Informal Inferential Reasoning and the Social: Understanding Students’ Informal Inferences Through an Inferentialist Epistemology

Author(s):  
Maike Schindler ◽  
Abdel Seidouvy
2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea M. F. Reiter ◽  
Philipp Kanske ◽  
Ben Eppinger ◽  
Shu-Chen Li

Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 65-75
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

When and how do theory-of-mind understandings begin? This chapter assesses infants’ social understanding. Babies are not the mindless beings scientists and philosophers once thought them. Even in the first year of infancy, they have remarkable knowledge about their social worlds. This is not something babies gain innately. Instead, among their innate abilities is an extraordinary predisposition to learn, especially about their social worlds. Before age two, the end of infancy, children have a foundation for all the social development that is to come, setting the stage for the massive growth in social understanding seen in preschoolers. Like their preschool siblings, infants learn by careful observation and by putting pieces together.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate Silver ◽  
Sarah Parsons

Purpose – There is a substantial lack of research focusing on how to support the social understanding of high-functioning adults with autism (HFA). The perspectives of three adults with HFA were used to develop and implement self-prompt systems to increase knowledge and awareness of social situations. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – Semi-structured interviews and diaries were used to support individuals to reflect on video-based and real-life social situations, within a qualitative participatory case study design. Qualitative data were analyzed thematically. Findings – Participants developed and used a self-prompt system to support their social understanding in a range of situations. “Noticing the unusual” in social situations, consideration of the potential impact of others’ behavior on them personally, and guessing the intention of others were identified as useful strategies. Basing social judgments on the facial expressions of others was not useful. Research limitations/implications – This was a small-scale study with only three high-functioning participants and so the research needs to be extended to a wider group. Practical implications – There is considerable potential for this approach to be used with adults accessing support services because the strategies identified can be easily applied and personalized. Social implications – Independent, unplanned use of the self-prompt strategy enabled participants to reduce dependence on others in social situations through supporting their independent thinking and actions. Originality/value – This study moves away from a deficit-focussed model of intervention to one that seeks to uncover strengths in order to empower individuals to use their existing knowledge.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Dear

ArgumentTalk of “reason” and “rationality” has been perennial in the philosophy and sciences of the European, Latin tradition since antiquity. But the use of these terms in the early-modern period has left especial marks on the specialties and disciplines that emerged as components of “science” in the modern world. By examining discussions by seventeenth-century philosophers, including natural philosophers such as Descartes, Pascal, and Hobbes, the practical meanings of, specifically, inferential reasoning can be seen as reducing, for most, to intellectual processes deriving from foundations that required intuitional insight that was owing to God. Mechanical reasoning, or artificial intelligence, was a contradiction in terms for such as Pascal, whose views of his own arithmetical machine illustrate the issue well. Hobbes’ analysis of reason, however, replaced the ineffable authority of God with the authority of the civil power, to reveal the social reality of “reason” as nothing other than authorized judgment.


2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 434-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Søren Overgaard ◽  
Joel Krueger

AbstractWe resist Schilbach et al.'s characterization of the “social perception” approach to social cognition as a “spectator theory” of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the crucial role interaction plays in enabling social understanding. We also highlight a dilemma Schilbach et al. face in attempting to distinguish their second-person approach from the social perception view.


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