The Consumer Revolution, 1650–1800

The production, acquisition, and use of consumer goods defines our daily lives, and yet consumerism is seen as increasingly controversial. Movements for sustainable and ethical consumerism are gaining momentum alongside an awareness of how our choices in the marketplace can affect public issues. How did we get here? This volume advances a bold new interpretation of the 'consumer revolution' of the eighteenth century, when European elites, middling classes, and even certain labourers purchased unprecedented quantities of clothing, household goods, and colonial products. Michael Kwass adopts a global perspective that incorporates the expansion of European empires, the development of world trade, and the rise of plantation slavery in the Americas. Kwass analyses the emergence of Enlightenment material cultures, contentious philosophical debates on the morality of consumption, and new forms of consumer activism to offer a fresh interpretation of the politics of consumption in the age of abolitionism and the Atlantic Revolutions.

Does the metaphysical dog wag its formal tail? The free energy principle and philosophical debates about life, mind, and matter.

According to Bruineberg and colleagues, philosophical arguments on life, mind, and matter that are based on the free energy principle (FEP) (i) essentially draw on the Markov blanket construct and (ii) tend to assume that strong metaphysical claims can be justified on the basis of metaphysically innocuous formal assumptions provided by FEP. I argue against both (i) and (ii).

Olódumare and Esu in Yorubá Religious Thought

Theological and philosophical debates on deities do not end easily; rather they open new vistas of understanding and further argumentation. In a previous work, I argued that there are two pairs of Olódumare and Es̩u in contemporary Yorubá religious thought and praxis. This conclusion was to navigate the extreme position that Olódumare and the Christian God have nothing in common. Although Segun Ogungbemi recently maintained the strict theological and moral differences between Olódumare and God using existential lens, he has not addressed the practical reality instantiated by the contemporary Yorubá diverse worshipers. Danoye Ogúntó̩lá-Láguda’s position on Olódumare and Es̩u is also slightly different from Ogúngbemí’s, although the former maintains a more practical posture. From their arguments I propose, in addition to my earlier two-pair argument that contemporary Yorubá may have four pairs of Olódumare and Esu: the first pair is autochtho ̩ - nous to the Yorubá, the second is Christian, the third Islamic, and the fourth, philosophical.

Privacy and the Communitarian Self

<p>Contemporary philosophical debates about privacy turn on important questions regarding selfhood. Minimally, someone who endorses the possibility of informational privacy is committed to the idea that there are ‘selves’ or ‘persons,’ and that it is possible to decide what information relates to them and how. I argue that most popular accounts of privacy rely on a liberal conception of the self. In the Kantian tradition, persons are characterised as ‘transcendental subjects,’ always partly prior to, and unencumbered by, their particular circumstances. Communitarians argue, however, that the liberal notion of the self offers only a partial account of personhood. It is not possible to reason as a transcendental subject because, in various ways, our sense of self is defined by circumstance. Our connections to various communities – such as a family, religion, or state – as well as the shared representations and meanings we rely on to gain self-knowledge, are indispensable parts of what it is be a person. Drawing on the work of Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Alisdair MacIntyre, I argue that to properly account for our want of privacy and its moral significance, we must look to the complex relationships between a person, their personal information, and the communities they inhabit.</p>

Privacy and the Communitarian Self

<p>Contemporary philosophical debates about privacy turn on important questions regarding selfhood. Minimally, someone who endorses the possibility of informational privacy is committed to the idea that there are ‘selves’ or ‘persons,’ and that it is possible to decide what information relates to them and how. I argue that most popular accounts of privacy rely on a liberal conception of the self. In the Kantian tradition, persons are characterised as ‘transcendental subjects,’ always partly prior to, and unencumbered by, their particular circumstances. Communitarians argue, however, that the liberal notion of the self offers only a partial account of personhood. It is not possible to reason as a transcendental subject because, in various ways, our sense of self is defined by circumstance. Our connections to various communities – such as a family, religion, or state – as well as the shared representations and meanings we rely on to gain self-knowledge, are indispensable parts of what it is be a person. Drawing on the work of Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Alisdair MacIntyre, I argue that to properly account for our want of privacy and its moral significance, we must look to the complex relationships between a person, their personal information, and the communities they inhabit.</p>

