scholarly journals Effects of Government Subsidies on Production and Emissions Reduction Decisions under Carbon Tax Regulation and Consumer Low-Carbon Awareness

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (20) ◽  
pp. 10959
Author(s):  
Weiling Wang ◽  
Yongjian Wang ◽  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Dalin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
The Government ◽  
Tax Regulation

To promote low-carbon production, the government simultaneously provides some subsidies under carbon tax regulations. Two government subsidies are widely adopted: one is based on emissions reduction quantity and the other is based on emissions reduction investment cost. Additionally, consumer low-carbon awareness has also been enhanced. Considering the aforementioned circumstances, this paper investigates the effects of different government subsidies on production and emissions reduction decisions under a carbon tax regulation by formulating three decision-making optimization models. The results show that (1) although the carbon tax regulation cannot guarantee further improvement of emissions reduction levels, government subsidies could make the corresponding conditions of improving emissions reduction investments wider; (2) a heavy carbon tax or stronger consumer low-carbon awareness would make the positive effect of government subsidies more apparent; and (3) subsidy policies may also be selected by the government from different perspectives, such as manufacturer development, consumer surplus, environmental damage and social welfare. Especially, from the perspective of maximizing social welfare, investment cost (IC) subsidy is not always advantageous, while emissions reduction (ER) subsidy can always bring higher social welfare compared with the case under no government subsidy.

scholarly journals Influence Mechanism on Supplier Emission Reduction Based on a Two-Level Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (23) ◽  
pp. 12439
Author(s):  
Lina Ma ◽  
Xinran Zhang ◽  
Yushen Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Impact ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Ghg Emissions ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Governmental Intervention ◽  
The Government ◽  
Reduction Effort ◽  
Better Than

The purpose of this paper is to investigate environmental performance of a supply chain which consists of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm. A mathematical model considering both downstream firm’s monitoring and governmental intervention is developed. Afterwards, a numerical example is presented to show the equilibriums of these models and the optimal choices of firms and government. The results show that when customers’ environmental awareness increases, both total environmental impact and social welfare decrease. The downstream firm’s monitoring will certainly reduce the total environmental impact. In most cases, it does not matter whether the downstream firm chooses to monitor the supplier or not, the total environmental impact and social welfare would not be affected when the government chooses subsidy. If a subsidy is present, firms and environment will be better than those without subsidy. Hence, the government is more likely to choose to provide subsidy and the downstream firm will not monitor the supplier’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction effort. In a few cases when environmental impact is too large, taxation may be the optimal choice for the government and the downstream firm will choose to monitor the supplier’s GHG emissions reduction investment.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution and Stability Analysis of Joint Distribution Alliance Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Under the Background of Green and Low-Carbon

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renbin Han ◽  
Mengke Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Environmental Benefit ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Government

Abstract Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieve high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low-carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of "government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B" tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that: (1) It is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out "free riding" and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

scholarly journals Low Carbon Economic Production Quantity Model for Imperfect Quality Deteriorating Items

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Y Daryanto ◽  
H.M. Wee
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Secondary Market ◽  
Deteriorating Items ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Economic Production Quantity ◽  
Work In Process ◽  
Economic Production ◽  
Production Quantity ◽  
Tax Regulation

This paper presents an economic production quantity (EPQ) model for deteriorating items with a certain percentage of defective products due to an imperfect process. The defective products are sold to a secondary market at a discount price. Due to environmental concern and carbon tax regulation, the manufacturer incorporates the control of carbon emission cost into its decision model. Carbon emission cost is a function of electricity consumption during production and inventory storage; it is also dependent on the carbon tax rate. Since the production process results in work-in-process inventory and carbon emission, the study tries to optimize the throughput time. We also examine the effect of carbon tax regulation on the potential emission reduction from the developed deteriorating item model. A numerical example and sensitivity analysis have been provided, and the result confirms the influence of carbon tax regulation in reducing carbon emission.

scholarly journals Analysis of China’s Carbon Emissions Base on Carbon Flow in Four Main Sectors: 2000–2013

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Li ◽  
Xiandan Cui ◽  
Minxi Wang
Keyword(s):  
Co2 Emissions ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Carbon Flow ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Energy Structure ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Coal Consumption ◽  
Co2 Intensity ◽  
Secondary Industry ◽  
The Government

