Supply Chain Design Optimization Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness Under Carbon Tax Regulation

2020 ◽  
pp. 81-92
Author(s):  
Zhimiao Tao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Design Optimization ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Supply Chain Design ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Tax Regulation

scholarly journals Mixed Carbon Policies Based on Cooperation of Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chain

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongwei Cheng ◽  
Dong Mu ◽  
Yi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
High Strength ◽  
Optimal Level ◽  
Carbon Market ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Policy ◽  
Carbon Reduction

This paper established cooperation decision model for a mixed carbon policy of carbon trading-carbon tax (environmental tax) in a two-stageS-Msupply chain. For three different cooperative abatement situations, we considered the supplier driven model, the manufacturer driven model, and the equilibrium game model. We investigated the influence of mixed carbon policy with constraint of reduction targets on supply chain price, productivity, profits, carbon emissions reduction rate, and so on. The results showed that (1) high-strength carbon policies do not necessarily encourage enterprises to effectively reduce emissions, and increasing market acceptance of low carbon products or raising the price of carbon quota can promote the benign reduction; (2) perfect competitive carbon market has a higher carbon reduction efficiency than oligarch carbon market, but their optimal level of cooperation is the same and the realized reduction rate is in line with the intensity of carbon policy; (3) the policy sensitivity of the carbon trading mechanism is stronger than the carbon tax; “paid quota mechanism” can subsidize the cost of abatement and improve reduction initiative. Finally, we use a numerical example to solve the optimal decisions under different market situations, validating the effectiveness of model and the conclusions.

scholarly journals Low Carbon Economic Production Quantity Model for Imperfect Quality Deteriorating Items

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Y Daryanto ◽  
H.M. Wee
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Secondary Market ◽  
Deteriorating Items ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Economic Production Quantity ◽  
Work In Process ◽  
Economic Production ◽  
Production Quantity ◽  
Tax Regulation

This paper presents an economic production quantity (EPQ) model for deteriorating items with a certain percentage of defective products due to an imperfect process. The defective products are sold to a secondary market at a discount price. Due to environmental concern and carbon tax regulation, the manufacturer incorporates the control of carbon emission cost into its decision model. Carbon emission cost is a function of electricity consumption during production and inventory storage; it is also dependent on the carbon tax rate. Since the production process results in work-in-process inventory and carbon emission, the study tries to optimize the throughput time. We also examine the effect of carbon tax regulation on the potential emission reduction from the developed deteriorating item model. A numerical example and sensitivity analysis have been provided, and the result confirms the influence of carbon tax regulation in reducing carbon emission.

scholarly journals The Farmers’ Channel Selection and Sustainable Analysis under Carbon Tax Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 2765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cong Zheng ◽  
Quangui Pang ◽  
Tianpei Li ◽  
Guizheng Wang ◽  
Yiji Cai ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Product Yield ◽  
Channel Selection ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Deterioration Rate ◽  
Dual Channels ◽  
The Government

This paper examines a farmer’s channel selection in a supply chain led by a retailer, considering carbon emissions and products’ deterioration. Three channels—online channels, retail channels, and dual channels—are proposed. The inventory model of perishable products and the two-stage Stackelberg game model are used to illustrate the operational process. To compare performances of the three channel structures, we further determine the critical points consisting of the profits and the carbon emissions among these channels. The results provide useful insights for supply chain members and the government. Farmers can choose a channel to optimize profit with respect to deterioration rate and product yield, but it might conflict with the aim of least carbon emissions. When the deterioration rate is high, the online channel is not a suitable choice. For the government, the carbon tax contributes to the reduction of carbon emissions, but it also leads to the loss of the farmer’s profit. Additionally, numerical results further illustrate that, from the perspective of the government, transporting and inventory processes are two major sources of emissions, and it is essential to implement carbon tax and exploit low-carbon transportation.

scholarly journals Research on Intelligent Decision of Low Carbon Supply Chain Based on Carbon Tax Constraints in Human-Driven Edge Computing