The Phenomenology of Elegance: an Outline

Elegance ranks low on the list of debated topics in philosophy, mainly because of the fleeting and mundane character of phenomena that it relies on for its existence. However, the rise of kinaesthesia as an important topic in today’s philosophical and phenomenological environment facilitates the inclusion of elegance in the canon of philosophical debates. This article reviews two important positions regarding elegance, that of Renaissance philosopher Baldassare Castiglione and of 20th Century realist phenomenologist Dietrich von Hildebrand. First, we underline three aspects of Castiglione’s concept of sprezzatura and showcase the significance and purpose of practicing elegance. This step is succeeded by a close look at von Hildebrand’s attachment to a realist phenomenological frame for understanding why he denies elegance the status of an ideal value. Last, we look at the connection between elegance and three ideas from a hybrid phenomenology from Husserl and Sheets-Johnstone. These connections form the basis for filling the significant gap between Castiglione’s Renaissance take on elegance and von Hildebrand’s realist perspective with a new phenomenological project regarding elegance. Keywords: Castiglione, von Hildebrand, Sheets-Johnstone, intentionality, kinaesthesia, axiology

Structuralismul în revistele de filozofie din România comunistă: respingere și acomodare (1954-1967)

This article presents the reception of structuralism in linguistics, psychology, social sciences, anthropology, and literature as viewed from the perspective of the most important philosophical journals in Romanian communism, Cercetări filozofice [Philosophical Research] and Revista de filozofie [The Philosophy Magazine] during the period between 1953 and 1967. Following François Dosse’s delineation between two phases of the development of structuralism (before and after 1967), Baghiu argues that in Romania – and possibly in Eastern Europe – structuralism was only taken serious as a methodology after the debate on Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault during 1967. Before that, every structuralist figure was criticized as bourgeois and idealistic. While Barthes becomes one of the most important references of French structuralism, Foucault becomes a sort of a public enemy in 1967, after his Les mots et les choses, which is viewed in socialist countries as anti-humanistic thought and thus rejected. This allows Baghiu to describe 1967 as a benchmark in which both structuralism and poststructuralism gain preeminence in philosophical debates in Romania, yet in different manners.

Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Specification

Philosophical debates over statistical evidence have long been framed and dominated by L. Jonathan Cohen's Paradox of the Gatecrasher and a related hypothetical example commonly called Prison Yard. These examples, however, raise an issue not discussed in the large and growing literature on statistical evidence – the question of what statistical evidence is supposed to be evidence of. In actual practice, the legal system does not start with a defendant and then attempt to determine if that defendant has committed some unspecified or under-specified act, as these examples appear to suppose. Rather, both criminal and civil litigation start with a sufficiently specified act and then attempt to determine if the defendant has committed it. And when we start with a more fully specified act, the statistics look very different, and these prominent examples no longer present the paradox they are claimed to support. Examining the issue of specification, however, does more than simply undercut the prominent examples in a long and extensive literature. The examination also raises normative issues challenging the legal system's traditional reluctance to base liability on the conjunction of probabilities.