Reducing carbon emissions is a major ways to achieving green development and sustainability for China’s future. This paper elaborates the detailed feature of China's carbon flow for 2013 with the carbon flow chart and gives changing characteristics of China's CO2 flow from the viewpoint of sector and energy during 2000 and 2013. The results show that (1) during 2000 to 2013, China's CO2 emissions with the approximately growth portion of 9% annually, while the CO2 intensity of China diminishes at different rates. (2) The CO2 emissions from secondary industry are prominent from the perspective of four main sectors accounting for 83.5%. The manufacturing play an important part in the secondary industry with 45%. In which the "smelting and pressing of metal" takes up a large percentage as about 50% in manufacturing. (3) The CO2 emissions produced by coal consumption is keep dominant in energy-related emissions with a contribution of 65%, while it will decrease in the future. (4) From the aspect of sector, the CO2 emissions mainly come from the "electricity and heating" sector and the "smelting and pressing of metals" sub-sector. While it is essential and urgent to propose concrete recommendations for CO2 emissions mitigation. Firstly, the progression of creative technology is inevitable and undeniable. Secondly, the government should make different CO2 emissions reduction policies among different sectors. For example, the process emission plays an important role in "non-metallic mineral" while in "smelting and manufacturing of metals" it is energy. Thirdly, the country can change the energy structure and promote renewable energy for powering by wind or other low-carbon energy. Besides it, the coke oven gas can be a feasible substitution. Finally, policy maker should be aware of the emissions from residents have been growing in a fast rate. It is effective to involve the public in the activity of energy conservation and carbon emissions reduction such as reducing the times of personal transportation.

scholarly journals The Farmers’ Channel Selection and Sustainable Analysis under Carbon Tax Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 2765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cong Zheng ◽  
Quangui Pang ◽  
Tianpei Li ◽  
Guizheng Wang ◽  
Yiji Cai ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Product Yield ◽  
Channel Selection ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Deterioration Rate ◽  
Dual Channels ◽  
The Government

This paper examines a farmer’s channel selection in a supply chain led by a retailer, considering carbon emissions and products’ deterioration. Three channels—online channels, retail channels, and dual channels—are proposed. The inventory model of perishable products and the two-stage Stackelberg game model are used to illustrate the operational process. To compare performances of the three channel structures, we further determine the critical points consisting of the profits and the carbon emissions among these channels. The results provide useful insights for supply chain members and the government. Farmers can choose a channel to optimize profit with respect to deterioration rate and product yield, but it might conflict with the aim of least carbon emissions. When the deterioration rate is high, the online channel is not a suitable choice. For the government, the carbon tax contributes to the reduction of carbon emissions, but it also leads to the loss of the farmer’s profit. Additionally, numerical results further illustrate that, from the perspective of the government, transporting and inventory processes are two major sources of emissions, and it is essential to implement carbon tax and exploit low-carbon transportation.

scholarly journals Information Investment and Sharing in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Government Subsidy and Consumer Preference for Energy-Saving Products

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jinxi Li ◽  
Yuyin Yi ◽  
Haishen Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
High Demand ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
The Government ◽  
Share Information

This study establishes a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer who invests in energy-saving products (ESPs) and one retailer who sells the products and may possess demand-forecast advantage. Considering government subsidy and consumer preference for ESPs and a random demand, we develop a four-stage Stackelberg game model to research the optimal strategies of the information investment and sharing of the retailer and the energy-saving R&D of the manufacturer. The results show the following: (1) When incurring a low information investment cost, the retailer is willing to invest in information acquisition techniques, while the retailer agreeing to share market information is related to the government subsidies and the probability of a high demand. The optimal strategy for the retailer is to share information when the probability of a high demand is less than 50% and the government subsidies for ESPs are high. Otherwise, the optimal strategy is not to share information. (2) The manufacturer not always expects the retailer to share information, which depends on the probability of a high demand and manufacturing cost. Especially, when the probability of a high demand is less than 50%, only a manufacturer incurring high cost will expect. (3) If the retailer refuses to share the information, the manufacturer can motivate the retailer to change his/her decision by sharing the information investment cost.

