Logical Principles of a Topological Explanation

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-514
Author(s):  
Ľudmila Lacková ◽  
Lukáš Zámečník
Keyword(s):  
Protein Folding ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Representation ◽  
Logical System ◽  
Valid Method ◽  
Topological Explanation ◽  
Existential Graphs

AbstractWe aim to demonstrate the applicability of Peirce’s iconic logic in the context of current topological explanations in the philosophy of science. We hold that the logical system of Existential Graphs is similar to contemporary topological approaches, thereby recognizing Peirce’s iconic logic (Beta Graphs) as a valid method of scientific representation. We base our thesis on the nexus between iconic logic and the so-called NonReduction Theorem. We illustrate our assumptions with examples derived from biology (protein folding).

scholarly journals Scientific Representation, Causality and Induction in L. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Eduardo Simões
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Representation ◽  
Geometric Representation ◽  
Logical Basis ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Proper Context

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the Wittgenstein Tractatus deals with themes related to the laws of nature, as well as with the metatheoretical principles of science. More specifically, our intention is to expose the notions of scientific representation linked to principles such as those of causality and induction. As a starting point, we propose that the notion of non-precedence of one scientific theory over another is of Hertzian inspiration, which argues that “one image may be more suitable for one purpose, another for another” (HERTZ, 1956, p. 3). As an unfolding of this notion, the systems of geometric representation of Hertz and Boltzmann will serve the Tractatus in order to demonstrate that laws, like the law of causality, as form and not content, only represent the network (any method) that, after all, is optional. On the other hand, metatheoretical principles such as induction have no logical basis and their effect, in the wake of what Hume thought, is only psychological. Like the other themes of the Tractatus, its Philosophy of Science cannot be understood outside a broader context, which is the proper context to the criticism of language. Therefore, what is presented here intends not to be divorced from the relationship between logic, language and science, since, in our view, these are the three pillars of support of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

scholarly journals Is Science Really What Naturalism Says it is?

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Federico Laudisa
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Representation ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Scientific Naturalism ◽  
The World

Abstract In spite of the relevance of a scientific representation of the world for naturalism, it is surprising that philosophy of science is less involved in the debate on naturalism than expected. Had the viewpoint of philosophy of science been duly considered, naturalism could not have overlooked the established lesson, according to which there is no well-defined recipe for what science must or must not be. In the present paper I address some implications of this lesson for (some forms of) naturalism, arguing that a radically naturalistic outlook fails to pay sufficient attention to some of the main lessons that philosophy of science has taught us concerning the nature of scientific theories. One of these lessons is that real scientific theories are far more normative than ordinary scientific naturalism is ready to accept, a circumstance that at a minimum is bound to force most naturalization strategies to re-define their significance.

scholarly journals Division, Syllogistic, and Science in Prior Analytics I.31

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Vlasits
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Logical System ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Systematic Classification ◽  
Critical Comparison ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
I 31

In the first book of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle sets out, for the first time in Greek philosophy, a logical system. After this, Aristotle compares this method with Plato’s method of division, a procedure designed to find essences of natural kinds through systematic classification. This critical comparison in APr I.31 raises an interpretive puzzle: how can Aristotle reasonably juxtapose two methods that differ so much in their aims and approach? What can be gained by doing so? Previous interpreters have failed to show how this comparison is legitimate or what important point Aristotle is making. The goal of this paper is to resolve the puzzle. In resolving this puzzle we not only learn more about the relationship between division and the syllogistic in Aristotle. We will also learn something about the motivation for the syllogistic itself, by seeing the role that it plays in his philosophy of science.

Camera and Mind

2008 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josh Ellenbogen
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Conceptual Model ◽  
Alternative Model ◽  
Scientific Representation ◽  
Late Nineteenth Century ◽  
Late Nineteenth

This article examines the standards of adequacy and utility that informed Etienne-Jules Marey's use of photography. It argues that Marey's work poses challenges to the analytic tools that scholars often use to theorize photography's role in scientific representation and attempts to establish an alternative conceptual model for understanding Marey's endeavor. Rooted in late nineteenth-century philosophy of science, this alternative model is meant to have a wider application to photographic projects of the fin de sièècle.

scholarly journals Making it count. An inferentialist account of computer simulation

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaakko Kuorikoski ◽  
Samuli Reijula
Keyword(s):  
Computer Simulation ◽  
Modeling And Simulation ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Computer Simulations ◽  
Simulation Modeling ◽  
Scientific Representation ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
Scientific Experimentation ◽  
The World

The dual problems of how an idealized model can represent and provide information about its target have become a central topic of in the philosophy of science. We argue that several current views are misguided in assuming that the epistemology of modeling and simulation must build on a philosophical theory of the representation relation (e.g. isomorphism, similarity). We extend Robert Brandom’s inferentialist account of meaning into scientific representation to argue that representational language is explicatory, not explanatory, in nature. We provide a broader philosophical rationale for inferential accounts of scientific representation, and an epistemologically modest account of the role of models in terms of inferential scorekeeping. We apply these views to the contested case of computer simulations to argue that, although the praxis of simulation modeling resembles that of scientific experimentation, simulations alone cannot lead to genuinely novel discoveries about the world, as they are merely tools for keeping our reasoning straight.

scholarly journals Toward Pragmatically Naturalized Transcendental Philosophy of Scientific Inquiry And Pragmatic Scientific Realism

2013 ◽  
pp. 79-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sami Pihlström
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Scientific Representation ◽  
Scientific Practices

This paper seeks to show that the turn toward local scientific practices in the philosophy of science is not a turn away from transcendental investigations. On the contrary, a pragmatist approach can very well be (re)connected with Kantian transcendental examination of the necessary conditions for the possibility of scientific representation and cognition, insofar as the a priori conditions that transcendental philosophy of science examines are understood as historically relative and thus potentially changing. The issue of scientific realism will be considered from this perspective, with special emphasis on Thomas Kuhn's conception of paradigms as frameworks making truth-valued scientific statements possible and on Charles S. Peirce's realism about "real generals". 

An AI-Based Philosophy of Science

1990 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-275
Author(s):  
William Bechtel
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science
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