Hedonism and Happiness in Theory and Practice

<p>In this thesis, I investigate several different questions about happiness and hedonism in theory and practice and offer several arguments and theories. In addition to making progress in these happiness-related areas of inquiry, this thesis aims to demonstrate the complexity and variety of happiness-related problems and the broad range of real-world problems that considerations of happiness can help to resolve. Furthermore, nearly every chapter of this thesis demonstrates how interdisciplinary analyses can bring new movement to problems that have become insulated within one academic discipline. This thesis is divided into two main parts. Chapters 1 through 5 constitute Part 1, and Chapters 6 through 8 constitute Part 2. Part 1 of this thesis is focused on theory and questions about what we should believe. In particular, Part 1 is concerned with Prudential Hedonism, a theory of what is good for a person, which claims (roughly) that a preponderance of pleasure over pain (sometimes referred to as happiness) is what is ultimately good for people. After providing a broad overview of hedonism, and especially Prudential Hedonism, in Chapter 1, the remainder of Part 1 focuses on one main question from philosophical debates about well-being: does the experience machine thought experiment give us good reason to believe that internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism are all false? The main conclusion that I argue for in Part 1 is that no, the experience machine thought experiment does not gives us good reason to believe that internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism are all false. Part 2 of this thesis is focused on practice, and particularly on how considerations of happiness can inform certain practices and help us to understand what we should do in certain circumstances. Unlike Part 1, which has a smooth narrative flow from chapter to chapter, Part 2 contains three relatively unrelated chapters, each of which investigates a different question without relying on the conclusions of any previous chapters. Chapter 6 argues that an optimistic view about scientific and technological progress allows for two interesting new theories for the meaning of life debate, and discusses what people with certain kinds of belief might want to do to achieve true meaning in life. One of these theories posits that causing there to be infinite happiness can be a way to achieve a truly meaningful life. Chapter 7 demonstrates how considerations of human happiness can justify why a particular set of distributive principles are the fairest way to apportion the burdens associated with adapting to, and mitigating, the potentially devastating effects of rapid climactic change. Based on these considerations, Chapter 7 includes fairly specific policy recommendations about what governments should do about climate change. This thesis also includes a Postscript for Policymakers. Compared to Chapters 2 to 7, the Postscript for Policymakers takes a much higher-level approach; it seeks to provide general answers to two very broad questions. Given its broader scope and different intended audience, the Postscript for Policymakers does not include in-depth discussion of all likely objections. The two questions addressed in the Postscript for Policymakers are: should policymakers use findings from the science of happiness to guide their policy decisions, and how can they best do this? The Postscript for Policymakers concludes that findings from the science of happiness should be used to guide policymaking (with several qualifications), and it provides recommendations for how best to do this.</p>

Hedonism and Happiness in Theory and Practice

<p>In this thesis, I investigate several different questions about happiness and hedonism in theory and practice and offer several arguments and theories. In addition to making progress in these happiness-related areas of inquiry, this thesis aims to demonstrate the complexity and variety of happiness-related problems and the broad range of real-world problems that considerations of happiness can help to resolve. Furthermore, nearly every chapter of this thesis demonstrates how interdisciplinary analyses can bring new movement to problems that have become insulated within one academic discipline. This thesis is divided into two main parts. Chapters 1 through 5 constitute Part 1, and Chapters 6 through 8 constitute Part 2. Part 1 of this thesis is focused on theory and questions about what we should believe. In particular, Part 1 is concerned with Prudential Hedonism, a theory of what is good for a person, which claims (roughly) that a preponderance of pleasure over pain (sometimes referred to as happiness) is what is ultimately good for people. After providing a broad overview of hedonism, and especially Prudential Hedonism, in Chapter 1, the remainder of Part 1 focuses on one main question from philosophical debates about well-being: does the experience machine thought experiment give us good reason to believe that internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism are all false? The main conclusion that I argue for in Part 1 is that no, the experience machine thought experiment does not gives us good reason to believe that internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism are all false. Part 2 of this thesis is focused on practice, and particularly on how considerations of happiness can inform certain practices and help us to understand what we should do in certain circumstances. Unlike Part 1, which has a smooth narrative flow from chapter to chapter, Part 2 contains three relatively unrelated chapters, each of which investigates a different question without relying on the conclusions of any previous chapters. Chapter 6 argues that an optimistic view about scientific and technological progress allows for two interesting new theories for the meaning of life debate, and discusses what people with certain kinds of belief might want to do to achieve true meaning in life. One of these theories posits that causing there to be infinite happiness can be a way to achieve a truly meaningful life. Chapter 7 demonstrates how considerations of human happiness can justify why a particular set of distributive principles are the fairest way to apportion the burdens associated with adapting to, and mitigating, the potentially devastating effects of rapid climactic change. Based on these considerations, Chapter 7 includes fairly specific policy recommendations about what governments should do about climate change. This thesis also includes a Postscript for Policymakers. Compared to Chapters 2 to 7, the Postscript for Policymakers takes a much higher-level approach; it seeks to provide general answers to two very broad questions. Given its broader scope and different intended audience, the Postscript for Policymakers does not include in-depth discussion of all likely objections. The two questions addressed in the Postscript for Policymakers are: should policymakers use findings from the science of happiness to guide their policy decisions, and how can they best do this? The Postscript for Policymakers concludes that findings from the science of happiness should be used to guide policymaking (with several qualifications), and it provides recommendations for how best to do this.</p>