Challenging theory-theory accounts of social understanding: Where is the social constructivist advantage?

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek E. Montgomery
Author(s):  
Albert Newen

Humans are hyper-social beings, highly dependent on others and on successfully interacting with them. Which theory can adequately describe our ability to understand others? In the literature we have an intense debate among proponents of theory-theory, simulation theory, and interaction theory. I argue first that none of these accounts is adequate but that we need to go in the direction of what I call the “person model theory.” The second important question is which types of embodiment (or further aspects of 4E) are systematically relevant for social understanding according to the person model theory? I argue that there are clear cases of embodiment of social understanding, while extendedness and/or enactment seem to be only clearly implemented in early infancy. Furthermore, 4E features of being embodied, enacted, extended, or embedded can only be ascribed to an implementation, a token of a specific type which makes the 4E features intensely context-dependent.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea M. F. Reiter ◽  
Philipp Kanske ◽  
Ben Eppinger ◽  
Shu-Chen Li

Author(s):  
Elsinora Mahananingtyas

Learners at elementary school age generally have a concept that is rich, but not systematically, not organized and spontaneous. With a skilled supervisor dialogue together, then learners can develop the concepts that are more systematic, logical, and rational. A social constructivist approach stresses the social context in learning that knowledge is constructed and built together with the teacher or friend of the more skilled colleagues. The purpose of this research is to improve or enhance quality (quality) were learning in class by applying the social constructivist approach at grade IV in the primary Christian Advent of Ambon. The method of this research is a type of class action Research with 4 stages, namely planning, implementation, observation and reflection. The results of this research that is happening gradual classical on the learners of the cycle I meeting 1 to 2 meetings amounted to 6.6% of the cycle I of the meeting 1 of 59% to 65.6% in meeting 2. While the ketuntasan of classical learners on cycle II increased to 6.8% in cycle II meeting 1 of 77.2% to 84%. Cycle II whole learners, prepared with a value above the KKM i.e. 15 learners or 100% complete


Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 65-75
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

When and how do theory-of-mind understandings begin? This chapter assesses infants’ social understanding. Babies are not the mindless beings scientists and philosophers once thought them. Even in the first year of infancy, they have remarkable knowledge about their social worlds. This is not something babies gain innately. Instead, among their innate abilities is an extraordinary predisposition to learn, especially about their social worlds. Before age two, the end of infancy, children have a foundation for all the social development that is to come, setting the stage for the massive growth in social understanding seen in preschoolers. Like their preschool siblings, infants learn by careful observation and by putting pieces together.


Hypatia ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-606
Author(s):  
Natalie Helberg

AbstractIn this article, I explore the relationship between performativity, as it appears in Judith Butler's work, and plasticity, as it appears in the work of Catherine Malabou. I argue that these concepts are isomorphic. Butler and Malabou both hold that resistance to contemporary forms of power, or “insubordination,” is contingent on a subject's ability to become other than what it is; Butler articulates this ability in terms of performativity, and Malabou articulates it in terms of plasticity. I reveal the social-constructivist dimension of Malabou's work while also making apparent the extent to which Butler's work, contrary to her own way of conceptualizing it, and hence surprisingly and uneasily, presupposes a biologically basic capacity for change. Plasticity is this biologically basic capacity. Both thinkers affirm the idea that insubordinate forms of transformation can be impeded by the discourse that conditions what a subject can think. I suggest that this is an insight that must be heeded, even as I seek to affirm a form of plasticity beyond discourse.


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