the key point of Hart’s method is that instead of defining a separate term, it is necessary to consider a statement, where the utterance plays a characteristic role, and is explained by specifying the conditions under which the entire statement is true. Some difficulties that arise when one uses this definition in the framework of the truth-conditional semantics are considered. In particular, it is shown that Hart uses open sentences of the form “X has a right” in its definition, which differ from closed sentences, primarily because they contain free variables with indefinite range of values. This uncertainty does not allow us to attribute to them the truth-value. The concepts of truth and falsity apply only to statements that are expressed by closed sentences. Thus, Hart’s claim of a special semantic nature of legal concepts and a special epistemological task of definitions in jurisprudence is reflected in his theory of the truth-conditional definition - a kind of contextual definition.

Contextual definitions and their applicability in the language of law

Contextual definitions within the framework of modern logics and philosophy of science are widely used and explained. Moreover, they have acquired an independent epistemological meaning, along with other types of definitions. However, in the humanities, their applicability has been questioned and challenged many times. The author, on the contrary, substantiates the premise that the effectiveness of contextual definitions, in particular in the legal language, is not lower, and sometimes even much higher than the effectiveness of generic definitions. In a contemporary, especially western legal science, Bentham’s and Harts’s points of view that the contextual definition is opposed to the genetic definition continues to dominate, and the latter in relation to the analysis of legal concepts is recognized as ineffective and unproductive. The author is of the opinion that these two types of definitions may well coexist and in some sense complement each other, taking into account different areas of their applicability. The main and most characteristic area of application of contextual definitions, according to the author, are the constitutional rules of law. Constitutional rules of law in this approach are considered as contextual definitions of the basic concepts by which other rules of law in the legal system are formulated. Contextual definitions are very useful when we need to clarify the very general concepts and terms that can be found, for example, in the text of the Constitution. As a result, the defined terms become semantically meaningful, and their use in the legal language becomes syntactically consistent.

Learning to look critically: teaching and learning visual literacy in art and design librarianship

Teaching and learning visual literacy within art and design librarianship presents several unique challenges. Librarians are better equipped than ever to meet these challenges with the help of ACRL Visual Literacy Competency Standards and the ACRL Framework for Information Literacy in Higher Education, which provides an exciting opportunity to situate visual literacy within the contextual definition of information literacy for art and design students. In mapping these two documents together the author found several ways to address the more critical components of information and visual literacy in more nuanced and meaningful ways. While art librarians have often addressed visual literacy needs to varying degrees and in creative and practical ways, a more systematic approach is needed as we move forward.