scholarly journals The Impact of Government Subsidies on the Low-Carbon Supply Chain Based on Carbon Emission Reduction Level

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (14) ◽  
pp. 7603
Author(s):  
Biao Li ◽  
Yong Geng ◽  
Xiqiang Xia ◽  
Dan Qiao
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

To improve low-carbon technology, the government has shifted its strategy from subsidizing low-carbon products (LCP) to low-carbon technology. To analyze the impact of government subsidies based on carbon emission reduction levels on different entities in the low-carbon supply chain (LCSC), game theory is used to model the provision of government subsidies to low-carbon enterprises and retailers. The main findings of the paper are that a government subsidy strategy based on carbon emission reduction levels can effectively drive low-carbon enterprises to further reduce the carbon emissions. The government’s choice of subsidy has the same effect on the LCP retail price per unit, the sales volume, and the revenue of low-carbon products per unit. When the government subsidizes the retailer, the low-carbon product wholesale price per unit is the highest. That is, low-carbon enterprises use up part of the government subsidies by increasing the wholesale price of low-carbon products. The retail price of low-carbon products per unit is lower than the retail price of low-carbon products in the context of decentralized decision making, but the sales volume and revenue of low-carbon products are greater in the centralized decision-making. The cost–benefit-sharing contract could enable the decentralized decision model to achieve the same level of profit as the centralized decision model.

The Thinking of Carbon Emissions Reduction Path under the Current Conditions of our Country - Based on the Comparison and Analysis of Carbon Trading and Carbon Tax

2013 ◽  
Vol 807-809 ◽  
pp. 1070-1074
Author(s):  
De Xin Guo ◽  
Qun Xu
Keyword(s):  
Fossil Fuels ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Internal Conflict ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Low Carbon Economy ◽  
Carbon Emissions Reduction ◽  
Global Transition

In the 21st century, with the increasingly serious global climate problems, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieve the global transition to a low-carbon economy, has gradually become the consensus of all countries in the world. And our country as the largest developing country and also is highly depend on fossil fuels, how to give attention to both promote the economic development, to meet people's growing material and cultural needs and protect the environment comprehensive energy conservation and emissions reduction between the internal conflict, is the problem which our country must seriously face and solve. This article will introduce the carbon trading and carbon tax and combined with the current China's national condition analysis the path choice of implementation of carbon emission reduction work in China.

The Effects of a Government’s Subsidy Program: Accessibility Beyond Affordability

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (7) ◽  
pp. 3211-3233
Author(s):  
Ping Xiao ◽  
Ruli Xiao ◽  
Yitian (Sky) Liang ◽  
Xinlei (Jack) Chen ◽  
Wei Lu
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Marketing Channel ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Subsidy Rate ◽  
Subsidy Program ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Rural consumers may face not only the challenge of affordability but also the problem of limited accessibility. Can a government’s subsidy program effectively address these issues? This paper examines the impact of a large-scale subsidy program, “Household electrical appliances going to the countryside,” offered by the Chinese government. The government regulation imposes a price subsidy combined with a price ceiling on products in the program. We consider two effects of the subsidy: the retail price is lowered to make the product more affordable to consumers, and manufacturers are encouraged to expand their distribution coverage to make products more accessible to consumers. We build a dynamic model of oligopoly to study how firms adjust their distribution coverage. Conditional on the model estimates, we evaluate the program’s effects on social welfare, consumer surplus, and firms’ market performance and marketing channel decisions through counterfactual analyses. We find that the subsidy program increases social welfare by CNY 0.209 billion, as a result of a subsidy expense of CNY 0.236 billion. When breaking down the impact, we find it increases consumer surplus by CNY 0.184 billion (50%), manufacturers’ profits by CNY 0.125 billion (53%), and manufacturers’ payoffs by CNY 2.5 million (17%). Specifically, 14% (13.2%) of the consumer surplus (firm profit) increases are from changes in distribution coverage, and the rest is from the subsidy (price changes). The program’s return of investment (i.e., social welfare minus subsidy expense), which is negative, however, could be improved by applying a relatively lower subsidy rate. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.

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