Students’ scientific representation enhancement through “ECRA” techniques in formative examination design

The recent studies in science learning has a specific interest with 4C’s which are communication, collaboration, critical thinking and creativity. This study explored the students’ 4C’s as they engage with physics concepts relating to alternating currents. This engagement entails students’ interpretation for descriptive questions. Following action research cycle, the study begin with planning the intervention using “ECRA” technique and conducted the activities with 38 Matriculation College students. The analysis attempt to make a connection between students’ ability to construct representational aspects of scientific description with formative achievement. This study systematically describes students’ understanding on the representations signify in the descriptive questions. Data collected from this study were Work Report, review of answers tutor questions, and interviews during observation stage. The finding suggests that, the ECRA technique is enabling students to obtain higher percentage in formative assessment by allowing them to developed richer conceptual understanding. Hence this study suggest that the representational issues in physics questions constructed in essay can be moderated with ECRA technique.

THE GOLDEN HORDE IN THE HISTORICAL MEMORY OF THE KAZAKHS

The historical memory of the Kazakhs, recorded in the historical legends, does not correlate with the modern representation of the medieval history of the Kazakhs. If the traditional historical memory is dominated by the notions of direct continuity between the Kazakhs and the Golden Horde, the scientific representation denies it. As a result of the predominance of such views in historical science, a myth about the absence of historical connection of the Kazakhs with a significant part of their modern ethnic territory is enshrined in the mass consciousness.

Scientific Representation, Causality and Induction in L. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the Wittgenstein Tractatus deals with themes related to the laws of nature, as well as with the metatheoretical principles of science. More specifically, our intention is to expose the notions of scientific representation linked to principles such as those of causality and induction. As a starting point, we propose that the notion of non-precedence of one scientific theory over another is of Hertzian inspiration, which argues that “one image may be more suitable for one purpose, another for another” (HERTZ, 1956, p. 3). As an unfolding of this notion, the systems of geometric representation of Hertz and Boltzmann will serve the Tractatus in order to demonstrate that laws, like the law of causality, as form and not content, only represent the network (any method) that, after all, is optional. On the other hand, metatheoretical principles such as induction have no logical basis and their effect, in the wake of what Hume thought, is only psychological. Like the other themes of the Tractatus, its Philosophy of Science cannot be understood outside a broader context, which is the proper context to the criticism of language. Therefore, what is presented here intends not to be divorced from the relationship between logic, language and science, since, in our view, these are the three pillars of support of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

Taking a Position

This chapter is stimulated by the author’s collaboration with the renowned choreographer Sharon Watson and dancers from the Northern School of Contemporary Dance to produce a contemporary dance work exploring the feelings of people who had voted for and against Brexit in the UK referendum of 2016. Suggesting that through attention to corporeal experience we might find ways of encapsulating prevalent political moods, it considers the ways in which political affect can exceed the capacities of typical scientific representation. Focusing on what it means to take a position, the chapter argues that dance has the potential to provide ways of attending to deep, prereflective, affective moods underlying and surrounding political situations. The chapter reflects upon the work of translation through which a choreographic devising process was informed by qualitative data. The idea of affective framing is outlined as a new way of thinking about such translatory work. Four arguments for further imaginative collaboration between artists and social scientists are offered, with a view to developing modes of political attention that capture the dynamics of politics as a felt experience.