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 48264-48273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheng Liu ◽  
Bin Hu ◽  
Yuanjun Zhao ◽  
Lingling Lang ◽  
Hangxin Guo ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Edge Computing ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Intelligent Decision

scholarly journals A Multistage Sustainable Production–Inventory Model with Carbon Emission Reduction and Price-Dependent Demand under Stackelberg Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (14) ◽  
pp. 4878
Author(s):  
Chi-Jie Lu ◽  
Tian-Shyug Lee ◽  
Ming Gu ◽  
Chih-Te Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Inventory Model ◽  
Sustainable Production ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Production Inventory ◽  
Dependent Demand ◽  
Tax Regulation

This paper investigated a multistage sustainable production–inventory model for deteriorating items (i.e., raw materials and finished goods) with price-dependent demand and collaborative carbon reduction technology investment under carbon tax regulation. The model was developed by first defining the total profit of the supply chain members under carbon tax regulation and, second, considering a manufacturer (leader)–retailer (follower) Stackelberg game. The optimal equilibrium solutions that maximize the manufacturer’s and retailer’s total profits were determined through the method analysis. An algorithm complemented the model to determine the optimal equilibrium solutions, which were then treated with sensitivity analyses for the major parameters. Based on the numerical analysis, (a) carbon tax policies help reduce carbon emissions for both the manufacturer and retailer; (b) most carbon emissions from supply chain operations negatively impact the total profits of both members; (c) the retailer may increase the optimal equilibrium selling price to respond to an increase in carbon emissions from supply chain operations or carbon tax; and (d) autonomous consumption positively affects both members’ optimal equilibrium policies and total profits, whereas induced consumption does the opposite. These findings are very managerial and instructive for companies seeking profits and fulfilling environmental responsibility and governments.

scholarly journals Effects of Government Subsidies on Production and Emissions Reduction Decisions under Carbon Tax Regulation and Consumer Low-Carbon Awareness

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (20) ◽  
pp. 10959
Author(s):  
Weiling Wang ◽  
Yongjian Wang ◽  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Dalin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
The Government ◽  
Tax Regulation

To promote low-carbon production, the government simultaneously provides some subsidies under carbon tax regulations. Two government subsidies are widely adopted: one is based on emissions reduction quantity and the other is based on emissions reduction investment cost. Additionally, consumer low-carbon awareness has also been enhanced. Considering the aforementioned circumstances, this paper investigates the effects of different government subsidies on production and emissions reduction decisions under a carbon tax regulation by formulating three decision-making optimization models. The results show that (1) although the carbon tax regulation cannot guarantee further improvement of emissions reduction levels, government subsidies could make the corresponding conditions of improving emissions reduction investments wider; (2) a heavy carbon tax or stronger consumer low-carbon awareness would make the positive effect of government subsidies more apparent; and (3) subsidy policies may also be selected by the government from different perspectives, such as manufacturer development, consumer surplus, environmental damage and social welfare. Especially, from the perspective of maximizing social welfare, investment cost (IC) subsidy is not always advantageous, while emissions reduction (ER) subsidy can always bring higher social welfare compared with the case under no government subsidy.

scholarly journals Impact of Asymmetric Carbon Information on Supply Chain Decisions under Low-Carbon Policies

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Yang ◽  
Jingna Ji ◽  
Chenshi Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
High Carbon ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Asymmetric Carbon

Through the establishment of the leading manufacturer Stackelberg game model under asymmetric carbon information, this paper investigates the misreporting behaviors of the supply chain members and their influences on supply chain performance. Based on “Benchmarking” allocation mechanism, three policies are considered: carbon emission trading, carbon tax, and a new policy which combined carbon quota and carbon tax mechanism. The results show that, in the three models, the leader in the supply chain, even if he has advantages of carbon information, will not lie about his information. That is because the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior has no effect on supply chain members’ performance. But the retailer will lie about the information when he has carbon information advantage. The high-carbon-emission retailers under the carbon trading policy, all the retailers under the carbon tax policy, and the high-carbon-emission retailers under combined quotas and tax policy would like to understate their carbon emissions. Coordination of revenue sharing contract is studied in supply chain to induce the retailer to declare his real carbon information. Optimal contractual parameters are deduced in the three models, under which the profit of the supply chain can be maximized.

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