Peirce’s Existential Graphs as a Contribution to Transcendental Logic

Author(s):  
Mohammad Shafiei
2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-146
Author(s):  
Giuliana Mancuso

This paper discusses Max Scheler’s early works, written between 1899 and 1906 in a neo-Kantian context. The very little attention the literature paid to them was almost always guided by the only aim to single the themes out which can be used as signs of Scheler’s future „conversion“ to phenomenology. In consequence of this predominant approach, the neo- Kantianism that characterizes Scheler’s early works has been treated as a vague notion and never examined as such. The paper specifies this notion through an examination of Scheler’s early works which shows their most significant theoretical debts (to R. Eucken, W. Windelband and particularly to H. Cohen) and the questions they deal with, i.e. the relation between knowledge and morality as different kinds of objective forms of experience; the methodological problem in philosophy; the development of a transcendental logic as general science of objectivity.


Author(s):  
Huaping Lu-Adler

This book is both a history of philosophy of logic told from the Kantian viewpoint and a reconstruction of Kant’s theory of logic from a historical perspective. Kant’s theory represents a turning point in a history of philosophical debates over the following questions: (1) Is logic a science, instrument, standard of assessment, or mixture of these? (2) If logic is a science, what is the subject matter that differentiates it from other sciences, particularly metaphysics? (3) If logic is a necessary instrument to all philosophical inquiries, how is it so entitled? (4) If logic is both a science and an instrument, how are these two roles related? Kant’s answer to these questions centers on three distinctions: general versus particular logic, pure versus applied logic, pure general logic versus transcendental logic. The true meaning and significance of each distinction becomes clear, this book argues, only if we consider two factors. First, Kant was mindful of various historical views on how logic relates to other branches of philosophy (viz. metaphysics and physics) and to the workings of common human understanding. Second, he first coined “transcendental logic” while struggling to secure metaphysics as a proper “science,” and this conceptual innovation would in turn have profound implications for his mature theory of logic. Against this backdrop, the book reassesses the place of Kant’s theory in the history of philosophy of logic and highlights certain issues that are still debated today, such as normativity of logic and the challenges posed by logical pluralism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-514
Author(s):  
Ľudmila Lacková ◽  
Lukáš Zámečník

AbstractWe aim to demonstrate the applicability of Peirce’s iconic logic in the context of current topological explanations in the philosophy of science. We hold that the logical system of Existential Graphs is similar to contemporary topological approaches, thereby recognizing Peirce’s iconic logic (Beta Graphs) as a valid method of scientific representation. We base our thesis on the nexus between iconic logic and the so-called NonReduction Theorem. We illustrate our assumptions with examples derived from biology (protein folding).


2012 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 417-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clinton Tolley
Keyword(s):  

1992 ◽  
Vol 23 (6-9) ◽  
pp. 639-663 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don D. Roberts
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-50
Author(s):  
Rudolf Meer

Both the categories and principles of understanding as well as the ideas and principles of reason build transcendental elements to conceive transcendental philosophy as a philosophical system. Accordingly, in addition to the “Transcendental Analytic”, Kant develops in the “Transcendental Dialectic” an expanded concept of the transcendental. The transcendental ideas do not denote object-constitutive principles but, in a weaker sense, conditions of the possibility of experience. The relation between Division One and Division Two of the “Doctrine of Elements” can be demonstrated exemplarily with regard to Kant’s references to astronomy. Based on the constitutive principles of understanding, which are directed towards the field of possible experience and provide a connection of cognition through reasons and consequences, as well as the regulative principles of reason, which form maxims of research, astronomy is a proper and rational natural science. The analysis of the case studies of astronomy shows that Kant uses the term transcendental within the framework of the “Transcendental Logic” of the Critique of Pure Reason to denote conditions that are constitutive for the possibility of an object in general and for describing necessary regulative conditions of experience. With these reflections, Kant places his transcendental philosophy in a long tradition of philosophical thought in which the celestial bodies are the preferred subject.


2014 ◽  
pp. 439-472
Author(s):  
John F. Sowa

Existential graphs (EGs) are a simple, readable, and expressive graphic notation for logic. Conceptual graphs (CGs) combine a logical foundation based on EGs with features of the semantic networks used in artificial intelligence and computational linguistics. CG design principles address logical, linguistic, and cognitive requirements: a formal semantics defined by the ISO standard for Common Logic; the flexibility to support the expressiveness, context dependencies, and metalevel commentary of natural language; and cognitively realistic operations for reasoning by induction, deduction, abduction, and analogy. To accommodate the vagueness and ambiguities of natural language, informal heuristics can supplement the formal semantics. With sufficient background knowledge and a clarifying dialog, informal graphs can be refined to any degree of precision. Peirce claimed that the rules for reasoning with EGs generate “a moving picture of the action of the mind in thought.” Some philosophers and psychologists agree: Peirce's diagrams and rules are a good candidate for a natural logic that reflects the neural processes that support thought and language. They are psychologically realistic and computationally efficient.


2010 ◽  
Vol 31 (01) ◽  
pp. 107-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rocío Zambrana

The Science of Logic is perhaps Hegel's most notoriously impenetrable work. Despite well over a century of commentaries as well as the recent proliferation of scholarship, there exists little agreement concerning the text, whether with regard to particular details or the project of speculative logic in general. Nonetheless, the Logic has often been regarded as exemplifying totalizing metaphysics at its worst. Contemporary philosophers concerned with overcoming metaphysics have thus sought to show not only the incoherence of speculative logic but also the perils of Hegel's supposedly totalizing philosophy. In contrast, showing the continuity between Kant and Hegel has been the strategy for establishing a ‘non-metaphysical’ view of Hegel's speculative logic. Against readings of Hegel as a metaphysical monist who defends the reality of the Absolute Idea developing in nature and spirit, speculative logic is presented as the absolute-idealist successor to Kantian transcendental logic. Hegel's speculative logic is an ‘idealist logic’, since it aims at expounding the conditions necessary for the determinacy of any possible object of thought. Speculative logic thus clarities that experience is dependent on non-empirical concepts and, ultimately, on selfconsciousness. Along this interpretative line, Hegel's Science of Logic offers an account of thinking as a norm-based activity, and of concepts as rules for fixing determinacy. The great insight of Hegel's Logic is, on this view, twofold. First, Hegel's notion of the concept [der Begriff] is understood as a holistic-inferential system of logical concepts, since it provides an account of conceptual content as determined by every other possible content. Second, Hegel's analysis of the actualization of the concept — of the concept that has ‘made itself the foundation’, in Hegel's obscure phrasing — provides an account of the fundamental role of authority involved in the process of fixing determinacy. To be bound to a rule is to acknowledge it as having authority over us and at the same time to institute it as authoritative over the states of affairs that we seek to determine. That Hegel spoke of the freedom of the concept is, therefore, crucial. It suggests that determinacy is ultimately a matter of the authorization of reason, of establishing one way of fixing intelligibility over against others.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document