Considerações sobre a impossibilidade de definir o homem a partir de Descartes

Procuramos, neste texto, pensar o significado da rejeição da tradicional definição de homem efetuada por Descartes, quando tenta entender o que somos. Essa rejeição é resultado de um novo método de filosofar, que poderíamos designar como via das ideias – aquela que parte das forças do próprio espírito para examinar tudo o que ocorre nele e em qualquer outra coisa, evitando usar de pressuposições. A fim de marcar essa diferença de perspectiva e a reiterada disposição do filósofo francês em elaborá-la, apontamos a limitação da noção de conceito – seja aquela da tradição aristotélica-escolástica, seja a pós-cartesiana, fortemente marcada pela representação científica – para dar conta da problemática do fenômeno humano. Nesse sentido, insistimos na riqueza e amplitude da noção de ideia – elaborada e reelaborada ao longo dos anos pelo filósofo – para enfrentar esse complexo fenômeno. Uma vez que o homem não é uma substância, a manifestação dos seus aspectos é sempre adjetiva, podendo qualificá-lo sem, contudo, propiciar a sua compreensão. Essa dificuldade de apreensão exige, portanto, que o estudo da ideia de homem explore até o limite a própria racionalidade humana Palavras-chave: Descartes. homem. ideia. conceito. definição. Considerations on the impossibility of defining man based on Descartes Abstract: The aim of this text is to reflect on the meaning of the rejection of the traditional definition of man performed by Descartes when he attempts to understand what we are. This rejection is the result of a new method of philosophizing, which we may designate as the way of ideas—that which emerges from the forces of one’s own spirit to examine all that occurs within it and in any other thing, avoiding the use of presuppositions. To highlight this difference of perspective and the reiterated willingness of this French philosopher in elaborating it, we indicate the limitation of the notion of concept—whether that of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition or the post-Cartesian tradition, strongly characterized by scientific representation—to deal with the problematic of the phenomenon of the human. In this respect, we stress the richness and amplitude of the notion of idea, elaborated and re-elaborated over years by this philosopher, to address this complex phenomenon. Since man is not a substance, the manifestation of his aspects is always adjectival, allowing qualification without, however, providing comprehension. This difficulty of perception therefore requires that the study of the idea of man explore human rationality itself to the greatest extent. Keywords: Descartes, man, idea, concept, definition Considérations sur l'impossibilité de définir l'homme à partir de Descartes Resumé: On se propose, dans ce texte, de réfléchir sur le sens du rejet de la définition traditionnelle de l'homme faite par Descartes, lorsqu'il tente de comprendre ce que nous sommes. Ce rejet est le résultat d'une nouvelle méthode de philosopher, que nous pourrions désigner comme la voie des idées - celle qui part des forces de l'esprit lui-même pour examiner tout ce qui se passe en lui et en toute autre chose, en évitant d'utiliser des présupposés. Pour marquer cette différence de perspective et la disposition réitérée du philosophe français dans son élaboration, nous soulignons la limitation de la notion de concept - soit celle de la tradition aristotélicienne-scolastique, soit celle post-cartésienne, fortement marquée par la représentation scientifique - pour rendre compte de la problématique du phénomène humain. En ce sens, nous insistons sur la richesse et l'amplitude de la notion d'idée - élaborée et retravaillée au fil des années par Descartes - pour faire face à ce phénomène complexe. Une fois l'homme n'est plus une substance, la manifestation de ses aspects reste toujours adjective, pouvant le qualifier sans toutefois favoriser sa compréhension. Cette difficulté d'appréhension exige donc que l'étude de l'idée de l'homme explore jusqu'à la limite la rationalité humaine elle-même. Mots-clés: Descartes, homme, idée, concept, définition. Data de registro: 17/11/2020 Data de aceite: 30/12/2020

The Downfall of the Diorama

Over the course of the twentieth century, millions of American children conducted their first science experiments by participating in science fairs. In tracing the development of a new visual medium of the 20th century – the science fair display – this paper captures the unruliness of scientific representation from a child’s eye view. The essay traces this phenomenon against the backdrop of broader debates regarding the role scientifically inclined youth would play in shaping the nation’s future. Science fairs also raise important philosophical questions regarding the epistemology of children’s experimentation. Over the course of fifty years, three-dimensional dioramas of the Progressive era were supplanted by postwar argument-driven text panels, capturing a distinct rupture in scientific representation. The essay argues that science fair displays provide an entry point for understanding how adolescents conceived of science on visual, material, social, and epistemological terms.

Images

Natural languages, numerals, formal languages, maps, diagrams, graphs, and pictures are all representations. Traditionally, philosophical discussion has divided these representations into two groups: imagistic and linguistic. Just as there are many natural and formal languages that fit on the linguistic side of this divide, there are many kinds of images. In what follows, then, “image” is meant to refer to the broad class of nonlinguistic representations that all seem to have much in common. There might be representations that are neither imagistic nor linguistic, and many representations are hybrids that partake of more than one kind. Focusing on images is not the same thing as focusing on pictures. (See the separate Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy entry on “Depiction.”) Pictures are images, but so are maps, graphs, radar images, and the like. So an account of pictures can be consistent with many accounts of images, just as an account of images can be consistent with more than one theory of pictures. There are very few accounts of images in this general sense, so the following does not include a section devoted to that topic. Instead, this entry traces the evolving interest in images and looks at the most prominent topics that have occupied philosophers over the last half century or so. One topic not covered here is the use of images in science. For that topic, see the separate Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy entry on “Scientific Representation.”